P.

Defendant Mildred Delgado was convicted of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) 1 and kidnapping for purposes of robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)), on evidence from which a jury could have determined an accomplice, rather than defendant, personally performed the act of asportation necessary to the offense of kidnapping. He contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct, sua sponte, on the law of accomplice liability. We conclude the court was required to instruct on aiding and abetting liability as a general legal principle raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 265 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827 , 926 P.2d 1013 ].)

*484 We also conclude the error was harmless. The jury was fully instructed on the elements of kidnapping for robbery, including asportation, and found those elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Instructions on the liability of an aider and abettor would merely have provided additional theories of defendant’s liability; their absence could not have prejudiced defendant. Moreover, the circumstantial evidence defendant was working with the apparent accomplice to kidnap and rob the victim…

At defendant’s jury trial for the crime of kidnapping for robbery (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)), 1 the prosecution’s evidence showed that defendant personally robbed but did not personally kidnap the victim; rather, he aided and abetted the kidnapper. The trial court did not, however, instruct the jury on the law of aiding and abetting, but only on the liability of a direct perpetrator for the crime of kidnapping for robbery, of which defendant was later convicted.

Like the majority, I conclude that the trial court’s omission of aiding and abetting instructions was error but harmless. But unlike the majority, I am of the view that the error violated the federal Constitution, thus requiring reversal of defendant’s conviction unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not, as I conclude, contribute to the jury’s verdict. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ] (Chapman).) In contrast, the majority views the error as violating only state law, in which case the inquiry is whether a reasonable probability existed that the error affected the trial’s outcome (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]), a…

Filed 4/4/

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, )

) Plaintiff and Respondent, ) S192704 ) v. ) Ct.App. 2/1 B220174 ) MILDRED DELGADO, ) Los Angeles County ) Super. Ct. Nos. Defendant and Appellant. ) BA337662/BA348502 ____________________________________)

Defendant Mildred Delgado was convicted of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)1 and kidnapping for purposes of robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)), on evidence from which a jury could have determined an accomplice, rather than defendant, personally performed the act of asportation necessary to the offense of kidnapping. He contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct, sua sponte, on the law of accomplice liability. We conclude the court was required to instruct on aiding and abetting liability as a general legal principle raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury‟s understanding of the case. (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 265.) We also conclude the error was harmless. The jury was fully instructed on the elements…