MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Before the Court is the motion of Defendant Cathay Bank (the “Bank”) which is represented by attorney Christopher Cro- *286 well, to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff Nobel Group, Inc. (“Debtor”), represented by attorney Wayne Silver, opposes the motion. This Court issued a Tentative Decision on December 11, 2014 and, at a hearing on the same date, heard arguments of the parties. After considering the parties’ arguments and reviewing applicable case law, for the reasons explained below, the Court grants the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. FACTS

Debtor’s Chapter 11 Plan (the “Plan”) was confirmed on February 4, 2014. Prior to confirmation, the Debtor sold the real property at 2585 El Camino Real, Santa Clara, CA (the “Property”) and paid off the Bank’s filed claim ($3,108,781.73) in full. The Bank’s escrow demand of $3,380,105 included approximately $250,000 in default interest charged between November 2009 and August 2011. Debtor disputed the default interest but agreed to pay the entire amount so the sale could close, reserving its right to challenge the additional amounts after the sale, post-confirmation. Debtor reserved $25,000 of sale proceeds as an estimate of attorney’s fees and costs the Bank might incur in litigating the dispute regarding the escrow demand. The Plan was confirmed over the Bank’s objection on the basis that:

(Oral ruling, 1/27/14).

A. The Plan

The Plan expressly reserves Debtor’s “right to dispute the amount paid and seek a refund of any excess payment, and object to any amended Proof of Claim filed by CATHAY BANK.” (¶4.4). The Plan further provides a deadline for objections to claims of 30 days after the Effective Date or 30 days after a proof of claim has been filed and served (¶ 6.3).

Article VIII of the Plan further provides that all causes of action held by Debtor and/or the estate on the petition date shall be transferred to the Reorganized Debtor, including “all claims against Creditors of the Debtor, including claims for overpayment from the sale of the 2585 Property.... The Reorganized Debtor shall have all rights to commence and pursue any and all Causes of Action, ... in any court or other tribunal, including without limitation, in an adversary proceeding filed in the Bankruptcy Court.”

Article IX, Retention of Jurisdiction, provides:

As set forth above, the Plan clearly envisions that the Debtor and the Bank will litigate the Debtor’s claims to the disputed funds in the bankruptcy court. The Bank did not object to any of these Plan provisions. It did not raise any of the current jurisdictional arguments until after the Plan had been confirmed.

The Bank did not file an amended proof of claim. Nevertheless, the parties stipulated to extend the deadline for Debtor to object to the Bank’s claim to May 21, 2014. On May 20, 2014, Debtor filed an objection to the Bank’s claim. A hearing was scheduled for July 10, 2014, and then continued to September 4, 2014. Prior to the continued hearing, on August 28, 2014, the parties filed a joint status conference statement indicating that Debtor would be filing an adversary proceeding within the next 10 days. The matter was taken off calendar. This adversary proceeding was filed October 2, 2014, approximately one month later.

On August 28, 2014, Debtor’s counsel filed a letter in the main case (docket no. 335) stating that the Plan had been substantially consummated and that Debtor had paid $1,520,755 to allowed claims under the Plan. The letter further states: “All administrative, priority, and unsecured claims have been paid under the Plan, and Class 7 Investor Claims have been paid a dividend of approximately 80%.” The letter also states that there are two unresolved matters concerning secured creditors, including the dispute with the Bank. At the December 11, 2014 hearing, Debtor’s counsel stated that claims in subordinate classes (ie., insiders) had not yet been paid.

B. The Complaint

The complaint contains three claims: breach of contract, declaratory relief, and objection to claim based on the Bank’s charging of approximately $250,000 of default interest on the debt owed to it from November 2009 and August 2011, after the loan had matured and the Property had been placed into receivership, and before the Bank had obtained an order in this case granting relief from stay.

