Ray

MEMORANDUM *

Bernadine Ray appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Tucson Old Pueblo Credit Union on her age discrimination lawsuit. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm.

We agree with the district court that Ray’s showing regarding her job performance was sufficient. The standard applied to a plaintiff’s prima facie case on summary judgment is low. Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994). Because TOPCU put forth nondiscriminatory reasons for Ray’s firing, the appropriateness of summary judgment in TOPCU’s favor turns on whether Ray made enough of a showing that these stated reasons were pretextual—and that the true reason for her termination was intentional age discrimination—to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1280-81, 1282 (9th Cir.2000) (explaining three-step ADEA inquiry in the summary judgment context). We conclude that she did not.

Ray argues that there was direct evidence of bias, pointing to the examiners’ 1998 inquiry about her retirement plans, but that evidence gives insufficient support to a claim that the Board’s reasons for…