DISCUSSION

Standard of Review “In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated. [Citation.] We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial evidence standard. The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review. [Citation.]” (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 505.)

3 Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Denial of Heinrichs’s Motion to Suppress The Fourth Amendment’s proscription on unreasonable searches and seizures requires that an arrest be based on probable cause to believe a crime has been committed (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673), while a detention may be based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (Id. at p. 674.) A traffic stop based on a suspicion that the driver has committed a traffic infraction is an example of a brief investigatory detention, permissible to determine whether a crime has been committed. But an investigatory traffic stop must remain a relatively brief encounter. Absent indications of criminal activity beyond the initially observed infraction, officers may not extend a stop’s duration beyond the time necessary to address the traffic violation and attend to officer safety concerns. (Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 354 [191 L.Ed.2d 492].) During a stop, an officer is allowed to inquire into matters unrelated to the suspected traffic violation. (Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 555 U.S. 323, 333 [172 L.Ed.2d 694].) However, if those inquiries “measurably extend the duration of the stop,” it may become an unconstitutional seizure. (Ibid.) The trial court found that “when . . . Officer Siglin asked Mr. Heinrichs if he had any paraphernalia or illegal objects on him, there had been a passage of a total of I believe 45 seconds from when he received [the dispatch] information. I can’t find that that’s unreasonably prolonged. The officer has the right to ask that question. Mr. Heinrichs answered that question, and that, from that point forward, gave the officer further reason to go forward. In fact, it was less than another, I believe 40, 45 seconds before Mr. Heinrichs acknowledged that he actually had the drugs in the car. So I don’t believe the stop was unduly prolonged.”

4 We agree with Heinrichs that Officer Siglin’s question regarding whether he had any paraphernalia or illegal objects in the vehicle was unrelated to the issuance of a citation for the traffic infractions. But we cannot agree that the record shows that the question measurably extended the traffic stop’s duration. It is undisputed the police were entitled to wait until dispatch advised whether Heinrichs had any warrants or probation referrals. Officer Siglin’s body camera video confirms that his inquiry to Heinrichs occurred in even less than the 45 seconds found by the trial court. Siglin concluded his transmission with dispatch, turned to Heinrich and asked him whether he had any paraphernalia or illegal objects. Heinrichs admitted to having “a pipe or two.” The exchange took only a few seconds. Such a brief continued detention beyond the period needed to check for warrants and probation was not unreasonable.

DISPOSITION

The order denying the motion to suppress evidence is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.*

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P.J. BALTODANO, J.

*Judge of the Ventura Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California constitution.

5 Timothy S. Covello, Judge Dodie A. Harman, Judge Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo ______________________________

Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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