Brownlee

MEMORANDUM *

Appellant Terrence Brownlee, a California state prisoner, filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in connection with a physical altercation with prison guards and the subsequent disciplinary proceedings. 1 He now appeals (1) the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim to the defendant prison guards and (2) its dismissal of his due process claim against prison officials involved in the disciplinary proceeding. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Eighth Amendment Claim

Brownlee’s Eighth Amendment claim alleged that prison guards applied excessive force to his leg and back. The court below granted summary judgment to the prison guards on this claim, but in *644 doing so, it engaged in an improper weighing of the evidence and failed to recognize that Brownlee’s deposition testimony and other evidence in the record raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the force applied to his leg and back was either necessary or excessive under Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.…

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority’s reversal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on Brownlee’s Eighth Amendment claim. However, I disagree with the majority’s finding that the district court improperly dismissed Brownlee’s due process challenge to the subsequent disciplinary proceedings. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.

As the majority notes, Brownlee was “[ajssessed 90 days Credit Forfeiture under a Division ‘D’ offense” for violating California Code of Regulation § 3005(c) for “obstructing peace officer during violent *645 incident.” In his complaint, Brownlee’s claim for relief asserts, in part, that:

Brownlee’s complaint clearly seeks “to overturn [his] disciplinary conviction.” Reversal of that conviction would certainly implicate the sanctions Brownlee received, including the loss of good-time credits. Indeed, a district court reviewing Brownlee’s due process claim would have to consider that sanction. Even reading Brownlee’s pro se complaint in the most charitable light, the majority’s contention that Brownlee somehow “challenges only the manner of confinement, rather than its duration” simply is…