MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ 1 Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiffs’ Motion”), Defendants’ 2 Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendants’ Motion”) and Defendants’ Motion to Strike (“Motion to Strike”). These matters came on for hearing before the Court at 2:00 p.m. on Thursday, October 20, 2011. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendants’ Motion to Strike is DENIED as moot.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

On November 4, 2008, the citizens of California adopted a ballot measure, Proposition 8, that changed the California Constitution such that marriage would thereafter exist only “between a man and a woman.” Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SSUF”), ¶ 29; Cal. Const, art. 1, § 7.5. Plaintiffs ProtectMarriage and NOM-California were primarily *917 formed ballot committees established under California’s Political Reform Act of 1974, Cal. Gov.Code § 81000 et seq. (“PRA”). Their specific purpose was to specifically support the passage of Proposition 8. SSUF, ¶¶ 1-2.

Plaintiff John Doe # 1 supported Proposition 8 and is considered a “committee” under the PRA because he contributed in excess of $10,000 to a committee that itself supported Proposition 8. Id., ¶ 3. In support of the Proposition 8 campaign, such committees raised in excess of $42 million from more than 46,000 individual contributors. See Declaration of Lynda Cassady, ¶ 15 and its attached chart. Plaintiff National Organization for Marriage California PAC (“NOM-California PAC”), to the contrary, was formed post-election to raise and spend money on ballot initiatives and candidates relating to the issue of marriage. SSUF, ¶ 4.

California’s PRA requires committees such as Plaintiffs to report certain information regarding their contributors. Specifically, Plaintiffs are required to file semiannual reports including the name, street address, occupation, name of employer, (if self-employed, the name of the business), as well as the date and amount received during the period covered by the statement of anyone who contributes more than $100 to them, both during and after active campaigns. Cal. Gov.Code §§ 84200, 84211(f). This information is then available, inter alia, on the website of the California Secretary of State.

Plaintiffs allege that, as a consequence of their support of Proposition 8, their contributors have been subjected to threats of violence, harassment and reprisals. Plaintiffs further allege that the PRA’s $100 reporting threshold is unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further maintain that the PRA’s post-election reporting requirements and the failure to purge reports post-election are facially unconstitutional as well.

In support of their first claim, Plaintiffs submitted 58 John Doe Declarations (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1). The first nine of those declarations were drafted in January 2009, and the rest were prepared prior to June 3, 2009. Plaintiffs have further provided a variety of media accounts, videos and articles pulled from various internet sources (Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 3-4).

Plaintiffs’ John Doe declarations document the following incidents that Plaintiffs allege constitute “threats, harassments and reprisals” sufficient to warrant exempting from disclosure the names of Plaintiffs’ contributors:

Most of the incidents alleged above were responses to public shows of support the declarants had made in favor of Proposition 8. See, e.g., Deck of John Doe #4 (protest held outside the entrance to declarant’s gated community when declarant held a fundraiser in support of Proposition 8 at his home); Deck of John Doe # 8 (declarant “attended numerous rallies, three press conferences, and spoke at a number of churches ... [,] also participated on panel discussions” and “attended an election night gathering at a hotel ... with other supporters of Proposition 8” where the supporter’s picture was taken and eventually published); Deck Of John Doe # 9 (photograph of individual at election night gathering prompted receipt of unsolicited messages on MySpace and Face-book accounts, emails and phone calls); Deck of John Doe #20 (after seeing a yard sign supporting Proposition 8 in the yard of a shop owner, two neighbors advised declarant they would no longer frequent his store).

Although immaterial to the Court’s decision, it is not at all clear from some of the declarations whether the alleged incidents were actually connected to a particular declarant’s support of Proposition 8. See, e.g., Deck Of John Doe # 11 (individual maintaining “Yes on 8” yard signs on her lawn and a bumper sticker on her car had her car window smashed); Deck of John Doe # 13 (believes car was keyed in retaliation for posting ‘Tes on 8” bumper stickers); Deck of John Doe # 23 (believes the statue of Mary, Mother of Jesus, at his church was painted orange in connection with Proposition 8).

Plaintiffs’ remaining evidence, Exhibits 3 and 4, is comprised of a collection of online media, including YouTube videos, blogs, court filings in other cases, and numerous articles. 3 Because the incidents reported within these Exhibits are highly repetitive, and perhaps deceptively overwhelming, they are catalogued by type of occurrence, rather than by exhibit number, here. 4

Much of Plaintiffs’ remaining evidence goes to alleged boycotts and “economic reprisals.” By way of example:

Plaintiffs also cite to evidence purportedly documenting Proposition 8-related backlash directed at the Mormon church primarily in October and November of 2008. For example:

Finally, Plaintiffs catalog a variety of other miscellaneous events they believe are relevant as well. For example:

B. Procedural History

In light of the above alleged acts, and because they were statutorily required to file semiannual reports on January 31, 2009, Plaintiffs initiated this action against Defendants on January 7, 2009. Plaintiffs have amended their Complaint several times, resulting in the now operative Third Amended Complaint.

On January 9, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, raising essentially the same arguments they raise in their current Motion, which this Court denied by formal order on January 30, 2009. At the same time, Plaintiffs also requested a Protective Order, which the Court granted. That Protective Order remains in place to date and permits the parties to redact personal information from filings not under seal. The Protective Order also grants the parties leave to file reference lists pursuant to FRCP 5.2(g). Plaintiffs did not appeal this Court’s Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, nor did they seek, from either this Court or from the Ninth Circuit, a stay of that decision.

