This is a petition for review of a decision of the Referee in Bankruptcy declaring certain chattel mortgages executed by the bankrupt to be void as against creditors upon grounds which we shall presently consider.

The petitioner, Crocker-Citizens National Bank, first petitioned the Referee for leave to exercise a power of sale under two chattel mortgages executed by the bankrupt in its favor, referred to respectively as Aerocolor mortgage and the *85 Web Offset mortgage, as security for a loan of $200,000 and as further security for advances thereafter to be made. The petitioner’s claim against the bankrupt estate now approximates $500,000. The chattels were sold by the trustee pursuant to stipulation, and, after having paid from proceeds thereof claims of certain conditional vendors, there remains approximately $70,000, which it is conceded should be paid to the petitioner if the chattel mortgages are found to be valid.

According to the certificate of the Referee, the questions thus raised are:

It is conceded that the chattel mortgages have attached thereto acknowledgments valid on their faces. But it is further conceded that the President and Secretary of the mortgagors, whose signatures were affixed, did not in fact personally appear before the notary public.

It is well settled in California that an acknowledgment not taken in substantial compliance with the applicable .statute is fatally defective and the instrument is treated as if not acknowledged at .all. 1 Cal.Jur.2d 482. Kelsey v. Dunlap, 7 Cal. 160 ; Bryan v. Ramirez, 8 Cal. 461 ; Barrett v. Tewksbury, 9 Cal. 13 ; Fogarty v. Finlay, 10 Cal. 239 ; Kennedy v. Gloster, 98 Cal. 143 , 32 P. 941 ; Merced Bank v. Rosenthal, 99 Cal. 39 , 31 P. 849 , 33 P. 732 ; Le Mesnager v. Hamilton, 101 Cal. 532 , 35 P. 1054 ; Lee v. Murphy, 119 Cal. 364 , 51 P. 549 ; Murray v. Tulare Irr. Co., 120 Cal. 311 , 49 P. 563 , 52 P. 586 ; Rolando v. Everett, 72 Cal.App. 2d 629 , 165 P.2d 33 .

It is also well settled that for a valid acknowledgment, the person whose acknowledgment is to be taken must appear personally before the certifying officer for the purpose of acknowledging the instrument. Le Mesnager v. Hamilton (1894) 101 Cal. 532 , 35 P. 1054 ; Montgomery v. Bank of America (1948) 85. Cal.App.2d 559, 193 P.2d 475 ; Burck v. Buchen (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 741 , 116 P.2d 958 .

To have such an effect, however, the defect must be apparent on the face of the certificate. 1 Cal.Jur.2d Merced Bank v. Rosenthal (1893) 99 Cal. 39 , 31 P. 849 ; Lee v. Murphy (1897) 119 Cal. 364 , 51 P. 549 ; Overton v. Harband (1935) 6 Cal. App.2d 455 , 44 P.2d 484 .

This exception to the general rule was first mentioned in the case of Merced Bank v. Rosenthal, supra, where the court said:

*86 In Overton v. Harband, supra, the court said:

Admittedly, the authorities in California in support of the exception are few and weak, but the courts have never had occasion to rule with greater force upon it. These cases, I believe, are sufficient to indicate that if the courts of California were to rule upon the point, they would uphold, under such circumstances, an acknowledgment valid on its face, even though subject to a latent defect. This appears to be the majority rule.

A recent article in 59 A.L.R.2d 1299 summarizes the rule as follows:

The theory behind the exception to the general rule was expressed in the case of Boswell v. First National Bank of Laramie, 16 Wyo. 161 , 92 P. 624 .

This exception to the general rule has also been applied in the case of chattel mortgages and in favor of the mortgagee thereof. Stockmen’s National Bank of Casper v. Lukis Candy Co., 47 Wyo. 127 , 33 P.2d 254 .

I conclude, therefore, that the Referee erred in holding that the chattel mortgages were void as against creditors.

The Referee found that the consideration for the chattel mortgages and the delivery of the chattel mortgages were not in accordance with the provision of § 3440.1 of the California Civil Code in that the mortgages were recorded 15 minutes prior to the time designated in the notices of intention to mortgage.

The record does not reveal just when the consideration was paid or when the chattel mortgages were actually delivered. All it does show is that the chattel mortgages were recorded 15 minutes before the time designated in the notices.

In the absence of any showing of prejudice on the part of any creditor, I conclude that there ha been a substantial compliance with § 3440.1 of the California Civil Code. In the absence of a further showing as to the time at which the consideration changed hands, the presumption of validity should support this holding. The object of this section in the Civil Code is to furnish creditors of the intended mortgagor a period of at least 10 days within which to levy attachment or execution on the property to be mortgaged and to garnishee or levy on the proceeds of the mortgage in the event payment is not met on the claims presented. There is no showing that the premature recordation of the chattel mortgages has in any way frustrated the object of the statute or prejudiced the rights of the creditors. In view of this conclusion it becomes unnecessary to decide whether the bankrupt was engaged in business as a manufacturer or a retail . merchant.

And finally the Referee found that the descriptions contained in the chattel mortgages of Aeroeolor, Inc. are insufficient as to all the property other than the machinery or equipment readily identified by serial number, etc.

It appears that the chattel mortgages in question failed to specify in the places therein provided the location of the chattels they purport to cover, these spaces being left blank. They do contain, however, the name of the mortgagor, Aerocolor, Inc., doing business as Aero Press, and its address at 4200 West Burbank Boulevard, Burbank, County of Los Angeles. The mortgages further contain the clause: “The mortgagor hereby warrants that he is the true and lawful owner of all the property specifically described above; that the same is free of all liens and encumbrances; that he is entitled to the lawful possession thereof; and that said property is now in his possession on the above described real property.” (Emphasis added)

There is no statutory requirement relating specifically to what type of description should be contained in a chattel mortgage. Such a description is sufficient if it meets the standards of certainty required by any agreement. Property must be so described or designated that the description may, by the aid of extrinsic evidence of surrounding facts and circumstances, be applied to some particular property. 43 Cal.Jur.2d 161. Applicable rules for determining the requisites for a sufficient description to chattel property in a chattel mortgage were discussed in Merced Production Credit Assn. v. Bayer, 222 A.C.A. 869, 873, 35 Cal.Rptr. 511, 513 .

The rule is fairly stated in 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 64, p. 672-673 as follows:

It seems apparent that an interested party could with little difficulty locate and identify the property described in the mortgage, and I therefore conclude that the description is sufficient.

In view of the foregoing the judgment, and order of the Referee of June 18, 1964, is reversed.