Sheikh

dissenting.

We lack jurisdiction to review the immigration judge’s determination that Sheikh’s conviction under California Penal Code § 485 constituted a crime of moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2). Sheikh did not challenge the moral turpitude finding in his appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Rather, he acknowledged in his BIA notice of appeal that he had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. Because the moral turpitude issue is administratively unexhausted, we are without jurisdiction to address it. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir.2004).

Our jurisdiction is statutorily limited to the review of issues exhausted before the BIA. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (d)(1). The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to give the administrative agency “a full opportunity to resolve a controversy or correct its own errors before judicial intervention.” *701 Sagermark v. INS, 767 F.2d 645, 648 (9th Cir.1985). In order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must put the BIA on notice of the specific issue, so the BIA has an opportunity to address it. Figueroa v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir.2008).

Sheikh’s BIA notice of appeal identified…

MEMORANDUM **

Sajid Sheikh (“Sheikh”), a native and citizen of Pakistan, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his application for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(1). 1 *699 Because the BIA summarily affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision, we review the IJ’s decision as we would that of the BIA. Perez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir.2008). We grant the petition and remand.

The IJ found that Sheikh’s conviction for appropriation of lost property under Cal.Penal Code § 485 constituted a crime involving moral turpitude, and that, as a consequence, Sheikh was ineligible for cancellation of removal on two bases. First, the IJ found that Sheikh was ineligible because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, that was committed within five years of his date of admission. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2). Second, the IJ found that Sheikh was ineligible because his “continuous physical presence” ended when he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and therefore Sheikh could not establish continuous presence…