Cooper

MEMORANDUM *

Hermond Dean Cooper appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant, Pasadena Unified School District (“PUSD”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

*101 We review de novo whether a plaintiff has exhausted required administrative remedies. Josephs v. Pacific Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1061 (9th Cir.2006). Cooper did not specifically raise the termination claim before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that claims for relief must be exhausted prior to federal judicial review.) The charges raised in an EEOC charge, however, do not strictly limit the suit that may follow. See Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir.1973) (noting that when an employee seeks judicial relief for incidents not listed in his original charge to the EEOC, the judicial complaint nevertheless may encompass any discrimination like or reasonably related to the allegations of the EEOC charge). Cooper’s 1999 EEOC charge alleged that he was subject to harassment from the personnel office. The…

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I would affirm the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Pasadena SD on Cooper’s 1997 discrimination and retaliation claim and his 1999 retaliation claim. I would also affirm its dismissal of Cooper’s termination claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because Cooper has not exhausted the required administrative remedies.

While it is true that we construe the language of EEOC charges liberally and *102 will adjudicate claims that are reasonably related to the EEOC charges, “there is a limit to such judicial tolerance when principles of notice and fair play are involved.” Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 635 (9th Cir.2002). “The crucial element of a charge of discrimination is the factual statement contained therein.” B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t. 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir.2002). Neither of Cooper’s EEOC charges so much as mentions termination proceedings. The 1999 charge all but excludes the dates of Cooper’s termination proceedings: the charge lists harassment beginning June 30, 1998, overlapping only one month with the termination proceedings occurring between October 1997 and July 1998. While his…