This is an action to enjoin and set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission (hereafter referred to as Commission) of March 21, 1963, as amended by order of June 20, 1963, and supplemental order dated December 31, 1963, which orders prescribed new divisions of joint rail rates on transcontinental freight traffic. The Commission’s order of March 21, 1963, provided for new divisions of joint rates on Eastern and Mountain-Pacific transcontinental freight traffic substantially more favorable to the Eastern lines than the present divisions. New divisions were also established on transcontinental traffic originating and terminating in Midwest territory and for Midwestern lines participation as intermediate carriers of traffic to and from Eastern (official) and Mountain-Pacific territory. These divisions benefited the great majority of Midwestern lines.

In April, 1954, most of the Eastern lines filed a complaint before the Commission seeking to increase their divisions of transcontinental freight revenue on traffic moving between stations of the Eastern lines in Eastern territory and stations in the eleven western states of Mountain-Pacific territory. The other Eastern lines now before the court filed similar complaints shortly thereafter.

A group of Midwestern lines filed a separate complaint .before the Commission against Mountain-Pacific lines and Eastern lines which brought into issue the lawfulness of (1) their divisions of joint rates between Midwest territory and stations in the western part of Mountain-Pacific territory; and (2) Midwestern lines subdivisions of the primary western divisions of joint rates between Eastern territory and said stations in Mountain-Pacific territory as to which the Midwestern lines performed intermediate service.

The Mountain-Pacific lines filed answers and cross-complaints to the complaints of the Eastern and Midwestern lines. Hearings, which terminated in the *531 Commission’s said 1963 orders, began April, 1955. All groups offered evidence based on their studies and claims re costs.

The present action was filed by plaintiffs, seven principal western roads and four smaller roads serving Mountain-Pacific territory, on June 23, 1963. A complaint in intervention was filed by forty-five additional roads serving Mountain-Pacific territory. All are referred to here as Mountain-Pacific lines. Also intervening were the People of the State of California and regulatory agencies of ten western states and the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway and Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad, Midwestern lines whose revenues were reduced by the Commission’s order.

The present divisions of joint rates on transcontinental traffic were established by agreement which has not been approved by the Commission. These revenues account for about 50% of the total freight revenues of Mountain-Pacific lines, 15% of that of Midwestern lines and about 6% of that of Eastern lines.

On June 27, 1963, the court issued a Temporary Restraining Order pending hearing on application for Interlocutory Injunction, and this three-judge court, on August 3, 1963, after hearing, entered an Interlocutory Injunction restraining enforcement of the new divisions order until after hearing by the Commission of petitions for reconsideration.

The Commission filed a “Supplemental Report” and order on December 31, 1963, denying all petitions for reconsideration which had been filed by plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs (hereafter referred to as plaintiff). The new order made some minimal changes in the order of March 21, 1963. On March 23, 1964, this court entered its Judgment for Interlocutory Injunction, on Supplemental and Amended Complaints previously filed, enjoining the enforcement of the Commission’s order of December 31, 1963.

The statutes primarily involved are Section 15(6) of the Interstate Commerce Act [ 49 U.S.C. § 15 (6)] and Sections 7(c), 8(b) and 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, enacted in 1946, [ 5 U.S.C. §§ 1006 (c), 1007(b) and 1009 (e) ]. Section 15(6) provides that in prescribing divisions the Commission is obligated to give due consideration, “among other things,” to the following factors:

(1) “(T)o the efficiency with which the carriers concerned are operated,”

(2) “the amount of revenue required to pay their respective operating expenses, taxes, and a fair return on their railway property held for and used in the service of transportation,”

(3) “the importance to the public of the transportation services of such carriers,”

(4) “and also whether any particular participating carrier is an originating, intermediate, or delivering line, and”

(5) “any other fact of circumstance which would ordinarily, without regard to the mileage haul, entitle one carrier to a greater or less proportion than another carrier of the joint rate, fare or charge.”

The numbering of the items to be considered is ours.

