MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING IN REM RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY

A hearing was held at the above-referenced time and place on the motion of Ocean II, LLC (the “Movant”) for relief from the automatic stay (dkt. 95) (the “Motion”) and other papers filed in relation thereto (dkt. 116 and 127). Appearances were as noted on the record.

Based on (i) the foregoing papers, (ii) the bankruptcy schedules (“Schedules”) and Statement Of Financial Affairs (“SOFA”) (dkt. 1) filed by the above captioned debtor(s) (“Debtor”), (iii) the proof of service included in the Motion papers showing service on the owner/borrower listed in the loan documents (the “Owner”), and (iv) the other documents and records in this case and the arguments and evidence presented at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

A. Findings of Fact

This case matches the profile of certain other cases that have come before the Court:

(1) In violation of the loan documents, an interest in the subject property purportedly was transferred to Debtor.

(2) Movant has presented sufficient evidence, including the following, to establish that the purported transfer was part of a “scheme” to delay or hinder Movant’s remedies against the property by implicating *711 the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) in Debtor’s bankruptcy case:

(3) Movant has not established that Debtor was part of such scheme 1 because on the present record:

(4) If Movant intended to seek a specific finding of this Court that Debtor was part of the scheme, the Motion papers and the facts and circumstances described above did not sufficiently notify Debtor of that possibility, and therefore Debtor had insufficient notice of any reason to oppose the Motion.

B. Conclusions of Law

Based on the foregoing facts, although it is not appropriate to find that Debtor participated in the scheme, it is appropriate to grant relief of the type set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d)(4) (“in rem” relief), for the following reasons.

(1) Relief is appropriate under 11 U.S.C. § 364 (d)(4) because, as of the time when the scheme was implemented, the debtor’s “filing of the petition was part of a scheme [by Transferor ] to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors” ( 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d)(4)). In other words, I interpret the term “was” as descriptive of the type of scheme (a scheme that involves the fact that filing the petition created an automatic stay), rather than as a temporal limitation intended by Congress to exclude schemes that are implemented post-petition. Compare In re Scarborough, 461 F.3d 406, 411 (3d Cir.2006) (interpreting the word “is” in 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (b)(2) as *712 descriptive, not temporal); In re Abdelgadir, 455 B.R. 896, 902-03 (9th Cir. BAP 2011) (same, under 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (b)(5)).

(2) Alternatively, the same in rem relief is warranted on two alternative grounds: the Court’s inherent authority, or the plain meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 105 (a).

(3) To the extent, if any, that Movant seeks any other extraordinary relief, such as relief against third parties without any notice (“Extraordinary Relief’), Movant has not provided sufficient legal authority or factual basis for such relief.

(4) Movant has established sufficient cause to waive the 14 day stay under Fed. R. Bankr.P. 4001(a)(3).

C. Conclusion

A separate order will be issued, concurrent with this Memorandum Decision, granting Movant relief from the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a), including in rem relief as described above.

. I make no finding regarding that issue one way or the other.