Marvin Walker v. Michael Martel

Warden Michael Martel appeals the district court’s grant of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to Petitioner-Appellee Marvin Walker. During just one month in 1979, Walker committed two armed robberies in San Jose, California, in which he shot and attempted to kill'four people. He shot most of the victims in the head, killing a 15-year-old boy and permanently injuring the three remaining individuals. Three weeks after the second robbery, Walker sold the murder weapon to a police officer who had been working undercover purchasing stolen property. Walker told the officer that the gun had been in his possession for months, had made him a lot of money over the last six months, and “had done a murder.”

He was convicted of first-degree murder, three counts of assault with intent to commit murder and other charges, and sentenced to death in 1980. During his trial, the sheriffs office placed a knee restraint on one of Walker’s legs under his pants. It is undisputed that several members of the jury became aware of it. Jurors noticed the restraint during trial because it made Walker limp to and from the witness stand when he testified during both the guilt and penalty phase. No…

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur in the majority’s holding that the state court reasonably concluded that a jury would not have acquitted Walker if counsel for Walker had with success objected to the shackle. We presume that juries follow instructions that are given, see Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 , 120 S.Ct. 727 , 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000), and here, even if the evidence had been presented without Walker shackled, I cannot see any likelihood that a responsible jury would have acquitted Walker. The evidence of his role in perpetrating armed robberies, with a philosophy to leave no witnesses, a murder, several attempted murders, and a serious sexual and physical assault on a young woman was just too strong to think that he was convicted because he was shackled.

But I depart from the majority’s holding that the California Supreme Court reasonably decided that counsel’s deficiency did not prejudice Walker in the penalty phase. The reason here too rests on the premise that juries follow the instructions given them. See id. In the penalty phase, the jury was instructed that it could implement the mercy of life imprisonment rather than death based on…

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARVIN PETE WALKER, No. 11-99006 Petitioner-Appellee, D.C. No. v. 4:94-cv-01997-

SBA

MICHAEL MARTEL, Warden, Respondent-Appellant. OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Saundra B. Armstrong, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 4, 2012—San Francisco, California

Filed March 7, 2013

Before: Barry G. Silverman, Susan P. Graber, and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Silverman; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Gould WALKER V . MARTEL

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty

The panel reversed the district court’s grant of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging a conviction and capital sentence for murder and related crimes.

Petitioner Walker contended that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the use of a knee restraint on one of Walker’s legs under his pants, which jurors noticed because it made Walker limp. The panel held that, under Strickland v. Washington,…