The Complaint alleges:

With respect to the First Claim for Relief for Breach of Contract, the Complaint further alleges:

The Complaint prays for the following relief: (1) judgment in an amount to be proven at trial for the default interest and attorneys’ fees paid to Cathay in connection with its escrow demand; (2) a declaration that Cathay was not entitled to default interest or attorneys’ fees and an order of restitution of the amounts overpaid; (3) an order sustaining Nobel’s objection Cathay’s claim; and (4) costs and attorneys’ fees.

C. Motion to Dismiss

The Bank moves to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, the Bank asks the Court to abstain from hearing the claims. The Bank also seeks dismissal of the second and third claims (for declaratory relief and objection to claim) on the grounds that those claims are dupli-cative of the breach of contract claim. With respect to the claim for declaratory relief, the Bank also asserts that Debtor may not seek restitution where a valid express contract covers the subject matter of the dispute. Regarding the third claim for objection to claim, the Bank asserts that the claim is time-barred.

The Bank also contends that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the first and second claims for relief, and should permissively abstain from hearing the entire case.

II. ANALYSIS

Post-confirmation bankruptcy court jurisdiction is limited to matters that affect the interpretation, implementation, consummation, execution, or administration of the confirmed plan. In re Resorts Int’l, Inc., 372 F.3d 154 , 168-69 (3d Cir.2004). This so-called “close nexus” test has been adopted and applied in the Ninth Circuit. In re Pegasus Gold Corporation, 394 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir.2005); In re Wilshire Courtyard, 729 F.3d 1279, 1287 (9th Cir.2013). “The close nexus test recognizes the limited nature of post-confirmation jurisdiction but retains a certain flexibility.” Pegasus Gold, 394 F.3d at 1194 . The close nexus test requires “particularized consideration of the facts and posture of the each case, as the test contemplates a broad set of sufficient conditions and retains . a certain flexibility.” Wilshire Courtyard, 729 F.3d at 1289 .

In Resorts Int’l, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit examined the extent of a bankruptcy court’s post-confirmation jurisdiction. The court noted that after confirmation of a reorganization plan, retention of bankruptcy court jurisdiction may be problematic. This is because once a plan is confirmed, the debtor-in-possession becomes the reorganized debtor, and, as a general rule, the bankruptcy estate ceases to exist. Therefore, the traditional test for “related to” jurisdiction — whether the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy — could not be met. Resorts Int’l, 372 F.3d at 164-65 (citing Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.1984)).

Resorts Int’l, 372 F.3d at 165 (citations omitted).

Because bankruptcy court jurisdiction is conferred by statute, parties to litigation cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction where none exists.

Resorts Int’l, 372 F.3d at 161(citations omitted). See also In re Captain Blythers, Inc., 311 B.R. 530, 538 (9th Cir. BAP 2004), aff'd, 182 Fed.Appx. 708 (9th Cir.2006); In re 350 Encinitas Investments, LLC, 2007 WL 2669546 , at *6 (S.D.Cal. Sept. 6, 2007), aff'd, 313 Fed.Appx. 70 (9th Cir.2009); United States v. Bond, 762 F.3d 255, 261 (2d Cir.2014); In re Washington Mutual, Inc., 2012 WL 4755209 (Bankr. D.Del. Oct. 4, 2012) (citing Resorts Int’l, 372 F.3d at 169; In re BWI Liquidating Corp., 437 B.R. 160,166 (Bankr.D.Del.2010); In re The Fairchild Corp., 452 B.R. 525, 532 (Bankr.D.Del.2011)); Quincy Medical Center v. Gupta, 2015 WL 58633 , at *4 (D.Mass. Jan. 5, 2015); In re Angel Fire Corp., 2012 WL 5880675 , at *4-5 (Bankr.D.N.M. Nov. 20, 2012) (citing Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 , 102 S.Ct. 2099 , 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982) (holding that no action of the parties can confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a federal court, thus the consent of the parties is irrelevant)).

