Mendoza-Granades

MEMORANDUM **

We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We affirm.

I. Felipe Mendozoir-Granades (“Mendoza”)

A. Doctrine of Merger

Mendoza was not convicted of, nor sentenced on, both a greater and a lesser-included offense; and there is no indication that Congress did not intend to authorize separate punishments for each of Mendoza’s offenses. Thus, the only authorities cited by Mendoza—United States v. Jones, 204 F.3d 541, 544 (4th Cir.2000), and United States v. Chase, 296 F.3d 247, 252 (4th Cir.2002)—do not support his argument that the district court should have imposed a “merged” sentence.

It is well-settled that a substantive crime committed in the execution of a conspiracy may be punished separately from the conspiracy. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 , 66 S.Ct. 1180 , 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). Moreover, the district court was statutorily required to sentence Mendoza, on Counts Five and Seven alone, to a minimum of thirty-two years, or 384 months, with this sentence running consecutive to the sentence imposed on the other counts of conviction. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924 (c)(l)(A)(ii), 924(c)(l)(C)(i), and…