Petitioner, Ernest M. Davenport, a Federal prisoner, is here upon motion to vacate his j'udgment of conviction for bank robbery, pursuant to Section 2255 of Title 28 United States Code. 1 He *946 appears in propria persona, which no appearance by respondent United States.

Allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, Davenport seeks to vacate the judgment of conviction upon the following grounds: (1) that he was not taken before a United States Commissioner, or any such officer similarly empowered, for arraignment as required by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 5(a), 18 U.S.C., R.F.Crim.P., Rule 5(a); 2 (2) that he was denied representation of counsel in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3006A; 3 and the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; 4 and (3) that for these reasons *947 —failure to bring him before a Commissioner and alleged denial of counsel — his plea of guilty was given under duress.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN BY FILES AND RECORDS

In a Complaint filed with the United States Commissioner by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on November 22, 1966, petitioner Davenport was charged along with one other defendant, Tommy Louis Lee Brown, with robbery of a national bank by use of a revolver, a dangerous weapon and device, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a) and (d). 5 The Commissioner issued warrants of arrest, one of which was executed by the arrest of Brown on the same day the Complaint was filed, November 22, 1966, and he was brought before the Commissioner immediately, on the day of the arrest. However, Davenport could not be found and his warrant of arrest was returned and filed unexecuted one month later, on December 22, 1966.

In the meantime and in fact the day before Davenport’s warrant of arrest was returned and filed unexecuted, an Indictment was returned by the Federal Grand Jury on December 21, 1966, charging Davenport and Brown with the same crime of bank robbery by use of a revolver, 6 and a bench warrant for Davenport was issued forthwith the same day.

On December 29, 1966, petitioner was located in the Los Angeles County Jail where he was serving a State sentence for traffic violations, and the bench warrant issued on the Indictment was served upon him and returned executed.

Petitioner remained in the County Jail under commitment of the United States Marshal and was brought before this Court on January 16, 1967, at which time the Court notified petitioner of his rights in the following proceedings:

The Court thereby appointed Sheldon M. Jaffe, Esq., a member of the State Bar of California, a graduate of Harvard Law School, and a highly qualified member of the Central District’s Federal Indigent Defense Panel supplied by the Los Angeles County Bar Association, to represent the petitioner.

Following the appointment of Mr. Jaffe, the Court continued to notify the petitioner and the other defendants present in the courtroom of his and their rights as follows:

(Rep.Tr., Jan. 16, 1967, pp. 6-7)

After conferring with Mr. Jaffe, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. At this time Mr. Jaffe made a motion for a separate trial for petitioner in an attempt to sever the trial of petitioner from that of his co-defendant who had previously been arraigned and whose trial was set for January 23, 1967. The Court granted counsel’s motion. (Rep.Tr., Jan. 16, 1967, p. 14.)

On January 23, 1967, petitioner, through his counsel, made a motion for a change of plea. At that time the Court orally inquired:

(Rep.Tr., Jan. 23, 1967, pp. 3-4.)

On February 20, 1967, petitioner came before the Court for probation hearing and sentencing. Again, the Court inquired of petitioner:

(Rep.Tr., Feb. 20, 1967, pp. 3-4.)

In his Presentence Report the Probation Officer gave the petitioner’s “Version Of Offense”:

Following the inquiry by the Court and taking the Presentence Report into consideration, the petitioner was found to be 23 years of age at the time of conviction and eligible for treatment under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5024 , as a Young Adult Offender under 18 U.S.C. § 4209 , 7 and in *951 need of confinement. Accordingly, the Court committed him to custody for treatment and supervision for a period of 20 years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (c) 8 or until discharged by the Federal Youth Corrections Division of the Board of Parolé pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5017 (d). 9 At the same time the Court recommended tha't the petitioner receive adequate psychiatric treatment while in custody. (Rep.Tr., Feb. 20, 1967, pp. 6-7; Judgment, Feb. 20, 1967.)

PETITIONER’S FIRST CONTENTION:

Conviction should be vacated because no preliminary hearing before Commissioner.

Petitioner’s first contention is that his conviction should be set aside because he was not taken before a Commissioner as required by Rule 5(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This contention is completely without merit. The files and records examined in the light of the applicable law are crystal clear on this point and show no denial of any of petitioner’s constitutional or statutory rights.

The Indictment in this case was returned on December 21, 1966. Petitioner could not be found arid a bench warrant was issued for him. He was found in the County Jail on December 29,1966 and the bench warrant was served upon him. Within a reasonable period after he was found in State custody, he was brought before the Federal Court on January 16, 1967, for arraignment and plea.

There was no prior preliminary hearing before a Commissioner, but the purpose of such a preliminary hearing is to determine whether or not there is, probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed an offense. Vincent v. United States, 337 F.2d 891, 896 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. den. 380 U.S. 988 , 85 S.Ct. 1363 , 14 L.Ed.2d 281 (1964), reh. den. 381 U.S. 947 , 85 S.Ct. 1775 , 14 L.Ed. 2d 714 (1965); Barrett v. United States, 270 F.2d 772, 775 (8th Cir. 1959).

After a person is indicted he has no right to a preliminary hearing before a Commissioner under Rule 5(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Probable cause for holding him for trial has been found by the Grand Jury in the Indictment and no preliminary hearing is required. Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir., July 19, 1967), citing and relying upon United States v. Salliey, 360 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1966), and Byrnes v. United States, 327 F.2d 825, 834 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. den. 377 U.S. 970 , 84 S.Ct. 1652 , 12 L.Ed.2d 739 (1964). 10

*952 Here the Indictment had already been filed on December 21, 1966, before the petitioner had been located and even one day before the arrest warrant issued on the Commissioner’s Complaint was returned unexecuted. The Grand Jury by returning the Indictment had resolved the question of probable cause and thereby eliminated the necessity for a preliminary hearing before the U.S. Commissioner.

