Shenglin Qin v. Mukasey

concurring.

I would uphold the IJ’s credibility determination on the sole basis that Qin’s testimony regarding his departure from the ship in Sacramento is implausible. As to the denial of Qin’s claim under the Convention Against Torture, I concur only because counsel conceded at oral argument that on the basis of the record in this case, Qin does not qualify for such relief.

MEMORANDUM *

Shenglin Qin seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) affirmation of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decisión to deny Qin’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The IJ found, and the Board affirmed, that substantial portions of Qin’s testimony were implausible, contradictory, or non-responsive.

We review an IJ’s adverse credibility determination under the substantial evidence standard. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 488-84 , 112 S.Ct. 812 , 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). Substantial evidence exists where the IJ had a “legitimate articulable basis to question the petitioner’s credibility, and ... offerfed] a specific, cogent reason for any stated disbelief.” Osorio v. INS, 99 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1996). The credibility determination must be upheld unless the evidence presented “was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Id. When, as here, the BIA adopts an IJ’s findings and reasoning, we review the IJ’s opinion as if it were the opinion of the BIA, applying the substantial evidence standard. See, e.g., Singhr-Kaur v. I.N.S.,…