On August 25, 2011, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. Defendants, with two exceptions, filed a Cross-Motion and Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion on September *923 15, 2011. 5 At the same time, Defendants moved to strike a large portion of Plaintiffs’ evidence. Plaintiffs filed a Reply as to their own Motion and Oppositions to Defendants’ Motions on September 29, 2011. Defendants filed a Reply to both their Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendants’ Reply”) and their Motion to Strike on October 13, 2011.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when “materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions interrogatory answers, or other materials” “show[ ] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-324 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on part of a claim or defense. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-the part of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F.Supp. 374, 378-79 (C.D.Cal.1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter Township of Monroe, 790 F.Supp. 707, 710 (E.D.Mich.1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v. Chem-Tronics, 16 F.Supp.2d 1192, 1200 (S.D.Cal.1998).

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Rule 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 , 106 S.Ct. 1348 , 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 , 88 S.Ct. 1575 , 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury *924 could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347 , 355 (9th Cir.1992). Stated another way, “before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 (quoting Schuylkill and Dauphin Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 , 14 Wall. 442 , 20 L.Ed. 867 (1871)). As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87 , 106 S.Ct. 1348 .

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 . Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F.Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D.Cal.1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir.1987).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs’ basic arguments in support of their Motion are as follows: 1) California’s campaign contribution disclosure requirements are unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs because there is a reasonable probability that such exposure will lead to threats, harassment and reprisals; 2) the $100 reporting threshold is unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to Plaintiffs, because the threshold cannot survive the requisite scrutiny and because disclosure will result in the above-described threats; and 3) post-election public ballot-measure reporting and the failure to purge public disclosures post-election are unconstitutional. Defendants counter that: 1) Plaintiffs have not shown a reasonable probability that an ordinary contributor to Plaintiffs’ will face threats, harassment or reprisals; 2) the State has an important interest in disclosure that outweighs the minimal burden imposed on Plaintiffs; and 3) post-election disclosure requirements and the $100 threshold survive exacting scrutiny.

These are essentially the same arguments first brought before the Court almost three years ago on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. There, the Court held that: 1) the State had a compelling informational interest in the disclosure of contributors to ballot-initiative campaigns; 2) the $100 reporting threshold was narrowly tailored to that informational interest; 3) the post-election reporting requirement was directly related to the State’s informational interest and burdened no more speech than was required; and 4) Plaintiffs were unlikely to show a reasonable probability that disclosure of the identities of Proposition 8 contributors would result in threats, harassment and reprisals, and thus Plaintiffs were unlikely to show an exemption from the disclosure requirements was warranted.

Very little has changed in this case since the Court originally addressed the parties’ arguments in the context of Plaintiffs’ original Motion. Even with what new evidence Plaintiffs have provided at this juncture, however, they have failed to convince *925 this Court that its prior reasoning was unsound or that any shift in the Court’s position is justified now. Accordingly, for the following reasons, Defendants, not Plaintiffs, are entitled to summary judgment.

A. Whether Plaintiffs Have Shown a Reasonable Probability that Disclosure of their Contributors’ Identities will Result in Threats, Harassment or Reprisals

According to Plaintiffs, disclosure of the identities of their contributors must be barred because they have demonstrated a reasonable probability that such disclosure will lead to threats, harassment or reprisals. Plaintiffs’ Motion, 5:16-22 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, — U.S .—, 130 5. Ct. 876, 914, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) (internal quotations omitted); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 , 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976)). This Court rejected this same argument in its Order Denying Preliminary Injunction explaining the rule as follows 6 :

ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F.Supp.2d 1197, 1212-1214 (E.D.Cal.2009).

Based on the same above authorities, Plaintiffs now ask this Court to issue a similar decision and to exempt those contributing to Plaintiffs’ cause from the disclosure requirements of the PRA. In support of their argument, Plaintiffs point to the incidents described by the Court above. Those incidents are characterized by Plaintiffs as including death threats, physical assaults and threats of violence, vandalism and threats of destruction of property, arson and threats of arson, angry protests, lewd demonstrations, intimidating emails and phone calls, hate mail, mailed envelopes containing white suspicious powder, blacklisting, loss of employ *928 ment and job opportunities, intimidation and reprisals on campus and the classroom, acts of intimidation through photography, economic reprisals and demands for hush money, and gross expressions of anti-religious bigotry. Plaintiffs’ Motion, 7:14-8:2. For their part, Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs’ characterization of the evidence. Before turning to the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ evidence, however, there is one core point pertaining to the Buckley test itself that necessitates initial consideration.

First and foremost, the parties hotly contest whether Plaintiffs are entitled to seek refuge under the exemption provided by Buckley and its progeny because that exemption was created for, and historically has been applied only to, “minor parties” or small, persecuted groups whose very existence depended on some manner of anonymity. Despite their ongoing contention that anyone making the requisite showing of threats, harassment and reprisals is entitled to the exemption, Plaintiffs’ Reply, 3:14-4:3, Plaintiffs did acknowledge at oral argument that the “minor party” element is a relevant consideration before the Court. This Court previously addressed the same issue in its Order Denying Preliminary Injunction finding that:

ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F.Supp.2d at 1214-1216 . Nothing before the Court today renders its above analysis inapplicable. To the contrary, the Court stands by its prior conclusion from almost three years ago and finds that Plaintiffs’ inability to make a principled analogy to the parties in the above cases is fatal to their current claim.

