Lawson

MEMORANDUM **

Pamela Lawson appeals summary judgment for her former employer, Reynolds Industries, Inc. and Teledyne Reynolds (collectively, “Reynolds”), 1 on retaliation claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ; and the California Fair Housing and Employment Act, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12940 et seq. (FEHA). We affirm.

I

Lawson’s Title VII claim was untimely as the district court could find that the “2002” date on the original letter was a typo and that the letter was instead signed and mailed on September 8, 2003. Her complaint was filed months after this. See Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Serv., Ltd., 495 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.2007).

II

Lawson failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found that her termination was retaliatory or that Reynolds’s stated reasons for terminating her were pretextual. In the circumstances, no inference of retaliation arises on account of the nearly twelvemonth gap between her protected complaints and termination. See Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir.2003). At oral argument counsel suggested that the last retaliatory act occurred…

dissenting in part:

This is an unusual case: Reynolds, the employer, in effect concedes that among its employees are many unwilling to accept either a woman or a Black (Lawson is both) in a supervisory position even though she is competent and capable. 1 Lawson was expected to accept abuse and humiliation if she were to keep her job as a supervisor. She was expected to get along and go along. She was the one upon whom retaliation could be visited without reprisal, rather than those who taunted and disrespected her. I therefore dissent from Part II of the memorandum disposition.

The district court granted Reynolds’s motion for summary judgment on Lawson’s retaliation claims because it concluded that Lawson had failed to produce evidence that the legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons proferred by Reynolds for terminating her employment were pretextual. 2 We review this decision de novo. Lindahl *549 v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir.1991). In so doing, we are required to accept Lawson’s evidence as true and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Id. at 1437 . We must also keep in mind that because of the elusive, yet fact-based nature of an employer’s true…