As to paragraph (1) of 15(6) above, the Commission concluded that none of the contending groups of carriers had been operated either more or less efficiently than another, and as to paragraph (3) of 15(6) above, that there are no differences in importance to the public of the services of the three groups of carriers.

Section 8 (b) of the Administrative Act [ 5 U.S.C. § 1007 (b)] provides in part:

Section 7(c) of the Act [ 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (c)] provides in part:

.Section 10(e) of the Act [ 5 U.S.C. § 1009 ■(e)] provides in part:

The interpretation of Section 15(6) is ■the subject of the major dispute in the instant case. Plaintiffs urge that the ■Commission is required to consider and to make specific findings as to each of the five factors set forth in Section 15(6), ■enumerated above. Moreover, they urge that the Commission is further required, by the provisions of Section 15(6), and .as well by Section 8(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, to find:

(1) The dollar amount of revenue required by each individual carrier involved;

.(2) The financial effect of the prescribed divisions on each individual carrier involved; that is, the extent to which the prescribed divisions will produce the dollar amount of revenue required by each individual carrier involved.

The “findings” made by the Commission following its report of March 21, 1963, are as follows:

The Commission bases its conclusion -that the Eastern and Midwestern lines should receive larger divisions of joint rates on the ratio of past revenues received from all services to total cost of services. Plaintiffs object to the Commission’s method of determining costs because it failed to use certain adjustments suggested by plaintiffs in the Rail Form A formula used. The Commission used average costs of all freight traffic, not the costs of transcontinental freight here in issue. This, plaintiffs urge, is in violation of the Acts involved because the •Commission failed to require Eastern and Midwestern lines to produce data in their sole possession showing their actual costs, and the Commission therefore failed to make required findings and conclusions, with respect thereto, supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiffs also contend the Commission refused to make essential ■findings and conclusions as to the reasonableness of the particular percentage divisions prescribed for Eastern lines and that the divisional scales prescribed for •determining the divisions of Midwestern lines are not supported by “rational findings or substantial evidence.”

With respect to the Commission’s treatment of “revenue needs”, plaintiffs say it disregarded passenger deficits and treated Mountain-Pacific roads “as freight carriers”, whereas Section 15(6) requires revenue needs be determined with respect to all transportation services, and that no findings were made in support of excluding passenger deficit in determining revenue needs, in violation of Section 8(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act.

The parties appear to agree that the prescribing of divisions involves the exercise of judgment and that the Commission shall have broad discretion in the •exercise of its judgment, that it need not specify the “weight” it attributes to various items of evidence and that its evaluation of the importance of the various factors is peculiarly within the purview of the Commission. See Boston & Maine Railroad v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 661 ,(D.C.Mass.1962), affirmed 371 U.S. 26 , 83 S.Ct. 117 , 9 L.Ed.2d 95 . At page 670 of 208 F.Supp., the court states:

The court goes on to observe that the “expertise” of the Commission is not sufficient by itself but that findings supported by substantial evidence are required. In commenting on the function of the court, it is stated at page 671 of the opinion:

The court also observes at page 671:

Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. F.P.C., 82 U.S.App.D.C. 208 , 163 F.2d 433 (1947), was a rate case before the Federal Power Commission on a petition to review and set aside its order. The court, after stating at page 439:

There is no question but that whether the new divisions are just, reasonable and equitable is for the Commission, not for the Court. But it is equally clear that, in prescribing the divisions, the minimum duty of the Commission is to give due consideration to-each of the five factors the Congress has' listed in Section 15(6). Furthermore, although the Commission has broad discretion in the matters involved, such discretion can never serve as a substitute for the “findings and conclusions, as well as the reasons or basis therefor”, required, by Section 8(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act [ 5 U.S.C. § 1007 (b)], or for the clarity of findings required by that Act.

Plaintiffs assert that Section 15(6)’ requires findings showing determination* of revenue needs in terms of dollars as to- individual carriers and consideration* thereof in prescribing new divisions, whereas defendants contend the provisions of Section 15(6) require determination of revenue needs only as to the- carrier groups and not individual carriers and that such needs may be in terms, of rates of return and need not be determined dollarwise.

In considering what Congress intended by the provisions of Section 8(b),. as to necessary findings and conclusions, this court concludes that it is not the-duty of the court to evaluate each bit of' evidence and determine whether the Commission has drawn the proper conclusion-therefrom. In this case the court has reviewed the portions of the record cited by the parties as required by above noted' Section 10(e). The Commissioners are experts and their stated opinions, as to* facts where based on the evidence, are-sufficient to support their findings. Whether there is sufficient evidence for-the Commission to arrive at the costs of service, and the data and information and method used, is within the discretion of the Commission, absent an abuse thereof. [§ 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (e).]

It is to be noted that the Administrative Procedure Act was enacted in 1946- and that the reason for such legislation appears, as stated by Congressman-. Walter on the floor of the House [92'. Congressional Record 5653 (1946)], to be to insure a determination by the Com— *535 mission in a rate case of the issues of law, fact and discretion, and that “the mere parroting of findings or conclusions in the words of the statutes, however sufficient that may be as an ultimate conclusion, definitely would not satisfy in any manner the requirement of this Section unless both the statute and issue were very narrow indeed.” The United States Supreme Court in Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 37 U.S. 156 at 167, 83 S.Ct. 239 at 245 , 9 L.Ed.2d 207 , states:

As to the revenue needs of the carriers concerned, the Commission must of necessity, in order to comply with the Congressional mandate of Section 15(6), give due consideration to the amount required to pay their respective “operating expenses, taxes, and a fair return on their railway property held for and used in the service of transportation.” Even though the Commission has broad discretion as to the facts it considers in arriving at conclusions as to the five requirements of Section 15(6), and in the evidence necessary to establish the factors deemed relevant in the making of new divisions, the law nonetheless demands that the new divisions be just and reasonable. And while the justness of the divisions is for the Commission in the first instance, the Court must be able to determine from the findings, conclusions, and orders of the Commission, whether the mandate of the statute involved has been met. It appears to the Court that, as to this particular factor, the mandate of Section 15(6) requires a finding in terms of dollars (“amount”), and that the Commission must also find the dollar amount of retujm to the carriers resulting from the new divisions, in order to arrive at the required determination as to whether the new divisions are “just, reasonable and equitable”; and to enable this Court to review the adequacy of the findings to support the Commission’s determination.

Regarding the need to make findings of the financial effect of the divisions, see Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & P. Railway Co. v. State of Illinois, 355 U.S. 300 at 309-310 , footnote 8, 78 S.Ct. 304 , 2 L. Ed.2d 292 (1958), where the United States Supreme Court, in affirming an order of the District Court remanding the case to the Commission for further findings, said in footnote 8, pages 309-310, 78 S.Ct. page 310:

This court does not conclude it is required to determine what evidence the Commission must consider and weigh in complying with each requirement for the prescribing of new divisions, nor has the court the power to substitute its fact appraisal for that of the Commission, but once the necessary factors are determined there must be findings which disclose that *536 the financial effect of any new divisions as to each carrier involved has been considered by the Commission in order that any reviewing court may be enabled to determine if the statutory requirements have been met by the Commission.

The issue of whether the Commission, in prescribing new divisions, must, pursuant to the provisions of Section 15(6), consider their effect on the individual carriers involved or only the groups of earners concerned is one of major importance. The defendants urge that the Commission need only consider the justness of divisions as between the groups and that the equitable subdivision of the primary division of transcontinental freight revenues as between the lines in each group is not the concern of the Commission at this time but that any carrier who may not receive a fair share under the subdivisions made as between the carriers in a group may in due time take its ease to the Commission. Plaintiffs contend that the Commission, in determining the divisions between the groups, must consider the effect on the individual carriers. As noted above, Section 15(6) requires the finding of the amount of revenue required to pay operating expenses, and so forth, “of such carriers.”