Plaintiffs’ reliance on dicta in Doe v. Reed, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 2811 , 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010) (“Reed”), for the proposition that the Supreme Court has already determined Plaintiffs are privy to the exemption does nothing to change this Court’s opinion. Reed concerned a challenge, by groups and individuals similar to Plaintiffs, to Washington’s compelled disclosure requirement insofar as those requirements pertained to referendum signatories. According to Plaintiffs, “the [Reed ] Court never so much as hinted that the exposure exemption would not be available to the group. To the contrary, a clear majority of the Court agreed that an exemption was indeed available to the group (although the Justices differed widely as to the threshold showing of threats, harassment, or reprisals that would be required to grant an exemption).” Plaintiffs’ Reply, 4:5-9. Plaintiffs overstate their case.

The issue before the Reed Court was “not whether disclosure of [a] particular petition would violate the First Amendment, but whether disclosure of referendum petitions in general would do so.” 130 S.Ct. at 2815. Accordingly, Reed “[left] it to the lower courts to consider in the first instance the signors’ more focused claim concerning disclosure of the *931 information on [that] particular petition.” Id. Plaintiffs thus appear to argue that, by-remanding for the lower courts to consider Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge based on any potential threats, harassment or reprisals contributors might suffer upon disclosure, the Supreme Court somehow sanctioned application of the Buckley exemption to major parties. However, Justice Alito was the only Justice that even alluded to the possibility that the Washington plaintiffs might succeed in their as-applied challenge, and his sweeping assertions as to the strength of Plaintiffs’ case are premature given the posture of the case before that Court. 8 See id. at 2823-3827. Accordingly, nothing in Doe v. Reed, at least at this juncture, overrides the clear statements made in past Supreme Court cases indicating that disclosure exemptions were primarily intended to combat harms suffered by small, persecuted groups.

Even if Plaintiffs could overcome the above hurdle, however, their evidence is still insufficient to warrant an exemption. Indeed, in its Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, this Court found Plaintiffs unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim for the reasons reiterated below, and nothing Plaintiffs have currently presented has convinced this Court departure from its former logic is now warranted on summary judgment. In its prior Order, this Court stated:

ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F.Supp.2d at 1217-1218 .

Despite Plaintiffs attempt now to put forth additional evidence of threats, harassment and reprisals, the Court’s findings remain the same. More specifically, despite the additional declarations and exhibits that are now before the Court, Plaintiffs still run into problems of proportionality and magnitude.

First, while Plaintiffs characterize their evidence as voluminous and comprised of “virtually countless reports of threats, harassment, and reprisals,” Plaintiffs’ Motion, 4:14-15, they have pointed to relatively few incidents allegedly suffered by persons located across the entire country who had somehow manifested their support for traditional marriage. In addition, while the evidence before this Court indicates that at least 7 million voters showed up at the California polls alone to support the passage of Proposition 8, this number, though large, still deceptively underestimates the number of supporters for Plaintiffs’ cause. Indeed, this figure does not capture all individuals supporting Proposition 8 on a national scale, nor does it capture those individuals who may have no connection to California’s campaign, but *933 have supported the same cause in other regions. Plaintiffs’ evidence of harassment, nonetheless extends much farther than California’s borders and includes incidents that arose in other states and that were directed at the much broader social issue of gay marriage in general.

Accordingly, even assuming Plaintiffs could, under some set of circumstances, prove an entitlement to an exemption, they would need evidence of thousands of acts of reprisals, threats or harassment, spanning much more than the short period of time covering California’s ballot-initiative process to prove contributors to such a massive group are entitled to anonymity of the type justified years ago for the individuals in Brown and NAACP . The declarations of 58 individuals signed in the months just following the election, along with Plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence from the same time period as documented in Exhibits 3 and 4, is simply insufficient on the facts of this case to convince this Court an ordinary contributor to Proposition 8 would have faced any backlash worthy of quashing the names of all contributors. 9 See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S.Ct. at 2829 (taking the position exemptions may be permitted “in the rare circumstance in which disclosure poses a reasonable probability of serious and widespread harassment”) (Sotomayor, J., concurring-joined by Stevens and Ginsburg).

Moreover, as the Court previously observed, notably absent from the record here are any instances in which Plaintiffs have suffered any sort of governmental backlash. While, based on the language derived from Buckley , governmental harassment is not necessarily a required showing, it is a factor for this Court to consider. Indeed, some governmental animosity has been present in all other cases in which an exemption has been permitted. Perhaps recognizing this, Plaintiffs argue “[tjhere can be no question that in many areas in California, and around the country, views against same-sex marriage ... are extremely unpopular” and “[ejven our courts of law have characterized those who fight against such laws as advocates of hate and bigotry who act ‘without reason.’ ” Plaintiffs’ Motion, 12:15-18. Nonetheless, any attempt by Plaintiffs to show governmental animosity here is half-hearted at best. As described above, parties entitled to an as-applied exemption (namely the NAACP and the SWP) in the past had suffered from systematic governmental discrimination, persecution and abuse. Those plaintiffs were not only directly victimized by the government, they consequently lacked adequate recourse to pursue means short of nondisclosure to protect against private violence. In this case, Plaintiffs cannot assert that there is some sort of governmental hostility to their cause, nor can they in good conscience argue that law enforcement was or would be non-responsive to any illegal acts directed at Plaintiffs contributors. 10

*934 To the contrary, Plaintiffs’ own evidence indicates law enforcement was not only responsive, but diligent in undertaking investigations into some of the more heinous acts alleged here. This factor is critical in light of the comments made by several concurring Justices in Doe v. Reed, indicating the ability of law enforcement to deal with threats, harassment and reprisals would weigh heavily against a need for an exemption. See, e.g., Doe, 130 S.Ct. at 2829 (exemption may be warranted “in the rare circumstance in which disclosure poses a reasonable probability of serious and widespread harassment that the State is unwilling or unable to control”) (Sotomayor, J., concurring, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg); id. at 2831 (“From time to time throughout history, persecuted groups have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all ... In my view, this is unlikely to occur in cases involving the PRA. Any burden on speech that petitioners posit is speculative as well as indirect. For an as-applied challenge to a law such as the PRA to succeed, there would have to be a significant threat of harassment directed at those who sign the petition that cannot be mitigated by law enforcement measures.”) (Stevens and Breyer, JJ., concurring); id. at 2837 (“There are laws against threats and intimidation; and harsh criticism, short of unlawful action, is a price our people have traditionally been willing to pay for self-governance.”) (Scalia, J., concurring).

