1. Indians — Action by United States to Protect Rights — Cattle Issued por Stockraising Purposes.

Under the act of Congress ratifying agreements made with Indian tribes in Montana, including the Blackfeet, which provide, inter alia, for the issuance of cattle to such Indians for stockraising purposes, and that all such cattle and their increase shall bear the brand of the Indian Department, and shall not be sold, exchanged, or slaughtered, except by consent of the agent in charge, an Indian to whom such cattle are issued acquires only a conditional ownership for the purposes stated in the act. and it is the right and duty of the United States to protect such ownership, for which purpose it may maintain an action in a federal court in behalf of an Indian from whom cattle so issued have been unlawfully taken; and such right is not affected by the fact that an Indian in whose behalf such an action is brought is a woman who is married to a white man, and has thereby become a citizen of the United States, but who remains on the reservation with her tribe — it being expressly provided by Act Aug. 9, 1888, c. 818, 25 Stat. 392, 1 Supp. Rev. St. p. 608, that such marriage and citizenship shall not “impair or in any way affect the right or title of such married woman to any tribal property or interest therein.”

2.. United States — Action by — Effect of State Statutes.

The right of the United States to maintain an action in respect to a governmental matter cannot be affected by a state enactment requiring a notice to be given or demand made as a condition precedent to suit.

3. Sheriffs — Levy of Attachment — Seizing Property of Third Person.

A sheriff is not protected in levying an attachment against a man on cattle owned by his Indian wife residing on a reservation, which cattle she could not lawfully dispose of, except with the consent of the Indian agent, and which, as required by law, bore the brand of the Indian Department, as well as her own brand, which was different from that of her husband; and it is immaterial that they were in the possession of the husband, or with cattle owned by him — the brands being sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the ownership.

4. Confusion of Goods — Application of Doctrine — Cattle.

The doctrine of confusion of goods has no application to cattle or horses, or other property of similar nature, that can be readily identified.

5. Conversion — Evidence of Ownership — Declarations of Person in Possession.

In an action against a sheriff and an attaching creditor for conversion of property of the debtor’s wife by its seizure and sale under the attachment, declarations of the husband to the creditor that the property was in his possession and that he was the owner are not admissible to prove his ownership as against plaintiff, especially where such declarations were made prior to the suit, and- were therefore not a part of the res gestas.

6. Same — Action by United States.

In an action by the United States, as guardian of an Indian woman, for the conversion by defendant of cattle issued to her by the government for stockraising purposes, and which she had no power to dispose of, declarations by her as to the ownership of the cattle are inadmissible against the plaintiff.

7. Same — Declarations of Officer in Making Levy.

Declarations of an officer, in making a levy, going to show his knowledge that the property levied on was owned by a third person, or that he was put on inquiry as to such ownership, are admissible in an action in behalf of such third person for the conversion.

8. Trial — Separation of Jury — Admonition.

The failure of the court, on the separation of the jury for a noon recess during a-trial, to admonish them against conversing about the case or forming an opinion thereon, as required by a statutory provision, is not a material error, where the admonition had been given on their previous separations during the same trial.

9. Same — Remarks of Court to Jury — Harmless Error.

Remarks of the court in its charge to the jury with respect to the conduct of the case by counsel held, while improper, not to have constituted prejudicial error.