after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

*676 The. contention of the plaintiff in error is: (1) That by the terms of the' policy itself it was in full force, at the time of McDougald’s death; (8) that if the first ground is untenable, then, under the laws of the state of New York, the defendant in error was obliged to .mail notices of premiums to Mrs. McDougald, the assignee of the policy, and that said notices were never sent. Can either of these contentions be sustained? The record does not contain any of the evidence offered at the trial. The complaint sets forth the policy in full, and the contentions of counsel are based exclusively upon the terms of the policy. This being true, it necessarily follows, under the familiar and well-settled rules, that all intendments are in favor of the regularity of the action of the court, and that error will not be presumed, but must affirmatively appear in the record. In the answer of the defendant there are many allegations of fact, which, under the rule above stated, in the absence of the testimony, should be considered as having been proven. We shall, however, consider the contentions of the respective counsel as to the proper construction of the policy and the statutes of New York applicable thereto.

1. The argument of counsel for the plaintiff in error is to the effect that, inasmuch as the policy by its terms was signed and delivered October 4, 1895, the two years’ term insurance covered the time of McDougald’s insurance to October 4, 1897; that the first 30th day of June occurring after the expiration of the two year’s term insurance was in 1898, and that a payment of the annual life premium on that day would, if it had been made, have covered the insurance from, the preceding October 4, 1897, to October 4, 1898, or at the earliest to June 30, 1898, and that the premium for the first two years’ term insurance was paid by the promissory note, and the next premium did not become due until June 30, 1898; the premiums upon the policy must be construed as having been paid up to June 30, 1898; that under the table of guaranties contained in the policy, the full amount of the insurance was continued without further payment of premiums to January 30, 1901, and McDougald having died prior thereto, to wit, on November 17, 1898, he was covered by the insurance, and the assignee was entitled to recover the full amount of the policy. This contention is based upon an erroneous theory as to the true date of the policy, is wrong in theory, and cannot be sustained.

In the light of all the facts, without extended discussion, we are of opinion that the policy, under its terms, must be construed as having fixed the time when the insurance -thereunder commenced to run as June 30, 1895. If any ambiguity exists in the policy upon this subject, it is removed by the application of McDougald for the policy, which, in express terms, is made a part of the policy. It is apparent that it was the intention of the applicant and the insurer that the time when the insurance mentioned in the policy commenced was June 30, 1895, although the policy was not signed until October 4th of that year. The language of the policy indicates, of itself, that this was the contract. ■ The life premium is payable on the 30th day of each June. The 80-year accumulation period expired *677 on the 30th of June, 1915. The 30th day of June, 1905, designates ihe - day on and after which the company will pay an amount equal to the total premium, together with the amount of the policy, if it «hall become a claim. It wras also agreed that the policy should not be forfeited after it had been in force three full years (under certain conditions), and by the table of guaranties, the third full year, if the premiums were paid, expired “June 30, 1898.” Each year mentioned in the table of guaranties expires June 30th. It necessarily follows that according to the terms of the policy, even conceding for the purpose of this opinion, that there was a payment of premium by the giving of the note by McDougald, the policy became forfeited at the expiration of the month of grace after June 30, 1897, namely, July 31, 1897.

2. An extended argument is presented by the plaintiff in error and numerous authorities cited, to show that the policy in question is a New York contract; that the law of New York relating to the mailing of notices must be complied with; that the policy could not be forfeited except by giving the statutory notice, and finally that the policy is subject to the act of 1892, and not the act of 1897, as claimed by the defendant in error. We deem it unnecessary to discuss at any length the provisions of the various statutes and decisions of the courts of New York based upon the respective statutory provisions. As a general rule, all statutes must be construed, and their provisions enforced, with reference to their object and purpose, and the intention of the Legislature in passing them. So far as the present case is concerned, after examining the statutes in question, we are of opinion that if the laws of New York are applicable to this insurance contract, it must be the statute of 1897 instead of the statute of 1892, that is to govern.

The act of 1897 reads as follows:

The act of 1897 went into effect April 8, 1897, and the default in payment of premiums due occurred June 30, 1897. The general rule which we deem applicable to the present case is clearly stated in Black on Interpretation of Laws (section 183, >pp. 359, 360), as follows:

See, also, Estate of Prime, 136 N. Y. 347, 352 , 32 N. E. 1091 , 18 L. R. A. 713; Rosenplaenter v. Provident Sav. Soc. (C. C.) 91 Fed. 728 ; Id., 96 Fed. 721 , 37 C. C. A. 566 , 46 L. R. A. 473; and authorities there cited; Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Foxworth (Fla.) 25 South. 338 , 343, 79 Am. St. Rep. 149 ; Shadewald v. Phillips (Minn.) 75 N. W. 717 ; Somers v. Commonwealth (Va.) 33 S. E. 381 ; Railway v. Broulette, 65 Minn. 367 , 67 N. W. 1010 ; Kennedy v. Adams, 24 Nev. 217, 221 , 51 Pac. 840 ; Endlich Interp. Stats. §§ 196, 490.

It is true that a statute is generally to be construed so as to operate prospectively only, unless on its face the contrary is manifest beyond reasonable question. “But a statute is not retrospective, in the sense under consideration, because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing.” Endlich Interp. Stats. § 380.

As was said by the court below:

■ The result thus announced by the court below is fully sustained by the decisions of the Supreme Court.

*679 In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24, 30 , 23 L. Ed. 789 , the court said:

In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U. S. 551, 559 , 24 Sup. Ct. 538, 541, 48 L. Ed. 788 , the court said:

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.