In addition, the vast majority of the incidents cited by Plaintiffs are arguably, as characterized by Defendants, typical of any controversial campaign. For example, picketing, protesting, boycotting, distributing flyers, destroying yard signs and voicing dissent do not necessarily rise to the level of “harassment” or “reprisals,” especially in comparison to acts directed at groups in the past. Moreover, a good portion of these actions are themselves forms of speech protected by the United States Constitution. Indeed this Court previously held that:

ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F.Supp.2d at 1218 .

As to Plaintiffs’ allegations of “economic reprisals” in the form of voluntary or forced resignations, as opposed to cases in which a relatively high percentage of small groups seeking an exemption were actually fired from their places of employment, Plaintiffs here have documented no terminations. See, e.g., SWP. Rather, Plaintiffs point only to instances of several individuals who allegedly resigned amidst controversy over their contributions to or support of Proposition 8, but even those individuals had their own supporters and nonetheless made the affirmative and individual decision to resign.

More troubling here are the few instances of violence or criminal activity that do not fall within the realm of protected speech. The Court does not take lightly the use of the mail to terrorize people with counterfeit biological agents or to threaten the lives of individuals taking a stand for their particular beliefs, nor does the Court condone the use of force or the escalation of peaceful protests to violence to make one’s position known. 11 However, Plaintiffs have produced insufficient evidence that the more incendiary events on which they rely were connected to Proposition 8 or to gay marriage at all. Rather, a number of these incidents were directed at the Mormon church, which, though a backer of California’s proposition, may also have been a target for any of a number of other reasons. In addition, as stated above, law enforcement appears to have responded swiftly and adequately in each of the instances Plaintiffs allege, rendering this case distinguishable from all cases in the past where exemptions have been granted. And, perhaps more importantly, the Supreme Court has never indicated that even a few acts of violence, when directed at a target as massive as the groups supporting Plaintiffs, would suffice to shield those groups from the scrutinizing light of the political process.

This Court also observes that, even assuming there is no “strict” requirement that Plaintiffs prove a chilling effect on anticipated speech, any such effect is notably absent here. Plaintiffs appear to have had no problem collecting contributions and those contributions continued to increase even during the most heated portions of the Proposition 8 campaign. Cassady Deck, ¶¶ 24-25. A few John Doe declarants mentioned they may be wary of donating in the future, but those relatively few individual statements are unpersuasive to the Court given Plaintiffs’ enormous multi-state backing. Plaintiffs have therefore simply not shown any real chill, nor have they shown, as feared by Buckley , that Plaintiffs’ movement was at all susceptible to a fall-off in contributions or that, absent an exemption, the movement might not survive. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71 , 96 S.Ct. 612 .

Finally, this case is unique because Plaintiffs’ contributors’ names were actually disclosed years ago and yet Plaintiffs have produced almost no evidence of any ramifications suffered in the almost three years post-disclosure. While the evidence contained in Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 3 and 4 contain a few instances of vandalism that have occurred more recently than during the height of the Proposition 8 campaign and its aftermath, none of those articles draw any real connection between the incidents alleged and the victims’ support of traditional marriage. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Exhs. 4-89, 4-90, 4-91, 4-93. Even Plain *936 tiffs’ counsel at oral argument in 2011 admitted he was only aware of one instance of harassment that had occurred post-election. Accordingly, from a practical perspective, it makes no sense to buy in to the argument that disclosure may result in repercussions when there is simply no real evidence in the record that such repercussions actually did occur in the past three years. Plaintiffs’ evidence is, quite simply, stale. See Doe v. Reed, 823 F.Supp.2d 1195 , 1205 n. 3, 2011 WL 4943952 at *10 n. 3 (W.D.Wash.2011).

Accordingly, while Plaintiffs can point to a relatively few unsavory acts committed by extremists or criminals, these acts are so small in number, and in some instances their connection to Plaintiffs’ supporters so attenuated, that they do not show a reasonable probability Plaintiffs’ contributors will suffer the same fate. Given the grand scale of Plaintiffs’ campaign and the massive (and national) support they garnered for their cause, Plaintiffs’ limited evidence is simply insufficient to support a finding that disclosure of contributors’ names will lead to threats, harassment or reprisals. 12 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to this claim is DENIED and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

B. Whether California’s $100 Reporting Threshold is Unconstitutional 13

1. Standard of review.

In their papers, Plaintiffs argue that the disclosure provisions in this case are subject to strict scrutiny such that those requirements must be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. Defendants adamantly contend that only “exacting scrutiny” is required. While the issue of the appropriate standard of review has previously been muddled, the Supreme Court recently clarified that exacting scrutiny applies here. See Reed, 130 S.Ct. at 2818 (“We have a series of precedents considering First Amendment challenges to disclosure requirements in the electoral context. These precedents have reviewed such challenges under what has been termed ‘exacting scrutiny.’ ”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Human Life of Washington Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1003-1005 (9th Cir.2010). Despite their disagreement with the underlying authorities, Plaintiffs thus conceded at oral argument in 2011 that this Court is bound to apply that less stringent standard of review. Accordingly, this Court must now determine whether California’s specific disclosure requirements “are substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest.” Id. at 1005 .