Although the question of subject matter jurisdiction is to be decided on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case, Wilshire Courtyard, 729 F.3d at 1289 , it is helpful to examine the cases to get a sense of the circumstances under which courts have analyzed whether a bankruptcy court had post-confirmation jurisdiction. The Court has reviewed a number of these cases. As a general rule, the eases where a close nexus was found involved a situation where resolution of the dispute would require the bankruptcy court to interpret or enforce a provision of the confirmed plan. See, e.g., Pegasus Gold, 394 F.3d at 1194 (“Resolution of these claims will likely require interpretation of the Zortman Agreement and the Plan.”); Wilshire Courtyard, 729 F.3d at 1289 (“the ultimate merits question depends in part on the interpretation of the confirmed Plan.”). Additionally, in Wilshire Courtyard , the resolution of the claims required applica *292 tion of a federal bankruptcy statute, 11 U.S.C. § 346 . Id. at 1290-91 .

Cases where courts found that the close nexus test was not met include Resorts Inti There, nearly seven years after confirmation of the plan, the trustee of a litigation trust formed pursuant to the confirmed plan filed a malpractice claim against the accountants for the litigation trust. In determining that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that

Resorts Int'l, 372 F.3d at 169.

In In re Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass’n, Inc., 439 F.3d 545 (9th Cir.2006), the Court of Appeals found that the close nexus test was not met where the post-dismissal determination of liability between a creditor and the state of Alaska “could not conceivably alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action or in any way impact upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.” Id. at 547- 48.

The retention of jurisdiction provisions in the Plan clearly indicate that the parties intend and agree to resolve the instant dispute in this Court. Additionally, the Plan expressly provides for recovery of the alleged overpayment to the Bank and provides that the Plan will be funded in part through recoveries on “Causes of Action,” which includes the instant claims. However, under the authorities cited above, these provisions do not confer jurisdiction over this dispute in the bankruptcy court. Indeed, they can be given little weight, as they are only effective if the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction in the first instance.

The Court finds that the resolution of this dispute does not affect the interpretation, implementation, consummation, execution, or administration of the confirmed plan. First, the issues in the adversary proceeding do not require the Court to interpret the plan. Second, by the Debt- or’s own admission, the Plan has been substantially consummated, notwithstanding the.fact that subordinated classes have yet to be paid. Third, the issues in the adversary proceeding arise solely under state law. Despite Debtor’s characterization of its third claim for relief as an objection to claim, there is no claim to object to. The Bank’s filed claim has been paid in full; the Bank never amended its claim. As far as the bankruptcy estate is concerned, the Bank’s claim no longer exists.

The Debtor’s Plan has not been fully consummated. This Court has found no cases that illuminate exactly what level of “consummation” or “execution” would suffice to confer subject matter jurisdiction. The only way the Court could find a close nexus exists in this case is through a broad interpretation of those terms, which is not supported in the existing case law. Because the Plan provides for partial funding via any funds recovered from the lawsuit between Debtor and the Bank, this reasonably could be construed as part of the consummation or execution of the Plan. *293 However, the recovery of overpayment to the Bank is not a primary or major component of the Plan. Additionally and importantly, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that even if a dispute could potentially increase recovery to creditors, that is not a basis for finding that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Pegasus Gold, 394 F.3d at 1194 n. 1 (“[W]e are not persuaded ... that jurisdiction lies because the action could conceivably increase the recovery to creditors .... such a rationale could endlessly stretch a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.”) (citing Resorts Int’l, 372 F.3d at 170; In re Craig’s Stores of Texas, Inc., 266 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir.2001)).

For these reasons, the Court finds that under the close nexus test, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims in this adversary proceeding. This is not a situation where this Court has any discretion in the matter. Therefore, the Court need not address the Bank’s remaining arguments.

Counsel for the Bank may submit a proposed form of order dismissing the adversary proceeding.

IT IS SO ORDERED.