Giovannoni

MEMORANDUM ***

This is an appeal from an attorney’s fee award entered in an action pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. For the reasons stated below, we affirm in part and remand in part the order of the district court.

Flora Marie Giovannoni brought an action in district court against a debt collection law firm and the collection attorneys that it employed (collectively referred to as defendants), claiming various violations of the FDCPA. On October 21, 2005, after accepting defendants’ Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 68 offer of judgment, Giovannoni filed her motion for attorney’s fees and costs, seeking compensation in the amount of $8,677.50 for 33.3 hours spent by her counsel (hereinafter Schwinn), $423.00 in taxable costs, and $88.10 in non-taxable costs. On November 17, 2005, the clerk of the court taxed costs in the amount of $250.00. Thereafter, on February 6, 2006, 2006 WL 279345 , the district court awarded Giovannoni her attorney’s fees in the amount of $4,338.75, half of the amount requested. In making such award, the district court concluded that the requested fees were excessive, Giovannoni’s claims were not…

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I join the majority’s decision to remand on the issue of non-taxable costs and to deny Bidna & Keys’ motion for fees and costs. However, I respectfully dissent from the affirmation of the district court’s across-the-board reduction in attorney’s fees. Although the district court appropriately justified some reduction in the fee award, it failed to explain adequately why it chose to make an across-the-board percentage cut rather than set forth an hour-by-hour analysis. Moreover, the district court failed to offer any explanation as to why a reduction rate of 50% was specifically appropriate.

A “district court has the authority to make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure ‘as a practical means of trimming the fat from a fee application.’” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir.1992). However, we have criticized such a “meat-axe approach” and held that “decisions of district courts employing percentages in cases involving large fee requests are subject to heightened scrutiny.” Id.; see also Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir.2001) (“[i]f…