2. The State’s informational interest.

Plaintiffs assert here that the State has no interest sufficiently compelling or substantial to justify compelled disclosure. While Plaintiffs assert that a number of cases have “suggested” that the State’s “informational interest may be sufficient to justify compelled ballot-measure disclosure,” Plaintiffs further contend any such finding is based on a misreading of Buckley . Plaintiffs’ Motion, 20:22-21:1. More specifically, Plaintiffs argue this informational interest is only implicated in candidate elections and is of minimal import *937 when it comes to ballot-initiative campaigns. Id., 21:6-12 . Plaintiffs believe voters can derive all necessary information pertaining to ballot measures from the text of an initiative itself. Id., 21:13-14 .

Defendants counter that Plaintiffs’ assertion that the State lacks a compelling informational interest in requiring disclosure “flies in the face of every relevant decision from the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals over the last four decades.” Defendants’ Motion, 26:22-24. Defendants point to authority this Court cited in its Order Denying Preliminary Injunction for the proposition that “[cjourts have repeatedly held that California’s informational interests in requiring disclosure by ballot measure committees” is sufficiently important. Id., 26:25-26 .

Indeed, in its Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, this Court found the State’s informational interest not only substantial, but compelling:

ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F.Supp.2d at 1207-1211 .

In the face of the above analysis, Plaintiffs have not in their current Motion convinced the Court the State’s interest here is anything other than sufficient. In fact, since the Court issued its above Order, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed that the State’s informational interest is “important”:

Human Life, 624 F.3d 990, 1005-1006 ; see also Canyon Ferry Road Baptist Church v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021, 1033 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is well established that, in the ordinary case, a state informational interest is sufficient to justify the mandatory reporting of expenditures and contributions in the context of ballot initiatives.”). That court also reiterated that “these considerations ‘apply just as forcefully, if not more so, for voter-decided ballot measures.’ ” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1006 (quoting Getman I, 328 F.3d at 1105). Moreover, the court noted that “[a]ecess to reliable information becomes even more important as more speakers, more speech- and thus more spending-enter the marketplace, which is precisely what has occurred in recent years.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1007 . The Human Life court therefore concluded that “[cjampaign finance disclosure requirements thus advance the important and well-recognized governmental interest of providing the voting public with the information with which to assess the various messages vying for their attention in the marketplace of ideas.” Id. at 1008 . 14

In addition, the Supreme Court in Citizens United , also recently spoke favorably of disclosure provisions. 130 S.Ct. at 914 (“In Buckley , the Court explained that disclosure could be justified based on a governmental interest in providing the electorate with information about the sources of election-related spending.”) (internal citations and quotation omitted); id. at 915 (“The disclaimers required ... provide the electorate with information, and insure that the voters are fully informed about the person or group who is speaking.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiffs, nonetheless argue that Citizens United should be ignored because that case involved candidate campaigns as opposed to ballot measure initiatives. Plaintiffs’ Motion, 22 n. 20. In light of the Ninth Circuit’s prior recognition, however, that a State’s informational interest can be even more powerful in the ballot measure elections than in candidate races, the Supreme Court’s discussion in Citizens United cannot be ignored.

Plaintiffs nonetheless ask this Court to ignore the great weight of the above authorities and to rely instead on the Tenth Circuit decision in Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.2010), a case in which that circuit reached a different conclusion than the above courts with respect to a ballot measure campaign. According to Plaintiffs, the Tenth Circuit was correct in finding that “the justifications for requiring disclosures in a candidate election may not apply, or may not apply with as much force, to a ballot initiative.” Plaintiffs’ Motion, 22:19-22 (quoting Sampson, 625 F.3d at 1249 ). Plaintiffs thus ask this Court to adopt the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning that “[t]he [Supreme] Court has never upheld a disclosure provision for ballot-issue campaigns that has been presented to it for review,” and that “the statements by the Supreme Court supporting disclosures in ballot-issue campaigns were dicta.” Id., 22:22-26 (quoting Sampson, 625 F.3d at 1258 ).

When comparing ballot initiatives to candidate campaigns, the Sampson court reasoned:

625 F.3d at 1249 . 15 That court later elaborated:

Id. at 1255-1257 .

The Sampson court ultimately rejected Supreme Court precedent indicating to the contrary by arguing that the high court’s message regarding the value of financial disclosure in the ballot-measure context is “mixed.” Id. at 1257 . According to the Tenth Circuit, while the Supreme Court has previously spoken favorably of disclosure requirements pertaining to ballot initiatives, that Court has never rejected a challenge to such disclosures. Id. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit believes those favorable discussions should be ignored as dicta. Id. at 1258 . That appellate court thus concluded that “while assuming that there is a legitimate public interest in financial disclosure from campaign organizations, we also recognize that this interest is significantly attenuated when the organization is concerned with only a single ballot issue and when the contributions and expenditures are slight.” Id. at 1259 .

The Tenth Circuit’s analysis regarding a state’s informational interest in ballot initiative campaigns is unpersuasive. First, that court rejected the reasoning in sever *944 al critical Supreme Court cases by categorizing those discussions as dicta. In addition, the Sampson decision is contrary to Ninth Circuit precedent that relies on the same Supreme Court authorities rejected by the Tenth Circuit to find that the State’s interest in ballot initiatives is important, and even compelling. In light of the contrary Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit authority already presented to this Court, this Court declines Plaintiffs’ invitation to rely on Sampson .

