Crosby

MEMORANDUM **

Acharmu Yazaid Crosby appeals pro se the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of California’s statutorily mandated period of parole following determinate prison sentences. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review the dismissal de novo, see Butterfield, v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024 (9th Cir.1997), and we affirm.

Although Crosby seeks to cast his action as a general challenge to the constitutionality of California’s parole statutes, “success in [his] action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of [his] confinement.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 , 125 S.Ct. 1242 , 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005). Crosby’s action is therefore barred, id. at 81-82 , 125 S.Ct. 1242 , and Crosby’s sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 , 93 S.Ct. 1827 , 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.