This is an action for double indemnity benefits in the amount of $15,000 under two policies of insurance issued by the defendant, New York Life Insurance Company, to Arnold Harrington, the deceased, as insured. The single indemnity life insurance benefits under the policies have already been paid to Mr. Harrington’s widow and the beneficiary, Joyce A. Harrington, the plaintiff in this action, and there is no dispute concerning those benefits.

Mr. Harrington was fatally injured by a self-inflicted gunshot wound on February 5, 1960 and died the same day. This action was commenced on# August 17, 1960 by the filing of a complaint in the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the City and County of San Francisco. On August 29, 1960 the action was removed to this Court by defendant, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a). This Court has jurisdiction of the action under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 .

The sole issue in the case is whether the death of Arnold Harrington “resulted directly, and independently of all other causes, from accidental bodily injury -x- * *-» within the meaning of the double indemnity provisions of the policies. The plaintiff submitted appropriate proof of death in which plaintiff represented the cause of death to be “accidental shooting.” In its answer defendant has declined to pay the double indemnity benefits. There is also lurking in the record under this defense (though not vigorously made) the suggestion by the defendant that the death was the result of suicide and therefore excluded under the double indemnity provisions of the policies. The parties agree that this case is controlled by the California law on the subject, since the contracts of insurance were issued in California, and the incident, which is the subject of this suit, occurred in California.

The facts, which are practically undisputed, are as follows.

Mr. Harrington, the insured, was a laboratory technician by occupation and was thirty-eight years old. He was married to the plaintiff herein, and as the issue of that marriage there were five children living in the home, the eldest being age eleven. He was happy in his occupation, which at the time of his death was bringing him an income from $1,000 to $1,200 per month. His financial condition was relatively good, in that other than secured obligations for payments on his home and automobile, and current living expenses, all of which were currently in good standing, he had no financial obligations. His health and the health of his family were good, with the. exception that he had an ulcer which was in a controlled condition. His family relationship appeared to be a happy one. There is no history of suicidal threats or tendencies. He had a hobby of collecting guns. Mrs. Harrington was fearful of guns, and did not participate in her husband’s hobby. At the time of his death he was the owner of a number of rifles and hand guns of various types, among them the German Mauser semi-automatic pistol with which he fired the fatal shot. Mr. Harrington fired his guns frequently at a firing range, was quite familiar with *677 them, was an expert shot, and prided himself upon his knowledge of guns. On the day of his death Mr. Harrington had been home from work with an adverse reaction to a flu shot, and he had a minor quarrel with his wife concerning her overstaying a visit with a girl friend. Mr. Harrington had been drinking, but did not appear to be intoxicated. The quarrel continued and Mr. Harrington left the house in anger, returning approximately an hour later. Upon his return Mrs. Harrington refused to make up with her husband or to reply to him. At that time present in the room was the oldest child, a son aged eleven. Mr. Harrington, saying words to the effect that he might as well do something he enjoyed, started handling the Mauser semi-automatic pistol. The pistol was loaded with one shell in the barrel, or firing chamber, and eight or nine shells in the magazine. He was causing the gun to make a clicking noise. According to the evidence this could have been done in one of three ways, all of which involved causing the hammer to be released from a cocked or semi-cocked position to firing position, while the safety lever was on safe. The safety mechanism on the gun was so designed that even though the hammer dropped toward the firing pin it would not strike the firing pin while the safety lever was in the safe position. After a number of clicks Mrs. Harrington requested him to stop, saying in substance “Please don’t do that, you know it makes me nervous” or “you know its dangerous,” to which Mr. Harrington replied that the gun was safe, and “see, I’ll show you.” Whereupon he placed the gun to his head and the gun fired, causing the gun shot wound through his head which caused his death shortly thereafter.

There was expert testimony concerning the condition of the gun and the operation of its mechanism. The significant factors are that there was little, if any, probability that the gun would fire when the safety lever was in the position of safe, one witness saying the chances were a million to one, and that this was so regardless of how the hammer was released; that the only way the gun could be fired was when the safety lever was in a fire position; that as a matter of general safety practice with respect to firearms it was “dangerous” to point a firearm loaded, or unloaded, with the safety on, or off, at any vital part of the body. Under these circumstances the Court finds:

(1) That the death was produced by a gun shot wound, which was caused by the voluntary act of the deceased;

(2) That deceased knew the gun was loaded, but he thought the safety lever was in a safe position and that the gun would not fire in that condition, and, further, that the gun could be pointed at his head safely in that condition;

(3) That at the time of the firing the safety lever of the gun was in the fire position, but that this condition was unknown to and unexpected by the deceased; and

(4) That the deceased had no intention to take his own life.

Under these facts plaintiff contends that death occurred from “accidental bodily injury”, and defendant contends that as a matter of law death could not have so occurred because the act of pointing a loaded gun at his head by the deceased was either suicidal or so inherently dangerous that death followed as a foreseeable consequence.

