Joshua
Joshua v. Adams
Opinion
Dissenting Opinion
Ferguson, J.
dissenting:
Cornel Ray Joshua, a paranoid schizophrenic, received an indeterminate life sentence for stealing two bottles of alcohol valued at $62. 1 Such a sentence is nothing if not cruel and unusual. Because “[t]his age of enlightenment cannot tolerate such barbarous action,” Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 678 , 82 S.Ct. 1417 , 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring), I dissent.
Based on the Eighth Amendment’s disproportionality principle, clearly established by Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), Joshua’s sentence should be reversed due to his diminished culpability as a paranoid schizophrenic. 2 The Supreme Court’s disproportionality cases make frequent references to a defendant’s “culpability” in determining whether the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Joshua’s mental illness impacted his culpability and, accordingly, his indeterminate life sentence for petty theft with a prior theft violation was contrary to clearly established federal law.
I.
The Supreme Court has clearly established that the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment “prohibits not only barbaric punishments,…
Lead Opinion
MEMORANDUM **
Petitioner Cornell Ray Joshua appeals the district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court.
Pursuant to California’s Three Strikes law, Joshua was sentenced to twenty-five years to life for stealing two bottles of alcohol, in violation of California Penal Code § 666. On appeal, Joshua argues that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against “cruel and unusual punishments” because he suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. Because Joshua filed his petition for collateral review after April 24, 1996, he must satisfy the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA) onerous standard of review. See Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 1 We may not grant Joshua habeas relief unless we find that the state court’s last reasoned decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d); Renderos v. Ryan, 469 F.3d 788, 793 (9th Cir.2006).