The complaint in the above entitled action was filed in the Superior Court in and for the County of Los Angeles, State of *882 California, on July 2, 1946. Named as defendants were: Paramount Pictures, Inc., a corporation; Samuel Goldwyn Productions, Inc., a corporation; Goldwyn Pictures Corporation, a corporation; Samuel Goldwyn Studios, a corporation; Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., a corporation; One Doe; Two Doe. The suit is of a civil nature, alleging plagiarism.

Paramount Pictures, Inc., is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York, and is a citizen and resident of that state. All of the other corporate defendants are citizens and residents of the State of California.

On March 6, 1947, the attorneys for the plaintiffs entered a dismissal of the action as to all of the defendants save and except Paramount Pictures, Inc. Defendants One Doe and Two Doe were fictitious defendants. The record is silent as to service on the Does.

On March 4, 1947, the plaintiffs filed a notice of motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint, and issue summons thereon. This motion was noticed for hearing for March 19, 1947. The plaintiffs requested the State Court to add the name: Samuel Goldwyn, and John Doe I, John Doe II, John Doe III, and Doe Corporation I and Doe Corporation II, as defendants. No action was taken by the State Court on the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file and serve their supplemental first amended complaint. The complaint prays for $300,000 in damages.

One hour prior to the time of hearing the motion in the Superior Court, defendant, Paramount, filed its petition for removal of the action to the United States District Court, served notice upon plaintiffs’ attorneys, and served points and authorities in support of its petition. The notice was served on the plaintiffs’ attorneys seventeen minutes prior to the time said petition had been noticed for hearing in Department I of the Superior Court. The Superior Court ordered removal of the action to the United States District Court, leaving undetermined the plaintiffs’ motion to file their supplemental complaint. After the removal the United States District Court granted this motion and the supplemental amended complaint was filed in this Court.

Samuel Goldwyn, during all of the times mentioned, was, and is, a resident and citizen of the County of Los Angeles, State of California. The facts stated are undisputed. The sole question for the determination of this Court is: “Has the United States District Court jurisdiction — do the facts justify a removal of the cause of action from the State Court to the United States District Court ?”

The plaintiffs, in their arguments for remand, contend:

(1) That the service of the notice of transfer was too brief.

(2) That this Court should examine all of the proceedings in the Superior Court.

(3) That the Superior Court should have ruled on the motion pending to amend their complaint which, if allowed, would have denied the defendant, Paramount, the right to remove the cause to the United States District Court.

(4) The order of the District 'Court allowing the supplemental complaint to be filed deprived the District Court of jurisdiction for the reason that the action was then against two defendants, one a resident and citizen of New York, and the other a resident and citizen of the State of California.

The law is clear on each of these propositions.

(1) There is no statute or rule requiring that any particular period of time must elapse between the service of notice and the filing of petition and bond. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 71 , 72. Neither Congress by statute, nor the Supreme Court by rule, found it necessary to fix any particular time. The Supreme Court has given consideration to proceedings with reference to removal when the original Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, and also the Amendments, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. See rule 81(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Amendments thereto; 36 C. J.S., Federal, Courts, § 253. Note 52, page 161.

In re Miller v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 1922, 4 Cir., 279 F. 806 :

The notice in question was served only an hour or two before the bond and petition were filed, which plaintiff contended was *883 practically the same as no notice at all. The court found adversely to the contention.

In re Spriggs v. Associated Press et al., D.C., 55 F.Supp. 385 :

The court affirmed its holding in Milliken v. Transcontinental Oil Company, D.C., 55 F.Supp. 381 , where the court held that any notice which is prior in time to the filing is sufficient to satisfy the statute. Citing cases.

There is no particular time to advise opposing party of the removal proceedings.

(2) The court has examined all of the proceedings in the Superior Court. The crucial point is the actual condition of the pleadings at the moment the notice of removal and bond were filed. An examination of the record shows clearly that at that very time there was only one defendant, the Paramount Company, a resident and citizen of New York. Woerter v. Orr et al., 10 Cir., 127 F.2d 969 .

See 54 C.J. page 285, sec. 175b:

“Where plaintiff voluntarily dismisses or discontinues as to a defendant or defendants whose presence prevents removal, the suit thereupon becomes removable where the necessary diversity exists between plaintiff and the remaining defendant or defendants, and the other jurisdictional requisites are present. The rule is otherwise, however, in the case of a disposition of the suit as to the defendant or defendants whose presence prevents removal, otherwise than by the voluntary act of plaintiff, as, for example, where there is an involuntary dismissal or nonsuit, a directed verdict, the sustaining of a demurrer to the evidence, or a judgment of reversal on appeal.

“Failure to service process or to bring defendant into court.

