This is a petition filed under section 24b of the bankruptcy law of 1898 to review an order of the district court for the district of Washington, Northern division, made and entered in. the above-entitled cause. The said D. N. Holden and Lizzie Holden were separately proceeded against in bankruptcy by their creditors. The causes were consolidated by consent, and “one and the same answer” filed to the petitions. Subsequently it was adjudged that the “respondents ahd each of them are bankrupts within the true intent and meaning of the acts of congress relating to bankruptcy.” The respondents then prayed exemption from the claims of creditors of two life insurance policies. The claim was disallowed by the referee, who made due report of his action to the court. The re *651 spondents filed exceptions to the report, and, after hearing, the court, by an order duly entered on the 16th of July, 1901, vacated the report, and adjudged the policies to be exempt. To review this order of the district court the present petition was filed by J. A. Stratton, the duly appointed trustee of the estates of said bankrupts. No answer has been filed to the petition, and the question is whether upon the facts stated the order in the district court should be revised.

The policies in question were issued on the 15th of June, 1894, by the Northwestern Life Insurance Company of Milwaukee, Wis., and were respectively numbered 206,383 and 303,921, and were, respectively, for the amounts of $5,000 and $2,000. Daniel N. Holden was the insured in both, and Lizzie Holden was the beneficiary in both, with'the provision, however, that if she should not survive him payment should be made to his executors, administrators, and assigns. It was provided in the policy No. 206,383 that it is “issued on the semitontine plan, and its tontine dividend period is twenty years,” and the following is indorsed on the policy:

It is alleged in the petition that the policies have a present cash surrender value combined of about $2,200, and it was stated on the argument that the creditors of each of the bankrupts are the same.

It is provided by the laws of the state of Washington “that the proceeds or avails of all life insurance shall be exempt from all liability for any debt.” Laws 1895, p. 336. By section 70a of the bankrupt law of 1898 it is provided that:

Section 6 of the bankrupt law is as follows:

The effect and extent of section 6 was considered by this court in Re Scheld, 44 C. C. A. 233 , 104 Fed. 870 , 52 L. R. A. 188, and it was said that the purpose of the section did not pervade the whole act, but was controlled by section 70a; and that under the latter section policies of insurance payable to the bankrupt himself, his estate or personal representatives, passed to the trustee of the estate. But we also said:

What is the character of the policies in the case at bar? Are they covered by the proviso of section 70? It will be observed that the policies were not payable to either Holden or his wife absolutely, but to her only if she survived him, and to his personal representatives if he survived her. Subject to such contingent interest in him, the policies and the money to become due under them belong to her, and it is beyond his power to transfer them to any other person or to surrender them. In re Heilbron’s Estate, 14 Wash. 536 , 45 Pac. 153 , 35 L. R. A. 602, citing Bank v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195 , 9 Sup. Ct. 41, 32 L. Ed. 370 , and other cases. Under the laws of Washington her interest in the policies became her separate property, and was assignable by her. 2 May, Ins. 399q, and cases cited. Each, therefore, has an interest in the policies, and each must be held to have an insurance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to him or to her, his of her estate or personal estate or personal representatives, and subject, therefore, to the provisions of section 70; in other words, passed to their respective trustees as assets of their respective estates. It may be that neither could surrender the policies without the consent of the other, but such right of surrender p'assed with the policies to their respective trustees. In Steele v. Buel, 44 C. C. A. 287 , 104 Fed. 968 , the circuit court of appeals of the Eighth circuit has decided that the rule of exemption of section 6 pervades the whole act, and is to be read into every other section and provision of the act. The difference of opinion between that learned court and this court demonstrates the ambiguity of the bankrupt act, and, while not insensible to the necessity of harmony in the decisions of the courts of appeal, we are not disposed to depart from the ruling in Re Scheld. There is a way open to respondents for a further review of the questions involved.

It follows that the order of the district court should be revised in accordance with this opinion; and it is so ordered.