Parry

I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that evidence of Parry’s prior convictions for delivery of methamphetamine was admissible under Rule 404(b) to show “knowledge and intent.” See mem. dispo. at 482. Critical to the majority’s resolution of this issue is the fact that, in both Parry’s prior convictions and the instant case, the methamphetamine at issue was packaged in glass vials, a storage method the majority calls “very unusual.” Id. At the time the district court denied Parry’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of the prior convictions, the government did not mention the vials, let alone offer any evidence that the use of vials to package methamphetamine is unusual; nor did it argue that the use of vials, if indeed unusual, would render the evidence of the prior convictions admissible under 404(b). In denying Parry’s motion, the district court did not mention the vials, explaining only that admission of the prior convictions does “seem appropriate under [the standard of United States v. Ramirez-Robles, 386 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir.2004) ], the ones for delivery of methamphetamine, to prove knowledge of methamphetamine traffic, and the nexus between methamphetamine…

MEMORANDUM **

Defendant Ronald Lester Parry appeals his convictions and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm after previously having been convicted of three “serious drug offenses” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1) and § 924(e); possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in *482 violation of 21 U.S.C. § 812 (b)(2) & (c), Schedule 11(c), § 841(a) & (b)(1)(c), and § 851; and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) and § 921(a)(8).

1. On de novo review, United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir.2004), we conclude that the district court did not err by refusing to suppress the evidence retrieved after the traffic stop. The police officer had probable cause to stop Defendant’s truck because he had reasonable suspicion that Defendant’s passenger was not wearing a seatbelt, which is a crime in Oregon. See Or.Rev. Stat. § 811.210(l)(d); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing criteria for reasonable suspicion). The officer testified that he saw that the passenger was not wearing a seat belt before he pulled over Defendant’s truck. The Affidavit…