MEMORANDUM **

Jose Alfredo Reyes-Platero (“Reyes”) challenges the sentence imposed by the district court following his plea of guilty to re-entry into the United States after removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a), (b)(2). We deferred submission pending our en banc decision in United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984 (9th Cir.2008). We now affirm, with the exception of certain supervised release conditions.

Reyes first contends that § 1326(b)’s aggravated felony enhancement provision, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), is no longer good law. We have previously considered, and foreclosed, that argument. See United States v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 472 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir.2007) (“We again reiterate that, while Apprendi may cast doubt on the continuing viability of Almendarez-Torres, Almendarez-Torres remains the law unless and until it is overruled by the Supreme Court”).

Reyes next contends that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B) by failing to make a finding at his sentencing hearing regarding the controverted, material issue of his motivation for re-entry into the United States, and by failing to address his contention that he was entitled to a sentence commensurate with those imposed through the fast track program. The record indicates, however, that the district court took into consideration Reyes’ professed reason for re-entry and found it to be irrelevant or unnecessary to the determination of his sentence under the factors articulated by 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a). Moreover, the district court ruled on Reyes’ fast track argument, stating that any findings regarding its applicability would be immaterial because the government’s actions fell within its prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, the district court complied with Rule 32.

We likewise reject Reyes’ contention that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence by failing to give due consideration to several of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 987-88 . “The district court need not tick off each of the § 3553(a) factors to show that it has considered them____However, when a party raises a specific, nonfrivolous argument tethered to a relevant § 3553(a) factor in support of a requested sentence, then the judge should normally explain why he accepts or rejects the party’s position.” Id. at 992-93. The district court complied with this requirement.

Finally, Reyes challenges several of the supervised release conditions imposed by the district court. We address each contention in turn.

AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; and REMANDED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.