P.

BACKGROUND

In March 2000, defendant Jose Leiva was charged with breaking into several cars and stealing property from them. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pleaded no contest to three counts of burglary of a vehicle. (§ 459.) On April 11, 2000, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for a period of three years, which meant that probation would expire on April 11, 2003. Included in the terms and conditions of probation were orders that defendant report to his probation officer within one business day of his release from custody and not reenter the country illegally if he left voluntarily or was deported. Because defendant was not a legal resident of the United States, he was deported to El Salvador on the day he was released from jail. On September 21, 2001, defendant failed to appear at a scheduled probation violation hearing based on an allegation that he had failed to report to the probation department. The trial court summarily revoked defendant‟s probation based on the failure to report and issued a bench warrant for defendant‟s arrest. It appears that neither the probation department nor the trial court knew that the reason…

*502 Opinion

At the relevant times, Penal Code former section 1203.2, subdivision (a) (as amended by Stats. 1989, ch. 1319, § 1, p. 5305), 1 provided, in part, that the revocation of probation, “summary or otherwise, shall serve to toll the running of the probationary period.” We granted review to resolve whether, once probation has been summarily revoked, this tolling provision permits a trial court to find a violation of probation and then reinstate or terminate probation based solely on conduct that occurred after the court-imposed period of probation had elapsed. For the reasons stated below, we hold that section 1203.2, subdivision (a)’s (section 1203.2(a)) tolling provision preserves the trial court’s authority to adjudicate, in a subsequent formal probation violation hearing, whether the probationer violated probation during, but not after, the court-imposed probationary period.

BACKGROUND

In March 2000, defendant Jose Leiva was charged with breaking into several cars and stealing property from them. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pleaded no contest to three counts of burglary of a vehicle. (§ 459.) On April 11, 2000, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence…

Penal Code former section 1203.2, subdivision (a) provided that a summary revocation of probation “shall serve to toll the running of the probationary period.” The majority holds that this provision, not substantively changed under current law, merely preserved the court’s authority to adjudicate, in a hearing under Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ] and People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 305 , 503 P.2d 1313 ] (Morrissey/Vickers hearing) held after the original imposed term of probation, whether a summary revocation entered during the original probationary term was validly based on an actual violation of probation committed during that time. Thus, the majority concludes, the tolling provision does not permit a court to determine, in a Morrissey/Vickers hearing following a summary revocation, that *519 the probationer committed a violation of probation after the originally imposed period of probation had lapsed. The majority applies this rule to a probationer who (1) was deported in 2001, one year after he received a three-year probationary term and served a county jail term as a condition thereof; (2) had his probation…