Myron

MEMORANDUM *

Myron appeals from the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of six of his claims and from summary judgment on his two remaining claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We affirm in part, reverse in part, dismiss in part, and remand.

I.

The district court dismissed most of Myron’s first claim and held that because Myron’s challenges regarding “overcrowding and understaffing” and “oppressive cell conditions” did not allege physical injury, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) barred the claims entirely. However, in Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir.2002), we ruled that section 1997e(e) only restricts the availability of certain types of relief (monetary damages in some instances), while leaving open the possibility of nominal and punitive damages. We held that section 1997e(e) did not bar claims entirely, but merely restricted the available types of relief. Id.

The district court therefore erroneously dismissed much of Myron’s first claim. We reverse that ruling and remand. As such, Myron’s as-applied Eighth Amendment challenge to the statute is moot. See Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2001). We dismiss that portion of…