Moreover, even if this Court was persuaded by the Tenth Circuit’s analysis, that case is distinguishable from the instant case on its facts. More specifically, in Sampson the Tenth Circuit was confronted with a challenge to a state requirement that a small group raising less than $800 register as a campaign committee in an election of just a few hundred voters. Id. at 1249, 1251-52 . The Sampson court reasoned that an average citizen could not be expected to master campaign finance laws and to determine which ones apply in a given election. Id. at 1259-60 . Accordingly, even small groups, such as the plaintiffs in that case, would have been required to hire counsel to do so. Id. at 1260 . Obtaining legal counsel to support such a small campaign was itself a substantial burden, which was then compounded by the time plaintiffs themselves were required to expend on the subject. Id. Moreover, the public interest in disclosure is minimal when the value of the financial information is so small. Id. (“We agree with the Ninth Circuit that ‘[a]s a matter of common sense, the value of this financial information to the voters declines drastically as the value of the expenditure or contribution sinks to a negligible level.’ ”) (citing Canyon Ferry Road, 556 F.3d at 1033 ). Accordingly, Sampson held that, on the facts before it, the burden on plaintiffs in compelled disclosure of their financial information, outweighed any benefit to the State. The Court did include the following important caveat in its decision:

Id. at 1261. Given the limited application of the Tenth Circuit decision, its non-binding nature, and its rejection of Supreme Court precedent, Sampson is not controlling, and, in this Court’s opinion, the better line of reasoning is that generated out of this Circuit. Accordingly, this Court now finds the State’s informational interest well-established and substantial.

3. Relationship between the $100 reporting threshold and the State’s interest.

Plaintiffs next contend that, even assuming the State’s informational interest is important, the State’s disclosure requirements are not appropriately tailored to that interest. Plaintiffs’ Motion, 28:4-6. According to Plaintiffs, “common sense dictates-and the Ninth Circuit has found-that the ‘value of this financial information to the voters declines drastically as the value of the expenditure or contribution sinks to a negligible level.’ ” Id., 28:8-10 (quoting Canyon Ferry Road, 556 F.3d at 1033 ). Plaintiffs also argue the failure to account for inflation undermines any connection between the disclosure requirements and the State’s interest. Id., 29:14. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, Defendants contend the $100 threshold is constitutional unless it is “wholly without rationality.” Defendants’ Motion, 34:25-28. *945 Defendants further argue that the threshold is the result of “considered legislative judgment,” id., 36:6, and that the threshold need not be indexed for inflation, id., 36:23.

This Court addressed the parties’ arguments in its Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, as follows:

ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F.Supp.2d at 1220-1224 . The Court’s prior analysis still stands.

Plaintiffs nonetheless contend now that the $100 reporting threshold does nothing to combat the State’s informational interest, which it attempts to define more narrowly as an interest in combating “voter ignorance.” Plaintiffs’ Motion, 24:12-14. Plaintiffs primarily believe that disclosure of large special interest groups will promote any such interest and that the identity of small donors, such as those contributing less than $100, is irrelevant. Id., 26:1-9. Plaintiffs also argue there are other legislative actions that can be taken to combat voter ignorance (e.g., making measures simpler and clearer for voters). Id., 25:1-12. Plaintiffs thus conclude that the only justification for disclosure requirements that could actually alleviate voter ignorance is the need to prevent the “wolf from masquerading in sheep’s clothing.” Id., 27:6-18 (quoting Getman I, 328 F.3d at 1106 n. 24). Plaintiffs then go on to argue that this final justification cannot be met when the amount of contributions to be disclosed “sinks to a negligible level.” Id., 28:4-10 (quoting Canyon Ferry Road, 556 F.3d at 1033 ). First and foremost, Plaintiffs’ citation to Canyon Ferry Road does little to further their argument.

In Canyon Ferry Road, plaintiff Canyon Ferry Road Baptist Church challenged Montana’s campaign finance laws, including its disclosure requirements. 556 F.3d at 1023 . In that case, the Church’s Pastor became interested in supporting a Montana initiative amending the state constitution, as here, to define marriage as between a man and a woman. Id. at 1024 . With the hope of having the initiative placed on the ballot, a member of the church printed out a petition and used the Church’s copy machine and her own paper to print less than fifty copies of the document. Id. With the Pastor’s approval, the member placed approximately twenty copies of the petition in the Church’s foyer. Id. At roughly the same time, the Pastor also arranged for a simulcast entitled “Battle for Marriage,” which did not expressly support or oppose any Montana initiative or candidate, to be shown at the Church. Id. The Church did not charge *949 for attendance and utilized unpaid public service radio announcements to advertise the event. Id. The Church also printed flyers, which did not mention the state initiative, publicizing the broadcast. Id. After the simulcast, the Pastor did speak in support of the Montana initiative. Id. at 1024-25 . The Pastor then circulated the petition and indicated that petitions were available in the lobby. Id. at 1025 .

The Montana initiative was successfully passed, after which groups opposing the ballot measure filed suit against the Church alleging it had created an “incidental political committee” and had failed to file the requisite disclosure forms. Id. The Church countered that it could not “constitutionally be subjected to the disclosure and reporting requirements applicable to ‘incidental political committees’ under Montana law on the sole basis of its activities of de minimis economic effect in connection with the ‘Battle for Marriage’ event and related petition-signing efforts in support of CI-96.” Id. at 1028 . It further argued that the Montana state law was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the Church. Id. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that “as applied to (1) the placement of the petition in its foyer and (2) [the Pastor’s] exhortation to sign the petition in support of [the initiative] during a regularly scheduled Sunday service, the ... interpretation of ‘in-kind expenditures’ is unconstitutionally vague.” Id. That court also agreed “that the designation of the Church as an ‘incidental committee’ because of its one-time, in kind ‘expenditures’ of de minimis economic effect violates the Church’s First Amendment free speech rights.” Id.