While defendant suggests that the conduct of the deceased might have been suicidal, the main thrust of its argument is based upon the proposition that the death was non-accidental because of the performance of a dangerous act from which death was a foreseeable consequence. Defendant’s reluctance to strongly urge that the death was the result of a suicidal act is confirmed by the evidence. Other than the minor family quarrel which occurred on the day of the shooting, there was no factor in Mr. Harrington’s life which either directly or indirectly supports the inference that he intended to take his own life at the time of the shooting, or at any other time. Such factors as his condition of *678 health, his financial status, his family status, and his mental condition, are all negative on the question of suicidal intent. The act of pointing a loaded gun, which he thought was safe, at his head, which might be characterized as foolish or dangerous, under the circumstances in which it occurred in this case is not suicidal. Plaintiff, therefore, has carried the burden that the death was not the result of suicide. 1 See Wilkinson v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 180 Cal. 252 , 180 P. 607 ; Canada Life Assurance Co. v. Houston, 9 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 523 .

The other portion of the defendant’s contention raises a more difficult question, namely, whether under the circumstances of this case the non-suicidal death was caused by accidental bodily injury. In this situation it is the duty of this Court to determine what the courts of last resort of the State of California would hold under the facts of this case. In Young v. Aeroil Products Co., 9 Cir., 1957, 248 F.2d 185 , the court said at page 188:

There are a number of California cases dealing with the interpretation of insurance policies which provide for death payments as the result of accidental deaths. Careful research by counsel and by the Court fails to disclose any California case which closely resembles this case on its facts, and it would be difficult to say with certainty what the California courts would hold under these circumstances. The California cases seem to make a distinction between insurance policies which insure against accidental death, and a death caused by accidental means, holding that those policies which insure against death from accidental means require proof not only “that death or injury should be unexpected or unforeseen, but there must be some element of unexpectedness in the preceding act or occurrence which leads to injury or death.” Rock v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 172 Cal. 462 , 156 P. 1029, 1030 , L.R.A.1916E, 1196.

There is a suggestion in later California cases that this distinction no longer is valid. Cox v. Prudential Ins. Co., 172 Cal.App.2d 629, 637 , 343 P.2d 99 . See also: Zuckerman v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 42 Cal.2d 460, 473 , 267 P.2d 777 . In any event the distinction is of no moment in this case, because the policy in this case insured against death from accidental bodily injury and would fall in the “accidental results” type of case as distinguished from the “accidental means” type of case, the latter requiring a greater quantum of proof.. It is the conclusion of this Court that the proof in *679 this case is sufficient to establish that death resulted from accidental bodily injury under either standard.

This conclusion is based upon the definition of “accidental” as that term is used in accident insurance policies. The earliest California case dealing with the definition of this word in the context of insurance cases is Richards v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 89 Cal. 170 , 26 P. 762 , where the court said:

This definition, “a casualty — something out of the usual course of events, and which happens suddenly and unexpectedly, and without any design on the part of the person insured,” has been repeated often in the many California cases which have subsequently dealt with the problem. Some of these cases are Price v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. 800, 802 , 147 P. 1175 ; Rock v. Traveler’s Insurance Co., supra; Rooney v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass’n, 74 Cal.App.2d 885, 888 , 170 P.2d 72 ; Zuckerman v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, supra; and Cox v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra. The essence of defendant’s position is that the deceased invited death by engaging in conduct so inherently dangerous *680 that death was the foreseeable result. In support of its position defendant cites Postler v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 173 Cal. 1 , 158 P. 1022 , overruled on other grounds in Zuckerman, supra; Price v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., supra, and Eraldi v. North American Acc. Ins. Co., D.C.N.D.Cal.1937, 20 F.Supp. 735 . In all of these cases the deceased started an altercation, which resulted in the death of the deceased caused by a shot from a gun fired by the other person to the altercation. In each of these cases the court held that in a case where the deceased invited death from a deadly weapon in the hands of another person the killing was a natural and probable consequence of his own voluntary act, and not- an accident. In Postler, supra, the court said:

Plaintiff’s position is that death in this case was accidental because it was the unexpected and unforeseeable result of a voluntary act, and plaintiff urges that, although the deceased’s voluntary act of pointing a loaded gun at his head was both dangerous and unnecessary, death was the result of the deceased’s mistaken belief that the safety lever of the gun was in a safe position, and that, therefore, the gun would not fire.

In support of her position plaintiff cites a number of eases, among which are Cox v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra, and Rooney v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, supra. In both of these cases the deceased had placed himself in a position of peril by a voluntary act of his own. In Cox, supra, the deceased had deliberately and voluntarily jumped out of a moving vehicle in which he was being transported as a prisoner by law enforcement officers, and was killed by a following vehicle. In Rooney, supra, the deceased started a fist fight, and was knocked to the ground and killed by striking his head against the sidewalk. Both of these cases are subsequent in time to the California cases cited by the defendant. Both quote from the case of Losleben v. California State Life Ins. Co., 133 Cal.App. 550, 556 , 24 P.2d 825 , with approval :

In Rooney, supra, it is said:

These more recent California cases seem to teach that, even though death may be the result of a voluntary act of the deceased in which the deceased started in motion a perilous course of conduct, death may be accidental where there is some act or occurrence in the course of conduct which is unanticipated and *682 unexpected by the deceased, and from which it cannot be said reasonably that death was the natural or probable consequences of such conduct. The cases are not clear on where reasonable foreseeability ends and the unexpected begins, but seem to leave that question to the facts of each case.

