The case shows that the plaintiff in error, who was defendant in the court below, had a contract with the United States for the erection of certain-buildings at Ft. Casey, in the state of Washington. He gave the bond required by the act of Congress approved August 13, 1894, entitled “An act for the protection of persons furnishing materials and labor for the construction of public works,” on which bond the Ætna Indemnity Company was surety.

The act of August 13, 1894, c. 280, 28 Stat. 278 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 2523, 2524], is as follows:

The Wheelihan-Weidauer Company supplied certain millwork in the performance of this contract, and at the conclusion thereof claimed a balance due it on that account of $5,34-6.89. It assigned its rights to the First National Bank of Everett, Wash., and, Burrell, having refused to pay the amount, the bank instituted the present action in tlie court below, in the name of the United States for the use and benefit of the bank. Issue was joined, the defendant ¿Etna Indemnity Company disclaiming knowledge of the state of the account, and the defendant. Burrell admitting a liability of $28.10, and denying any greater liability.

It is clear, we think, that the United States has no real interest, direct or indirect, in the controversy. Manifestly, it could not sue alone, for it is not entitled to any of the money. A controversy, in the sense of the judiciary act, is, as said by the court in United States, to Use of Edward Hines Lumber Company, v. Henderlong et al. (C. C.) 102 Fed. 2 , a case “brought before some competent court of justice for forensic discussion and judicial decision. In order that the United States shall become plaintiffs in a case or controversy in a judicial tribunal, they must have some interest in the matter in issue. Where the plaintiff’s statement of his case discloses,that he has no interest in the controversy, and it affirmatively appears that the *46 right to the matter in controversy is vested wholly in some one else, it is difficult to perceive how such person can be said to have a case or controversy. The term ‘parties’, includes all persons who are directly interested in the subject-matter in issue, who have a right to make a defense, control the proceedings, or appeal from the judgment. Strangers to the suit are persons who do not possess these rights. Hunt v. Haven, 52 N. H. 162. The plaintiff is he who, in a personal action, seeks a remedy in a court of justice for an injury to, or a withholding of, his rights. The legal plaintiff is he in whom the legal title or right of action is vested. The equitable plaintiff is he who, npt having the legal title to the right of action, is in equity entitled to the'thing sued for. Such are the accepted definitions of the terms ‘parties’ and ‘plaintiffs.’ The United States are neither the legal nor equitable plaintiffs in the present action. They are seeking no remedy for any injury to, or for the withholding of, any of their rights; nor have they any equitable right to or interest in the thing sued for. They have neither the legal right of action, nor any equitable interest in the matter in controversy. The United States are simply a formal or modal party — a mere name, used for convenience only. The right of action is vested solely in the Edward Hines Lumber Company, and it, and not the United States, is the real party plaintiff in the pending controversy. The statute merely delegates authority to the laborer or materialman to use the name of the United States for his use and benefit in any court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties. It can hardly be supposed that it was the purpose of the statute to authorize a laborer or materialman to prosecute petty claims, involving only a few dollars, in this court, when a more speedy and inexpensive trial can be had in the courts. of the state. This is obvious from the fact that Congress has manifested a steady purpose to restrict, rather than to enlarge, the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. No reason is perceived why the courts of the United States should take cognizance of the suits of laborers, and materialmen, unless the citizenship of the parties, and the amount involved in the controversy, are such as would give jurisdiction as in the case of other suitors. These views find support in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Browne v. Strode, 5 Cranch, 303 , 3 L. Ed. 108 ; McNutt v. Bland, 2 How. 9 , 11 L. Ed. 159 ; Walden v. Skinner, 101 U. S. 577, 588, 589 , 25 L. Ed. 963 .”

By the law of Maryland, the bond of an administrator is taken to the state, but is held for the security of persons interested in the estate of the deceased. A suit on such a bond was commenced in a state court of Maryland against citizens of Maryland, and was removed to the Circuit Court of the United States on the ground that the real party in interest was a citizen of New Jersey. In considering the question of jurisdiction there raised, the Supreme Court held that the case must be treated, so far as the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States is concerned, as though Markley, for whose use the action was brought in the name of the state, was alone nameff as plaintiff; saying in its opinion:

Inasmuch, therefore, as it appears from the pleadings that thé First National Bank of Everett is a corporation organized under the United States banking law, having its banking house at the city of Everett, state of Washington, that the defendant Burrell is a resident of the state of California, and the defendant .¿Etna Indemnity Company is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Connecticut, and that the amount involved exceeds the sum of $3,000, it is clear that the court below had jurisdiction of the action, on the ground of the diversity of citizenship of the parties.

