This is an action brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error to recover damages for the alleged negligent killing of her husband, James Beaumont. At the close of the trial the court directed the jury to find a verdict for the defendant. The jury so found, and judgment was duly rendered in defendant’s favor. The only question raised by the assignment of errors is whether or not the court erred in giving this instruction.

The material facts are substantially as follows:

Did the court err in refusing to submit the case to the jury? Is there any evidence tending to show that the defendant was guilty of any negligence? What was the’ cause of the collision?

The plaintiff in error, with apparent earnestness, claims that, inasmuch as the witnesses were nearly all in the employ of the defendant, the case ought to have been submitted to the jury, in order to determine whether the testimony given by them was reasonable. The argument seems to be that each witness was endeavoring to exculpate himself, and fasten the blame on somebody else, and that each witness, in these respects, is unworthy of belief. This idea permeates the entire brief. The general tone of the argument of counsel can be best explained by a quotation from their brief:

The testimony, which it is claimed was given in order to fasten the blame on others and thereby exculpate themselves, principally relates to the question whether Hall or Beaumont was guilty of negligence. It is a complete answer upon this point to say that it is wholly immaterial whether the collision was attributable to the negligence of Hall or Beaumont, because they were fellow servants in the employ of defendant, and, if either was guilty of the negligence which caused the collision, the plaintiff could not recover. This principle is too well settled to require discussion or citation of authorities, and is admitted to be correct by plaintiff’s counsel. The sole question for our determination is whether the defendant was guilty of any negligence. The only debatable question is whether .order Ho. 10 was so worded as to mislead the conductors and engineers.

It is claimed that order Ho. 10 violated at least two of defendant’s rules — First, by using the word “extra” as applied to Blew’s train, which was simply an engine and caboose, while by rule 112 the word “extra” implied that Blew’s train was an irregular or extra freight train; second, that said order contained information not essentially *537 a part of the order, so far as Hall, conductor of the work train, was concerned, thus violating rule 200; that, in addition thereto, the order “that second section Ho. 53 and Blew extra will meet at Enumclaw” was misleading, and threw Hall off his guard as to his duty to protect against Blew extra east, as he ought and probably “would have done had he not been misled by this order.” The witness Riche in his testimony said: “I would understand order Ho. 10 to mean that it was a freight train that Hall was to protect against. Could not tell from order Ho. 10 that it was simply an engine and caboose that Beaumont was running. It is customary and usual for an engine and caboose out on the road to run much faster than a freight train.” The question is not whether order Ho. 10 might he considered by others as misleading, but whether, as a matter of fact, either Hall or Beaumont was misled thereby. If they understood it as intended by the train dispatcher, it makes no difference what other interpretation might have been given to it by outside parties. W. C. Albee, the train master, testified that he thought it best to give an order “in the way that train order Ho. 10 was given. Beaumont had ran extras and work trains.” How did Hall and Beaumont interpret the order? Would it have made any difference in the result, or in any manner have prevented the collision, if Beaumont’s train had been designated as consisting of an engine and caboose instead of “extra”? Beaumont is dead, and his understanding must he gleaned from his acts, and from his general knowledge, which he is shown to have had. He certainly knew of what his train consisted. There is no evidence whatever which tends in any manner to prove that he was misled by order Ho. 10.

We have heretofore quoted some of the testimony of Conductor Hall with reference to order Ho. 10. He further testified as follows:

This testimony conclusively shows that Hall was not misled by order Ho. 10. The record, in onr opinion, shows that Beaumont did not exercise usual care and caution in sooner stopping his train when he saw, or should have seen, the lights in the rear end of Hall’s train, and the signals given by Ramsey, a brakeman oh Hall’s train. The testimony also shows that Beaumont disobeyed order Ho. 37 given to him at South Prairie, which is a registering station, directing him to ran slowly and carefully “at Maywood.” Moreover, rule 149 limits the speed of a freight train to one mile in three minutes. The speed he made with his train was far in excess of this limit. Having violated this rule relative to speed, and disobeyed the orders of defendant, he must, under the principles announced in Railroad Co. v. Poirier, 167 U. S. 47 , 17 Sup. Ct. 741, 42 L. Ed. 72 , be held guilty of negligence.

*538 We are of opinion, upon a careful review of the whole evidence, that it was Beaumont’s negligence that caused the collision. The case may be, as claimed by counsel, a hard one for plaintiff; but it is made absolutely clear that plaintiff, under the law, upon the undisputed facts, is not entitled to recover any damages. It therefore necessarily follows that the court did not err in instructing the jury to find a verdict for defendant. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed-