The question for decision arises upon the petition of certain creditors of the Pacific Coast Warehouse Company to have that corporation adjudged bankrupt, and the demurrer of the defendant thereto. The petition alleges:

*750 The averments of the petition clearly show that the business of the defendant corporation is that of conducting a public warehouse, and the question raised by the demurrer is whether such a business-is a trading or mercantile pursuit within the meaning of subdivision “b” of section 4 of the bankruptcy act of 1898, Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 547 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3423], which provides that “any corporation engaged principally in manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing, mining, or- mercantile pursuits, * * * may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt.” The words “trader” and “mercantile pursuits” have a well-defined meaning in law, and there is no better statement of the sense in which those words are used in the bankruptcy act than the following, quoted from the opinion of Judge Brown, of the Southern District of New York in the case of In re New York v. W. Water Co., 98 Fed. 711 :

So, also, in the Matter of Cameron Town Mut. Fire, Lightning & Windstorm Ins. Co. (D. C.) 96 Fed. 756 , the court, after referring-, to the fact that the bankruptcy act of 1867, Act March 2, 1867, c. 176, 14 Stat. 517 , applied to “all moneyed business or commercial corporations, and joint-stock companies,” said:

*751 , To the same effect may also be cited: In re Tontine Surety Co. of New Jersey (D. C.) 116 Fed. 401; In re Philadelphia & Lewes Transportation Co. (D. C.) 114 Fed. 403 ; In re Surety Guarantee & Trust Co, (C. C. A.) 121 Fed. 73 . In view of the foregoing decisions, which I regard as sound, my conclusion is that the business of a warehouseman is not a “trading” or “mercantile pursuit” within the meaning of the bankruptcy act. The fact that when grain is stored with it the defendant issues to the owner a warehouse receipt, which, when negotiated, operates as a transfer of the title to the grain therein described, does not make the business of defendant that of a trader or merchant. In the negotiation of the warehouse receipt, it is the owner of the grain who thereby sells and transfers the title to his grain, and not the defendant. The defendant, as warehouseman, is simply the bailee of the grain which is stored with it. Whether Congress wisely excluded corporations engaged in business like that of the defendant from the operation of the bankruptcy act, is not for the court to determine. The statute is a valid exercise of the power granted by the Constitution to Congress to establish “uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States,” and it is not for the courts to vindicate or question the wisdom of laws which it is their duty to administer. In re Drake (D. C.) 114 Fed. 229 .

The demurrer to the petition is sustained, and the petitioners will be allowed two days within which to amend their petition, if so advised.