The case of Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe et al. v. United States et al., 225 F.Supp. 584 (D.C.Colo.1964), concerned an order of the Commission establishing divisions of joint rates for railroad freight in eastern-transcontinental inter-territorial traffic. The District Court held that the Commission improperly found presently existing divisions to be unlawful and that the new divisions established by the Commission were unlawfully prescribed. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court states, at page 606:

In holding the Commission failed to observe the standards of Section 15(6) in making its findings, the court says at page 607:

The “typical evidence rule” was considered at length by the court in the-Santa Fe case, supra. After noting the' evidence before the court in the New England Divisions Cases, (Akron, C. & Y. R. Co. v. United States) 261 U.S. 184 , 43 S.Ct. 270 , 67 L.Ed. 605 [ 66 I.C.C. 196 . at 201], the court, in the Santa Fe case,, states at page 591 of 225 F.Supp.:

Thereafter the court quotes from the' opinion in the New England Divisions-Cases re the requirements of the typical. *537 evidence rule and then states the rule at page 592, as follows:

The typical evidence rule does not operate to excuse failure to find that the divisions are just, reasonable and equitable not only between the groups of carriers involved but also as to each individual carrier in each division. Referring again to the Santa Fe ease, supra, the court, at page 595, in speaking of the use of aggregate data, states:

Further, at page 596, quoting from Beaumont, etc., Ry. Co. v. United States, 36 F.2d 789 (D.C.Mo.1929), affirmed 282 U.S. 74 , 51 S.Ct. 1 , 75 L.Ed. 221 :

Continuing at page 597:

The case of Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349 , 56 S.Ct. 797 , 80 L.Ed. 1209 , is discussed by the court in Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe et al. v. United States, 225 F.Supp. 584 , supra, at some length. At page 598 it observes that the issue in the Baltimore & Ohio case before the Supreme Court was whether the divisions and rates established by the Commission were confiscatory, pointing out, however, at page 598 of its opinion:

At page 599, the Colorado court, after quoting from the opinion in the Baltimore & Ohio case, says:

True, the court there was focusing on the determination of the unlawfulness of the present divisions but it is reasonable to assume that the same rules would apply in determining the fairness of new divisions. We are to have in mind, in the case at bar, that the divisions of joint rates are concerned and not the determination or the propriety of the amount of the joint rates involved. At page 599, the court, in the Santa Fe case, continues:

After observing that there may have been “data respecting the particular rates applicable to carriers who are here parties plaintiff * * * available to the Commission”, the court says that that data was pre-war and there was no reason to assume that that information had “any great bearing” on the present divisions of “particular rates” applicable to the transcontinental western lines who were parties plaintiff to the action and that there was no statement by the Commission that it did consider the evidence, and on page 600 the court observes :

Defendants point out that the New England Divisions Cases, 261 U.S. 184 , pages 201-202, 43 S.Ct. 270 , 67 L.Ed. 605 -(1923), hold that the Commission’s divisions are not invalid unless they prescribe the proportion to be received by each of the connecting carriers. This-ruling shows that subdivisions of primary divisions need not be made “[i]f the real controversy is merely how much of the joint rate shall go to carriers east of the Hudson river and how much to carriers west * * * ” (page 202, 43 S.Ct. page 277, New England Divisions Cases), but the case does not hold that the needs of individual carriers need not be considered in determining the primary divisions involved. This same conclusion may be said to apply with respect to the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Abilene & Southern R. Co., 265 U.S. 274 , 44 S.Ct. 565 , 68 L.Ed. 1016 (1924), and Beaumont, S. L. & W. R. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 74 , 51 S.Ct. 1 , 75 L.Ed. 221 (1930).

There is always the question of just, how much reason the Commission must, set forth in support of its methods of determining necessary elements involved. The reviewing court must satisfy itself that the bricks (elements) which go into-the structure, to wit, the Commission’s, divisions, are in such form that the court can ascertain whether the bricks used are those required by law. This fact is recognized by the statutory requirements and cases discussed hereinabove, and the necessity of findings as to the revenue needs of and the financial effect of the new divisions on each carrier involved appears to the court to be well established.