The record further shows that the judgment of the court below was entered upon an award made in pursuance of 'the following written stipulation of the parties:

It is contended on the part of the plaintiff in error that a federal court is not authorized to enter judgment on an award so made. The decisions of the Supreme Court are to the contrary. The suit of Burchell v. Marsh et al., 58 U. S. 344 , 15 L. Ed. 96 , involved a case in which one of the parties sued the other for debt, who, in his turn, claimed damages for the manner in which he was sued. One of the claims made by the party who was sued was for damages for the violence of the agent of the creditors, and the referees to whom the case was submitted for arbitration heard evidence upon that subject. Afterwards, a bill in equity was filed in the Circuit Court by the losing party to the arbitration proceedings, to set aside the award on the ground that it “was made either from improper and corrupt motives, with the design of favoring said Burchell, or in ignorance of the rights of the parties to said submission, and of the duties and powers of the arbitrators who signed the said award.” The trial court having entered a decree annulling the award, the Supreme Court reversed it with directions to dismiss the bill, but without prejudice to any legal defense, saying, among other things:

In Hecker v. Fowler, 69 U. S. 123, 128 , 17 L. Ed. 759 , the Supreme Court said:

In Thornton v. Carson, 11. U. S. 596, 3 L. Ed. 451 :

Judgment having been entered by the trial court for the amount of the money mentioned in the award, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the judgment. See, also, York & Cumberland R. Co. v. Myers, 59 U. S. 246 , 15 L. Ed. 380 ; Robinson v. Mutual Ben. Loan Ins. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 11,961; New York Working Co. v. Schnieder, 119 N. Y. 475 , 24 N. E. 4 .

Indeed, it is difficult to sec any difference in principle between the stipulation upon which the judgment here appealed from was based and a stipulation by the counsel in the cause to the effect that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment in the sum of so many dollars. We have entertained and considered the appeal, notwithstanding the clause of the stipulation to the effect that the judgment entered upon the award should be unappealable, because, if the contention of the *50 appellant that no judgment could legally be entered upon an award in a federal court was well taken, perhaps he should not be bound by his agreement not to appeal from the judgment entered thereon; but, being of the opinion, as already indicated, that the contention is not sound, it would seem that the appellant should be precluded from qüestioning, on,appeal from such judgment, any alleged error in the arbitration proceedings. Nevertheless, we have looked into his complaint in that regard.

One of the assignments of error is as follows:

That errors of the sort indicated in the foregoing assignment of error cannot be urged against an award is well settled in the state of Washington, where this case arose, and elsewhere. School Dist. v. Sage, 13 Wash. 352, 43 Pac. 341 ; Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U. S. 344 , *51 15 L. Ed. 96 ; York & Cumberland R. Co. v. Myers, 59 U. S. 246 , 15 L. Ed. 380 ; Wilson v. Wilson, 18 Colo. 615 , 34 Pac. 175 ; 1 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 710.

-Vccording to the stipulation of the parties, the testimony introduced before the arbitrators of which the plaintiff in error complains was that of four witnesses to the effect that other miliwork furnished on other buildings by the real plaintiff in interest, the Wheelihan-Weidauer Company, was unobjectionable and was furnished in a good and workmanlike manner, and particularly that the work done by the Wheelihan-Weidauer Company at Et. Worden, at the same time and under the same management, and of the same character, was satisfactory; such testimony having been introduced in rebuttal by die plaintiff after the defendants had attempted to show by four competent witnesses that the superintendent of the Wheelihan-Weidauer Company was incompetent by reason of drunkenness to perform his duties in a good and workmanlike' manner. Such rebuttal testimony was clearly admissible, for, when the competency of the foreman of the company was attacked by the defendants to the suit, it was certainly competent for the plaintiff to show that other work of like character, done contemporaneously for other parties, under the management of the same foreman, was good and acceptable. “By their fruits ye shall know them. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or tigs of thistles ?”

The judgment is affirmed.