Sarmento

MEMORANDUM *

Gerald Sarmentó appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Henry Schein, Inc. on his Americans with Disabilities Act claims. Sarmentó contends that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether he has made a prima facie showing that he is “disabled” under the ADA. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1011 (9th Cir.2007). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We affirm.

*27 Sarmentó contends that he is disabled under all three definitions of “disability” in the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(A)-(C). The record fails to support Sarmento’s assertion.

There is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sarmentó was “disabled,” though he suffered from lifting restrictions as a result of a back injury. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(A). We have previously determined that a lifting restriction impairing an employee’s ability to work only one particular job is not “substantially limiting” and therefore not a “disability” under § 12102(2)(A). Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 540-41 (9th Cir.1997). Sarmento’s “inability to perform a single, particular job does not…