Taheri

dissenting:

I would affirm the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Evergreen. Taheri did not create a genuine issue of material fact disputing Kegley’s nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.

Taheri may rely on circumstantial evidence to show that Evergreen’s proffered reason for his discharge was pretextual, but that circumstantial evidence must be “ ‘specific’ and ‘substantial.’ ” Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1284 (9th Cir.2001). Taheri’s evidence is neither. Employees’ general observations that many people slept on the *80 job do not directly dispute Kegley’s specific statements that in his short time at Evergreen before becoming General Manager he did not witness any employees sleeping on the job, nor do the employees’ accounts contradict the evidence that Kegley disciplined all those he discovered sleeping on the job once he became General Manager. Even viewing the employees’ testimony in the light most favorable to Taheri, it does not create a genuine issue of material fact about Kegley’s personal knowledge or show that Kegley himself knew of but failed to discipline other, similarly-situated employees who were sleeping on…

MEMORANDUM *

Tony Taheri appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Evergreen Aviation Ground Logistics Enterprises, Inc. (“Evergreen”), Taheri’s former employer, on his claim of retaliation in violation of the Alaska Human Rights Act, Alaska Stat. §§ 18.80.200 et seq. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we reverse.

The Alaska Human Rights Act tracks federal civil rights law, see Veco, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906, 920 (Alaska 1999), and Alaska courts have adopted the framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to evaluate whether a plaintiff has a claim for retaliation under the Act, Mahan v. Arctic Catering, Inc., 133 P.3d 655, 660 (Alaska 2006). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a *79 plaintiff must show that (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (8) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the employer’s action. Id. at 919 (citing Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 730-31 (9th Cir.1986)); Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit Union, 439 F.3d…