More specifically, the Church argued that Montana’s disclosure requirements were unconstitutional as applied to it. Id. at 1030-1031 . While acknowledging that the State had a sufficiently important informational interest in disclosure, the court noted that the information needed “is the identity of persons financially supporting or opposing a candidate or ballot proposition.” Id. at 1032 (emphasis in original). That court observed that “[t]he disclosure requirements are not designed to advise the public generally what groups may be in favor of, or opposed to, a particular candidate or ballot issue; they are designed to inform the public what groups have demonstrated an interest in the passage or defeat of a candidate or ballot issue by their contributions or expenditures directed to that result.” Id. at 1032-33 .

Looking to Buckley , the Ninth Circuit then asked “whether Montana’s ‘zero dollar’ threshold for disclosure is ‘wholly without rationality.’ ” Id. at 1033. The court concluded that it could not “say that the informational value derived by the citizenry is the same across expenditures of all sizes.” Id. Moreover, “[a]s a matter of common sense, the value of this financial information to the voters declines drastically as the value of the expenditure or contribution sinks to a negligible level. As the monetary value of an expenditure in support of a ballot issue approaches zero, financial sponsorship fades into support and then into mere sympathy.” Id. (emphasis in original). The court also noted that the burden of reporting remains unchanged despite the minimal nature of any expenditures. Id. at 1034. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “if the Supreme Court’s ‘rationality’ test for threshold disclosure levels has any force at all, there must be a level below which mandatory disclosure of campaign expenditures by ‘incidental committees’ runs afoul of the First Amendment.” Id. On the facts before it, the Canyon Ferry Road court therefore held that:

Id. The court specifically limited its holding, however, to the above formulation and declined to express any views regarding the constitutionality of the state’s disclosure requirements pertaining to either candidate elections or to monetary contributions of any size. Id. Accordingly, while Plaintiffs attempt to carve out and rely on language that is persuasive to their position, that language is simply not on point. In addition, that case is factually distinguishable since it dealt with in-kind contributions that were entirely negligible, not monetary contributions in excess of a threshold rationally set by the state legislature. Moreover, while the in-kind contributions in that case were of no real consequence there, the totality of small contributions in this case were very consequential because a review of those contributions in the aggregate demonstrated, for example, just how much money supporting Proposition 8 was coming in to California from out of state. This Court finds it highly relevant to a California voter’s decision making process whether a ballot measure amending California’s Constitution is being supported by fellow Californians or by citizens of neighboring states. Accordingly, Canyon Ferry Road, has no real bearing on this case.

A First Circuit decision from just a few months ago is much more on point. In National Organization for Marriage v. McKee, that court addressed a challenge to Maine’s campaign disclosure provisions requiring “anyone spending more than an aggregate of $100 for communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate to report the expenditure to the Commission.” 649 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir.2011). As here, the plaintiff in that case argued the state lacked a sufficiently important interest justified by its $100 reporting threshold. Id. at 60 . Also as here, that plaintiff relied on Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 , 126 S.Ct. 2479 , to argue that disclosure thresholds must fail unless indexed to inflation.” Id. at 60-61. The McKee court rejected both of plaintiffs arguments stating:

Id. at 61 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . The First Circuit’s reasoning is consistent with Buckley , with this Court’s Order Denying Preliminary Injunction and with the current facts. Plaintiff has not provided any case law or new factual data indicating that the legislative decision in this case was “wholly without rationality” or that either the McKee court or this Court were incorrect in upholding $100 disclosure requirements. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to this claim is DENIED and *951 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

C. Whether Post-Election Reporting of Contributors or a Failure to Purge Reports Post-Election is Unconstitutional

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that California’s only possible interest, its informational interest, is insufficient to justify post-election compelled disclosure or the State’s failure to purge reports post-election. 17 Plaintiffs’ Motion, 33:7-8. According to Plaintiffs, “the problem of voter ignorance is, by definition, a pre-election concern.” Id., 33:11-13 . Plaintiffs also contend any post-election State interest could be served solely through non-public, as opposed to public, disclosure. Id., 35:8-12 .

Defendants disagree, arguing that the State’s informational interest does not end with an election. Defendants’ Motion, 32:6-8. Citing to this Court’s Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, Defendants contend the informational interest continues because, inter alia, legislation is not “carved in stone”, disclosure aids future campaigns, scholars rely on disclosure information to understand the influences of campaign contributions, post-election disclosure prevents ballot measure committees from evading disclosure by accepting contributions in the final days of an election, and complete and accurate reporting requires a sufficient amount of time such that final reporting cannot be finalized on or before an election. Defendants reject Plaintiffs’ assertion that non-public disclosure would serve the State’s needs, arguing that non-public disclosure only would deny voters, future campaigns and scholars useful information. Id., 34:14-15 .

Plaintiffs raised this same argument in their Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Court disposed of that argument in its relevant Order as follows:

ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F.Supp.2d at 1224-1225 .

Plaintiffs raise no new legal arguments and present no material facts not already addressed by this Court. Because Plaintiffs remaining arguments are based on their unsupported assertion that California’s informational interest cannot be served by post-election reporting, Plaintiffs’ arguments are rejected and their Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, therefore, is GRANTED.

