Carey

MEMORANDUM *

Jackson alleges that the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff’s due process claim was improper since there a liberty interest was at stake. We agree. The Supreme Court in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 , 125 S.Ct. 2384 , 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005), did not state that only indefinite transfers to security housing units implicate liberty interests, but that a transfer of thirty days or less did not implicate liberty interests. Plaintiff was kept in the security housing unit for five months, a significant amount of time. It is unclear whether a liberty interest is implicated by plaintiffs five month confinement *660 in the security housing unit. The District Court erred by granting summary judgment on plaintiffs due process claim.

Plaintiff also alleges that the District Court acted improperly in dismissing his case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. It is necessary that administrative remedies be properly exhausted before prisoners begin the appeals process. 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (e); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 , 126 S.Ct. 2378 , 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). However, plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies…

I agree that summary judgment was inappropriate on the issue of whether Jackson’s liberty interest was implicated by his confinement in the Security Housing Unit (SHU). However, as to the majority’s holding regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies, I respectfully dissent.

I would affirm the district court’s ruling that Jackson did not exhaust administrative remedies. To exhaust remedies properly, prisoners must comply with deadlines and other procedural requirements. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83 , 126 S.Ct. 2378 , 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). One purpose for the exhaustion requirement is to afford corrections officials “time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525 , 122 S.Ct. 983 , 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002); see Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 490-91 (7th Cir.2002) (requiring prisoner who was granted a transfer, but not actually transferred, to appeal such failure to transfer, stating that doing so would give the director “an opportunity to learn of possible infirmities in the prison grievance system and to correct any such infirmities”).

Jackson’s first grievance, which he fully…