Justice Cardozo, in setting aside an order of the Commission in United States v. Chicago, M. St. P. and P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 499 at 510-511 , 55 S.Ct. 462, at *539 467 , 79 L.Ed. 1023 (1935), expressed the standard of judicial review as follows:

Plaintiffs’ contentions re unlawfulness of the findings, and failure to make findings in many instances, concern matters as to which the Commission has used what this court believes to be the particular method adopted by the Commission in its discretion, as a body of experts, in the determination of factors or elements of factors it is required by the statute to consider. Specific findings of the propriety of the use of information which the Commission, as experts in this field, considers to be sufficient and adequate re pertinent elements are not necessary. To require same 'would be to compel the Commission to justify each method and all facts considered in arriving at every factor involved in the making of new divisions. We hold this would exceed the requirements of Section 8(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act. The economic regulation of business is not susceptible of the same degree of definiteness as commercial law. Once the required factors are determined by the Commission, it must, however, apply them in a realistic fashion in drawing its conclusions as to just, reasonable and equitable divisions.

Defendants take the position that the Denver & Rio Grande, Missouri-Kansas-Texas and St. Louis-San Francisco Railroads have waived any objections to losses resulting from the new divisions. The court concludes that there has been no intentional relinquishment of a known right on the part of any of these roads and that none of them waived any right to object to losses resulting to them from the new divisions.

Divisions in general, defendants urge, are made on the basis of “rate of return” figures which are equivalent to divisions in terms of dollars. The court concludes that divisions in rates of return are not equivalent to divisions in terms of dollars and that divisions so stated do not satisfy the requirements of the statutes involved, as they do not disclose a determination or consideration of all the required elements in arriving at what the Commission concludes are just, reasonable and equitable divisions. The court further concludes that to comply with the provisions of the sections of the Interstate Commerce and the Administrative Procedure Acts, cited and discussed hereinabove, the Commission is required to make affirmative findings which disclose that the requirements of Section 15(6) have been met and the factors therein required have been determined and considered, not only as to the groups of roads involved but with respect to each carrier affected in said groups; that findings must be made as to the amount of revenue, in terms of dollars, required by the respective carriers affected in any new divisions prescribed, the financial effect of the Commission’s orders in terms of dollars as to the carriers and the extent to which the new divisions prescribed will produce the revenue found to be required; that the findings show that in the prescribing of just and reasonable divisions the Commission has considered how said divisions affect the individual carriers with respect to the factors required to be determined by *540 Section 15(6); and that the findings further show that, as required by Section 15(6), the Commission has considered the revenue needs of the carriers for all transportation services, including needs represented by passenger deficits.

The court has discussed a majority of issues 1 to 19 of the 30 issues involved, as submitted by the parties, and in view of the conclusions reached it is unnecessary to discuss issues 20 to 30. However, no inference is to be drawn that the court is of the opinion that the issues 20 to 30, or any other numbered issues not discussed in this opinion, are of the nature it would be required to decide should they be raised at some future time.

By reason of the insufficiency of the Commission’s findings and conclusions, as stated above, the Commission’s orders of March 21, 1963, as amended, and December 31, 1963, will be set aside, and the cause will be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Any order which might hereafter be made by the Commission in the proceedings under review or new proceedings would be subject to challenge and to injunctive relief if the Commission failed to act in accord with the statutory requirements. Cantlay & Tanzola v. United States, 115 F.Supp. 72 at 84 (D.C.S.C.Cal.1953), and 28 U.S.C., Sections 1336 , 2284, 2324 and 2325. In the circumstances, the matter of injunctive relief herein becomes moot.

This opinion shall serve as Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the extent required by Rule 52(a), F.R.. Civ.P.

Counsel for the plaintiffs are requested' to submit Judgment setting aside the-Commission’s orders and remanding the cause to the Commission for further proceedings. This memorandum opinion is-not a final Judgment.