Fizer

MEMORANDUM *

1. The district court propex'ly held that Bell’s speedy trial claim is procedurally defaulted, because the last reasoned state court judgment to consider the claim “clearly and expressly” invoked a state procedural bar to dispose of it. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-63 , 109 S.Ct. 1038 , 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989).

Furthermore, Bell cannot show the “cause” and “prejudice” necessary to lift this procedural bar. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 , 116 S.Ct. 2074 , 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996). Attorney error can constitute “cause” for these purposes only where the error constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 , 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), requiring a showing first “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and second “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Bell argued before us only that his appellate counsel, on direct appeal after his second trial, provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise a speedy trial claim. Accordingly, he can establish the “cause” prong of…