Hildebrand

MEMORANDUM **

1. The district court did not err in denying the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in John Hildebrand’s habeas petition. Even if counsel had successfully introduced all the potential impeachment evidence, Hildebrand cannot demonstrate a “reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The tape recording, combined with the testimony of three separate women all identifying an almost identical pattern of sexual misconduct, eliminate any possibility of prejudice. Thus, we need not even consider whether his counsel reasonably decided not to investigate these matters more thoroughly than he did. See Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir.2002). For the same reasons, Hildebrand is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, as such an entitlement arises only if his “allegations, if proved, would entitle him to relief.” Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir.1992) (citation omitted).

2. In Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 , 75 n. 5, 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) the United States Supreme Court explicitly “express[ed] no…