The fact that petitioner was in State custody at the time he was finally located by Federal authorities does not give petitioner any right to a preliminary hearing before a Commissioner after a Federal Indictment has been returned. Barrett v. United States, 270 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1959), supra.

PETITIONER’S SECOND CONTENTION:

Conviction Should be Vacated Because of Denial of Counsel.

Petitioner’s second contention that he was denied representation of counsel in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3006A and the ruling of Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), also lacks merit.

The files and records conclusively show that petitioner was more than adequately represented at all times by competent counsel and there is absolutely no reason that would justify vacating his conviction or setting his conviction aside. Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965); Bouchard v. United States, 344 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1965); Codfield v. United States, 263 F.2d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 1959).

Petitioner also makes reference to his being questioned by officers while he was in State custody. He contends that he requested an attorney be provided for him but he adds that at all times he refused to sign any of the papers investigating officers purportedly asked him to sign.

These allegations are clearly inadequate to raise any issue of a denial of petitioner’s constitutional rights. Nowhere does petitioner allege that he answered any of the questions asked by the officers. In his affidavit accompanying his petition he admits he refused to sign any of the papers which the officers asked him to sign. There is no allegation by petitioner that, upon or after any interrogation, he furnished the officers any evidence of any kind — statement, admission or confession- — without the presence or advice of an attorney.

But even if petitioner were to adequately allege that he made statements to the officers after demanding and being refused an attorney, such allegation would not raise any issue of a denial of his constitutional rights. Snipe v. United States, 343 F.2d 25, 28 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. den. 382 U.S. 960 , 86 S.Ct. 440 , 15 L.Ed.2d 363 (1965). No statement of petitioner was ever offered in evidence in any way, whether in the form of a confession, or an admission, or otherwise, so the Court finds the facts here do not bring petitioner within the teachings or rulings of Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964) and Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

The record shows that petitioner pleaded guilty before this Court. That is enough to deny petitioner’s- motion here, because even if petitioner had made some statement, confession or admission (which he obviously had not), it would have no bearing on this pending motion under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 . As the 7th Circuit stated in United States v. French, 274 F.2d 297, 299 (7th Cir. 1960):

PETITIONER’S THIRD CONTENTION:

Guilty Plea Given Under Du/ress.

The petitioner’s third contention that his plea of guilty was given under duress is also shown by the record to be without merit. Without quoting or repeating in detail the Reporter’s Transcript of proceedings in Court when his plea of guilty was taken, suffice it to say that the record unequivocally demonstrates the Court asked the petitioner whether he had discussed the nature and circumstances of the offense with his attorney; whether his attorney has explained the maximum penalty that the Court could impose; whether there had been any promise of reward or special treatment made to him; whether there had been any threat of coercion or violence; whether he understood that the plea of guilty was an admission of the essential allegations of the charge; and whether he was pleading guilty because he was and for no other reason. Only after receiving positive “yes” responses to these questions did the Court find the petitioner convicted upon his plea of guilty.

CONCLUSION

The allegations of the motion have no substance or support in the record here. On the contrary, every contention of the motion is overwhelmingly refuted by both the record and proper reading of the law. Petitioner has failed to allege grounds entitling him to a hearing and therefore this Court finds that none is necessary.

Petitioner’s motion and all the files and records of the case “conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief,” and particularly to no hearing. 28 U.S.C. 2255, 11 Earley v. United States, 381 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. July 31, 1967), citing and quoting United States v. Fleenor, 177 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1949).

ORDER

Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered that petitioner’s motion to vacate and set aside sentence pursuant to 28 United States Code 2255 be and the same is denied.

. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 :

. “Rule 5. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER

. This is the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Public Daw 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 , sometimes popularly known as the Federal Indigent Defense Law, which requires each District Court of the United States to place in operation a plan for furnishing counsel to indigent defendants. The Central District of California has such a plan for the United States District Court, Southern District of California, effective February 15, 1965, which was adopted and carried over by the new Central District of California upon its formation September 19, 1966, by Joint Resolution of Judges, “Statement of General Policy in re Redistricting of California”.

As we shall demonstrate, counsel was appointed for defendant the very first day he appeared in Court, January 16, 1967, although we note parenthetically that defendant in a rambling account claims he was in Court on January 12 and 13, 1967 — Thursday and Friday— when this Court did not and invariably does not conduct any arraignment and plea proceedings; and he also claims he was in Court on January 14 and 21, 1967 —both Saturdays — when the Court was not in session at all.

Actually he was in Court on only three specific days — all Mondays — January 16, January 23 and February 20, 1967, and each time he was fully represented by his Court-appointed counsel, Sheldon M. Jaffe, an able member of the Federal Indigent Defense Panel.

. “CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ARTICLE [VI]

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the *947 crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the Witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”

See also: Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964).

. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a)

. Indictment No. 144-CD, Count Two.

. 18 U.S.C. § 4209 .

. 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (c).

. 18 U.S.C. § 5017 (d).

. In addition to Vincent v. United States, 337 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1964), supra, and Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir., July 19, 1967) supra, see also: United States ex rel. Bogish v. Tees, 211 F.2d 69, 72 (3rd Cir. 1954); Barber v. United States, 142 F.2d 805, 807 (4th *952 Cir. 1944), cert. den. 322 U.S. 741 , 64 S.Ct. 1054 , 88 L.Ed. 1754 (1944); Boone v. United States, 185 F.Supp. 411, 412 (D.C.Ky.1960).

. See footnote 1 supra.