after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

It is claimed that the indictment does not state facts sufficient to constitute any offense against the laws of the United States. It will be noticed from the indictment that the names of the Chinese persons whom it is alleged the plaintiff in error and his codefendants entered into a conspiracy to release are unknown, that the vessel from which they were to be landed is unknown, that the names of the Chinamen awaiting deportation from the county jail are unknown, and that the names of the Chinese persons to be substituted for and in place of the five Chinese persons awaiting deportation are unknown. It is contended that for these reasons the indictment is wholly insufficient.

Are these details essential to constitute the crime charged? Are they of a character that reaches the substance of the crime? No one questions the correctness of the principles for which the plaintiff in error contends—that the accused in the indictment must be “informed of the nature and cause of the accusations” against him, and that for this purpose all of the material facts and circumstances embraced in the definition of the offense must be stated. No essential of the crime can be omitted. The object of an indictment is to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge as will enable him to make his defense, to enable him to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against another prosecution for the same cause, and to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction. These general principles have been frequently announced by the Supreme Court. United States v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360 -362, 24 L. Ed. 819 ; United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611 , 26 L. Ed. 1135 ; United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 199 , 2 Sup. Ct. 531, 27 L. Ed. 698 ; United States v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483 -486, 8 Sup. Ct. 571, 131 L. Ed. 516 ; Pettibone v. *705 United States, 148 U. S. 197, 202 , 13 Sup. Ct. 542, 37 L. Ed. 419 ; Blitz v. United States, 153 U. S. 308, 315 , 14 Sup. Ct. 924, 38 L. Ed. 725 .

The gist of the crime of conspiracy, as alleged in the indictment, is the unlawful combination and agreement between the parties named as defendants therein. In Pettibone v. United States, supra, the court said:

The conspiracy in the present case was to accomplish an unlawful purpose, to wit, to aid and abet the landing in the United States of Chinese who were not, under the laws of the United States, entitled to land. The conspiracy was general in its nature. It applied to Chinese who were confined in the county jail, and was not limited to any particular person or persons, or to persons who came on any particular vessel, or from any certain port or place. These things, if unknown, could not be more clearly stated, and were not essential to make out the crime as alleged, and, as to the overt acts in carrying out the crime, were mere matters of evidence. We are of opinion that the indictment is sufficiently clear and certain upon all the essential points, and is sufficient to inform the plaintiff in error as to the nature of the accusation against him.

We are also of opinion that the court did not err in refusing to allow the plaintiff in error for the third time to re-examine the jurors. The 11 jurors on the second examination stated that the fact that one of the defendants on trial had changed his plea would not in any manner prejudice them against the plaintiff in error. The matter was within the discretion of the court. It is apparent from the record of the trial that the plaintiff was not prejudiced by this ruling. The jurors were properly cautioned in regard to this matter. The court charged the jury as follows:

The testimony of Thomas T. Burnett, if competent, and believed by the jury to be true, was sufficient to justify the verdict of guilty found by the jury. But the plaintiff in error claims that the testimony of Burnett was wholly inadmissible; that “a conviction for conspiracy cannot be had on the uncorroborated testimony of the co-conspirators, nor can co-conspirators corroborate each other”—and cites United *706 States v. Logan (C. C.) 45 Fed. 873 , in support of this proposition. That case is not sustained by the federal decisions.

In United States v. Sacia (D. C.) 2 Fed. 754, 758 , Judge Nixon charged the jury that:

See, also, to the same effect, United States v. Babcock, 3 Dill. 581 , Fed. Cas. No. 14,487; United States v. Flemming (D. C.) 18 Fed. 907 -916; United States v. Ybanez (C. C.) 53 Fed. 536, 540 ; United States v. Howell (D. C.) 56 Fed. 21 -28; Wolfson v. United States, 101 Fed. 430 -436, 41 C. C. A. 422 .

In Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325 -336, 13 Sup. Ct. 60, 36 L. Ed. 991 , there is an extended discussion upon the point herein involved. There a severance was had between the case of Mary Rautzahn and that of Benson, on trial for murder. She, not having been tried, was called as a witness on behalf of the government against Benson, and it was claimed that Mary Rautzahn was not a competent wit-, ness against him. The court, among other things, said:

In 12 Cyc. 453, there is a reference to many state authorities which sustain the principles that, “in the absence of a statute, the credibility of an accomplice is for the jury,” and that “no common-law rule forbids a conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, if *707 his evidence satisfies the jury of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.”

See, also, Underhill on Criminal Evidence, § 73; Hughes on Criminal Eaw, § 3172.

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.