Here the facts would seem to support the conclusion of accidental death rather than death as the foreseeable result of a dangerous or perilous course of conduct. It does not require expert opinion to establish that it is dangerous or perilous to point a loaded gun at one’s head in the parlance of general safety practices in the handling of firearms. However, this does not mean that every death which results from the performance of such conduct is not an accident. If, as expert testimony showed here, the gun had a safety mechanism which reasonably could be anticipated to prevent firing, and consequently death, when properly used, then it cannot be said that death was the foreseeable result of pointing the loaded gun if the one pointing the gun thought, and had good reason to believe, that the gun was in that condition. The conduct of the deceased here could be called foolish, stupid, dangerous, perilous, unnecessary and many other characterizations of a similar import, but in the context of the surrounding circumstances it would require a strained appraisal of the facts to say that what occurred was not unexpected and unforeseen by him. Before he pointed the gun at his head he had been doing the same unsafe, mechanical manipulation with the gun by causing the hammer to be released toward the firing pin with the safety lever in a safe position without firing the gun. His announced purpose for putting the gun to his head was to demonstrate the safety of the gun in that condition. It was his mistaken belief that the gun was safe which produced the unexpected occurrence. It can be argued with some degree of plausibility that the deceased should have foreseen what probably happened here, namely, that somehow, in the manipulation of the gun he inadvertently moved the safety lever from a safe position to a fire position just before putting the gun to his head. In other words, should he have anticipated the mistake which caused his death? The answer is that in the common understanding an occurrence which happens as the result of a mistake is usually an accident. When weighing probabilities in this area the courts seem to require some element of certainty of the end result by the means used, without the intervention of some act or occurrence of an unexpected nature, such as a mistake, before holding that death is a foreseeable consequence. Here the end result of death would not have occurred but for the mistaken and unexpected condition of the gun. The Court, therefore, concludes that death in this case resulted directly from accidental bodily injury.

Defendant has cited a number of cases from jurisdictions other than California which are not supported by the weight of authority in California, or are distinguishable on their facts. These cases are Kinavey v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1942, 149 Pa.Super. 568 , 27 A.2d 286 , (doing acrobatic stunts on the rail of a bridge while intoxicated); Allred v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1957, 247 N.C. 105 , 100 S.E.2d 226 (a fourteen year old boy killed as the result of lying down in the middle of a highway to show how brave he was); Ford v. Standard Life Ins. Co., Tenn.1947, 12 C.C.H. Life, Health and Accident Cases 789, (handling a venomous snake under the religious belief he could handle such snakes without harm); Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1951, 84 Ga.App. 214 , 66 S.E.2d 119 (playing a form of “Russian roulette”); and Baker v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 1956, 201 Tenn. 247 , 298 S.W.2d 715 (permitting a person to shoot at a can on the insured’s head). There should be added to the cited cases Trivette v. New York Life Ins. Co., 6 Cir., 1960, 283 F.2d 441 (shooting self with pistol). What was said in Cox, supra, seems apropos here:

There are outside cases which seem to support plaintiff. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kent, 6 Cir., 1934, 73 F.2d 685 ; and Peppers v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 1936, 53 Ga.App. 851 , 187 S.E. 215 .

During the course of trial defendant objected to and moved to strike certain pre-death conversations by deceased and statements by plaintiff made shortly after the occurrence. The Court admitted the evidence and reserved ruling on the objections and motions to strike. The objections are overruled, and the motions denied. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the evidence, as a matter of law, did not establish that death occurred from accidental bodily injury within the meaning of the two insurance policies in question. Ruling was reserved. The motion to dismiss is denied.

Prior to the taking of evidence plaintiff requested the right to amend the pleadings to conform to proof on the question of interest. Plaintiff should forthwith present her proposed amendment, so that final judgment can be prepared and entered after the question of interest is determined.

Judgment is awarded plaintiff in the amount claimed, subject to the determination of the question of interest. Under the provisions of Rule 52(a), F.R. Civ.P., 28 U.S.C. the findings and conclusions in this memorandum shall constitute the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court, except on the issue of interest, and counsel for plaintiff is directed to prepare and present a judgment in accordance herewith after the determination of the question of interest.

. In its brief defendant asserts that the burden of showing that death was not the result of suicide was on the plaintiff, citing Zuckerman v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 1954, 42 Cal.2d 460 , 267 P.2d 777 . If defendant’s assertion is the holding of the Zuckerman case plaintiff here has met that burden. It is unnecessary for this Court to determine whether or not the Zuckerman case so holds.