Peake

MEMORANDUM **

Chevron U.S.A., Inc., and Chevron Transport Corporation, Ltd. (collectively, Chevron) appeal from the district court’s judgment following a jury verdict in favor of Peake, a former Chevron employee. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we reverse and remand.

I

Chevron argues that the district court improperly excluded evidence concerning Peake’s use of alcohol and non-prescription drugs. The excluded evidence included Riley’s notes, which indicate that Peake admitted having used alcohol and cocaine in the year prior to August 18, 2000, as well as Peake’s wife’s declaration stating that Peake “abuses alcohol and ... other substances.” We review a district court’s decision to exclude evidence as irrelevant or inflammatory for an abuse of discretion. See Obrey v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 691, 694 (9th Cir.2005). Except as otherwise provided, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible” and “[ejvidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” Fed.R.Evid. 402.

A

The excluded evidence was relevant to Peake’s negligence, unseaworthiness, and breach-of-contract claims. With respect to both his negligence and unseaworthiness claims, Peake was required to…

dissenting:

I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

In this Circuit, we will not reverse a district court for abuse of discretion unless we are certain that the judgment of the district court was unreasonable. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1038 , 121 S.Ct. 628 , 148 L.Ed.2d 537 (2000). As we have previously explained:

Speiser, Krause, & Madole P.C. v. Ortiz, 271 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir.2001). Accordingly, reversal for abuse of discretion is inappropriate unless we are firmly convinced that “the reviewed decision lies beyond the pale of reasonable justification under the circumstances.” Harman, 211 F.3d at 1175 .

We also give “considerable deference” to a district court’s decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. McEuin v. Crown Equip. Corp., 328 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir.2003), *685 cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 , 124 S.Ct. 1169 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1204 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). Put differently, the district judge is given wide latitude in determining the admissibility of evidence under this standard, United States v. Fagan, 996 F.2d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir.1993), and we will uphold…