“While the mere failure to serve process on the defendant or defendants whose presence prevents 1 removal does not, it seems, render the suit removable where there was an attempted service, according to some cases where plaintiff fails to serve process upon, or otherwise fails to bring into court, the defendant or defendants whose presence as a party would prevent removal, and proceeds or elects to proceed against the other defendant or defendants alone, the suit is removable provided there is the required diversity in respect of such other defendant or defendants and the other jurisdictional requisites are present, and in some cases a like rule permitting removal has been applied even where there is nothing to show an election to proceed against such other defendant or defendants, but the contrary view has been taken, and it has apparently been held tha-t such failure does not render the suit removable even where plaintiff has proceeded against such other defendant or defendants.” See cases in footnote. 1

(3) Immediately upon the filing of the proper notice and bond for removal, the State Court was deprived of jurisdiction and, hence it had no power to proceed and determine the motion pending before it.

(4) The District Court, in permitting plaintiffs to file an amended complaint wherein Samuel Goldwyn, a resident and citizen of the County of Los Angeles, State of California, was named a defendant, did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction.

Pullman v. Jenkins, 305 U. S. 534 , at page 537: 59 S.Ct. 347 , at page 349, 83 L.Ed 334;

“The second amended complaint should not have been considered in determining the right to remove, which in a case like the present one was to be determined according to the plaintiffs’ pleading at the time of the petition for removal.” The opinion by Chief Justice Hughes cites the following cases: Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205, 213, 216 , 26 L.Ed. 514 ; Graves v. Corbin, *884 132 U.S. 571, 585 , 10 S.Ct. 196 , 33 L.Ed. 962 ; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Wangelin, 132 U.S. 599, 601 , 10 S.Ct. 203 , 33 L.Ed. 473 ; Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers’ Finance Co., 264 U.S. 182, 189, 190 , 44 S.Ct. 266 , 68 L.Ed. 628 ; Saint Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294, 295 , 58 S.Ct. 586 , 82 L.Ed. 845 .

The right of removal on the grounds of diversity was first granted by the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73 , and has been amended several times. It was believed that a non-resident citizen could not obtain justice in a state court because of local prejudice, and hence the law provided that the non-resident citizens could remove the actions to the federal courts. With tile interchange of commerce between states, the rapidity of travel, communication, the telegraph, telephone and radio in the more than a century and a half that has passed, since the Judiciary Act, changing the life of the nation from isolated communities to a composite whole, no one would seriously contend today that there was any prejudice in any state court in the nation which would deprive a non-resident of a fair trial in tort or contract actions. Criminal actions cannot be removed. Judge William Denman, United States Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit, presented to the 1943 Annual Conference of United States Judges of the Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco, a resolution to abolish the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the federal courts. This resolution was adopted by a vote of fifteen, and one against it, and subsequently five other judges of the Circuit have agreed to the proposal. The resolution was passed in connection with Senate Bill 1548, repealing the Enabling Act conferring diversity of citizenship jurisdiction on the District Courts. 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1). Judge Denman said in his opening remarks:

“Mr Chairman, my brethren of the bench, and members of the bar: The resolution I am proposing for your consideration is:

In a learned discussion, Judge Denman then treats the subjects under three main heads:

The learned jurist said:

Judge Denman points out further the distance and the great injustice to litigants and witnesses when cases are transferred from a local court to the federal court. He then points out the fallacy of the opposition. Commenting on Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, Judge Denman said:

Judge Denman’s persuasive argument has never been answered.

Judge Leon Yankwich said: “A woman slips on a banana peel in a corner grocery store and lands in the Federal court.”

The jurors, both in the state and in the federal courts are selected from the same general locality, and no one would contend that the state judges are not just as able to try these issues as are the federal judges. It is the opinion of this court that the entire matter should be re-examined by Congress to effect greater efficiency in the federal administration of justice, in clearing the federal dockets.

In California civil actions, the party demanding a jury trial must deposit $24 jury *886 fees for the first day and pay the mileage of approximately $8 to $10; and from then on if he desires to continue the jury he must pay the jury fees daily unless by stipulation the opposing parties have agreed to share the expense of the jury; if no stipulation has been entered, then at the end of the litigation the prevailing party adds the jury expense to his costs, to be paid by the losing party. Section 4300f, Cal. Political Code.

If a case is removed from the state court, the federal treasury pays all of the jury fees.

The motion to remand is denied.

An exception is allowed the plaintiffs.

Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Company, 196 U.S. 239, 244, 245 , 25 S.Ct. 251 , 49 L.Ed. 462 ; New Orleans, M. & T. R. Co. v. State of Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 141 , 26 L.Ed. 96 ; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Koontz, 104 U.S. 5, 14 , 26 L.Ed. 643 ; National S. S. Company v. Tugmen, 106 U.S. 118, 122 , 1 S.Ct. 58 , 27 L.Ed. 87 ; St. Paul & Chicago Ry. Co. v. McLean, 108 U.S. 212, 216 , 2 S.Ct. 498 , 27 L.Ed. 703 ; Crehore v. Ohio & M. Ry. Co., 131 U.S. 240, 243 , 9 S.Ct. 692 , 33 L.Ed. 144 ; Kern v. Nuidekoper, 103 U.S. 485, 493 , 26 L.Ed. 354 .