Mengping Lu v. Mukasey

MEMORANDUM **

Mengping Lu, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed his appeal of an order by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Lu’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), based on an adverse credibility determination.

We review the decision of the BIA, which agreed with the “outcome reached by the [IJ]” but did not, expressly or by citation to Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), adopt or incorporate any of the reasons cited by the IJ in its decision. Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir.2008) (“Where the BIA conducts a de novo review and issues its own decision, rather than adopting the IJ’s decision as its own, we review the BIA’s decision.”). Our review is therefore limited to the grounds on which the BIA explicitly relied. 1 Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.2004).

The BIA’s independent adverse credibility determination is not supported *638 by substantial evidence. Rivera v. Muka-sey, 508 F.3d 1271, 1274 (9th Cir.2007) (“We review adverse credibility findings under the…

dissenting.

This court is bound to review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence, and we should reverse only if our review of the record compels us to a conclusion contrary to that reached below. I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 , 112 S.Ct. 812 , 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992); Singh v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir.2006).

In this case, the IJ’s adverse credibility finding is supported by numerous material inconsistencies that go to the heart of the petitioner’s claim for asylum. The IJ identified many of these contradictions in her oral decision, and the BIA affirmed in a brief order, 1 agreeing with the outcome reached by the IJ, implicitly incorporating her adverse credibility determination, and noting four specific inconsistencies in the petitioner’s application that supported the IJ’s original finding that the petitioner lacked credibility.

In reaching its desired result here, the majority discards the IJ’s reasoning in its *640 entirety, ignores the host of inconsistencies apparent in the record, acknowledges only the four discrepancies noted by the BIA in its brief order of affirmance, and deems the petitioner credible as a matter of…