*953 CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum and Order, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 245) is DENIED, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 259) is GRANTED, and Defendants’ Motion to Strike (ECF N. 271) is DENIED as moot. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

. Plaintiffs are ProtectMarriage.com—Yes on 8, a Project of California Renewal ("Protect-Marriage”); National Organization for Marriage California—Yes on 8, Sponsored by National Organization for Marriage ("NOM-California”); John Doe # 1, an individual, and as a representative of the proposed Class of Major Donors; and National Organization for Marriage California PAC ("NOM-California PAC”).

. Moving Defendants are Debra Bowen, Secretary of State for the State of California, in her official capacity; Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General for the State of California, in his official capacity; Department of Elections—City and County of San Francisco; Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney for the City and County of San Francisco, California, in his official capacity and as a representative of the Class of Elected City Attorneys in the State of California; and Ann Ravel, Sean Eskovitz, Elizabeth Garrett, Lynn Montgomery and Ronald Rotunda, members of the California Fair Political Practices Commission, in their official capacities.

. Defendants have moved to strike all evidence included in these Exhibits on the grounds that the contents: 1) are inadmissible hearsay; 2) exceed the scope of a stipulation entered into by the parties; 3) were not disclosed during discovery; or 4) were not properly authenticated. The Court is inclined to grant Defendants’ Motion for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that most of the exhibits are indeed hearsay. However, because consideration of the evidence included in these Exhibits does not alter the Court’s decision, Defendants’ Motion to Strike is instead DENIED as moot.

. The Court has referenced each exhibit in which the following facts are alleged to show, in part, that while Plaintiffs may characterize *919 their evidence as "voluminous” or "overwhelming,” in many instances the same events are reported repeatedly in multiple articles, creating the false impression that there is more here than closer inspection reveals. The Court notes also that, given the anonymous nature of the John Doe declarations, it is not clear whether any of the incidents alleged in those documents may overlap with any of the incidents documented in Exhibits 3 and 4. Based on the factual descriptions in some of the John Doe declarations, it is entirely possible that some of the above declarants are reporting incidences also reported below. Compare, e.g., Decl. of John Doe # 29 with Exh. 4-96. Any potential unidentified overlap is immaterial, however, and thus will be ignored.

. Defendant Jan Scully, on behalf of herself and as representative of the designated Class of District Attorneys in the State of California, submitted a position statement indicating that the Defendant Scully and the District Attorney Class "are, at best, peripheral Defendants in this case.” Position Statement, 2:6-7. This class thereby states their position as follows: "[T]o the extent that the Court determines that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs is not well-taken, then Defendant Scully and the District Attorney Class oppose that motion; however, to the extent that the Court determines that tiny Cross-Motions filed by any other party in this case are not well-taken, Defendants herein oppose those motions.” Id.., 2:18-3:4.

. At times the Court has chosen to quote extensively from its prior Order Denying Preliminary Injunction because the issues facing the Court today are largely unchanged from those facing the Court then and because the Court’s prior analysis is still highly relevant and directly applicable to the current facts before it today.

. In its Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, the Court began by analyzing the applicable standard of review and the State’s interest in compelled disclosure. These issues are discussed in the current context below.

. Notably, on remand, the Washington District Court rejected those plaintiffs’ arguments that they were entitled to the same type of exemption sought here. See Doe v. Reed, 823 F.Supp.2d 1195 , 2011 WL 4943952 (W.D.Wash. October 17, 2011).

. Plaintiffs even acknowledge in their papers that only a minority of individuals on the other side of the campaign resorted to the complained of tactics that are cause for concern. Plaintiffs’ Motion, 1:10-12 (“Some groups and individuals, certainly a minority, have resorted to advancing their cause, not by debating the merits of the issue, but by discouraging participation in the democratic process through acts calculated to intimidate.”) (emphasis added).

. Plaintiffs do argue that their contributors were victimized despite existing laws criminalizing the underlying conduct. Essentially, Plaintiffs argue those laws did nothing to deter criminal behavior. However, Plaintiffs have not alleged that any law enforcement response was insufficient, that law enforcement has somehow turned a blind eye to any criminal conduct, or that criminal sanctions will not be imposed if appropriate. That is a critical distinction between the instant case and past cases such as Brown and NAACP.

. To the contrary, those resorting to these sorts of tactics do more to undermine their cause than to further any civilized and productive discourse.

. It bears mention that if the Court were to find an exemption warranted here, it is likely a similar exemption would prove warranted in any election concerning a controversial ballot measure. As a result, those issues in which the public shows the greatest interest would be subject to the least transparency.

. Plaintiffs challenge the State's reporting threshold both facially and as-applied. Since Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge is based on the same arguments already disposed of by the Court above, only Plaintiffs' facial challenge will be addressed here.

. Plaintiffs contend the Human Life court’s "informational interest” discussion is dicta and is not relevant here, in part because that court was asked to evaluate only political committee definitions, not disclosure requirements. Plaintiffs’ Motion, 21 n. 19. Plaintiffs do not articulate, however, how the court's inquiry into the state’s interest there was any less relevant to the issue before it, or how the analysis would differ here.

. Notably, the court's latter point appears to go to the State's inapplicable "Corruption Interest” rather than to its "Informational Interest.”

. As an example, the public could very well be swayed by the fact that numerous donations to Plaintiffs, and likely to others, came from out of state. It appears very probable to this Court that the California electorate would be interested in knowing if a California initiative was funded by the citizens it is intended to affect or by out-of-state interest groups and individuals. In order to properly capture the number of non-California donors, it is quite logical to require a lower, rather than a higher, reporting threshold.

. From a practical perspective, Plaintiffs’ latter argument is somewhat illogical given the fact Plaintiffs acknowledge contribution reports are reproduced on the internet and elsewhere. It is not entirely clear what purpose would be served by the State’s purging of reports post-election when that information has already entered the public domain.