Wu Chen v. Holder

MEMORANDUM *

Wu Chen, a native and citizen of China, petitions pro se for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) summarily affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Chen asserted past persecution and a fear of future persecution on account of his girlfriend’s underage pregnancy, which was in violation of China’s family planning policies. Without reaching the merits of Chen’s claim, the IJ denied relief on the ground that Chen’s testimony was not credible, and the BIA affirmed. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 .

When, as here, “the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ, we review the IJ’s decision as if it were that of the BIA.” Hoque v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir.2004). We review for substantial evidence the BIA’s adverse credibility finding, and will uphold the agency’s decision unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Singh v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir.2004). “While the substantial evidence standard demands deference to the IJ, we do not accept blindly an IJ’s conclusion that a petitioner is not…

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the decision to grant Chen’s petition because, in my view, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence and the record does not compel a contrary conclusion.

As the majority explains, we are reviewing the IJ’s decision as though it were the opinion of the BIA. See Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir.2003). In doing so, we must accept the IJ’s findings of fact unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 , 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812 , 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). This is an extremely deferential standard of review, and it is not enough that the evidence supports a contrary conclusion, or that we would have weighed the evidence differently. See id. To reverse the IJ’s findings, the evidence must be so overwhelming that “any reasonable adjudicator” would be compelled to reach a eon-trary conclusion. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4)(B). Even though the majority identifies problems with some of the IJ’s findings, the evidence, when viewed in its entirety, does not compel reversal.

Although the majority dismisses discrepancies in the evidence regarding Chen’s age…