Moore

dissenting.

I read Moore’s complaint differently, which leads me to a different result from the majority. I believe the complaint also alleges a failure to deliver Moore’s goods in Hilo, as the parties agreed. As the agreement is reflected in a bill of lading for carriage of goods by sea, I would say that maritime jurisdiction exists. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 . I agree with the district court’s substantive analysis. Accordingly, I would affirm.

MEMORANDUM *

We must first discharge the appellate court’s “special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95 , 118 S.Ct. 1003 , 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 73 , 117 S.Ct. 1055 , 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (internal citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district *151 court treated Moore’s claims as maritime contract claims and asserted maritime jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 . We disagree with this conclusion. Moore’s complaint alleges Hawaii tort claims of conversion and negligence. See Haw.Rbv. Stat. §§ 490:7-204, 7-210, 7-308(h), 7-309. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, Moore is “the master of [his] claim; he ... may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 , 107 S.Ct. 2425 , 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Although Moore’s complaint states that Young Bros, failed to deliver goods and attaches a page from the bill of lading, “the presence of underlying federal issues does not create jurisdiction…