Petitioner, Alvin H. Nairn, a prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution in Lompoc, California, is here upon motion to vacate his judgment of conviction for bank robbery, pursuant to Section 2255 of Title 28, United States Code. 1

Allowed to proceed in forma pawperis, petitioner seeks to vacate his judgment of conviction upon his plea of guilty on the following grounds: (1) that he was not taken before a United States Commissioner without “unnecessary delay”, as required by Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; (2) that he confessed without being advised of his rights; and (3) that his plea of guilty was the result of psychological coercion, intimidation and fear induced by law enforcement officials.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN BY FILES AND RECORDS

A complaint filed with the United States Commissioner on November 21, 1966 by the Federal Bureau of Investiga *159 tion charged petitioner Nairn with robbery of a national bank. On the day the complaint was filed, the Commissioner issued a warrant of arrest, which was executed by Nairn’s arrest the following day, November 22, 1966. Naim was immediately, on the same afternoon as his arrest, brought before the Commissioner and committed to the Los Angeles County Jail.

On December 21, 1966, the Federal Grand Jury returned a three count Indictment 2 charging Nairn, along with co-defendants Tommie Louis Lee Brown and Ernest Manfred Davenport, with robbery of a savings and loan association, robbery of a national bank and attempted robbery of a national bank, by use of a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a) and (d). 3

Petitioner was arraigned before the Honorable Jesse W. Curtis, United States District Judge, on December 27, 1966, and, after conferring with his appointed counsel, Mario P. Gonzalez, he entered a plea of not guilty to the Indictment. Subsequently, on January 23, 1967, petitioner appeared before this Court and, through his counsel, moved for a change of plea:

In the Presentence Report the Probation Officer stated the “Official Version” and then the “Defendant’s version of Offense” :

Taking into consideration the conviction on Count 3 of the Indictment and the Presentence Report, petitioner was found to be 23 years of age at the time of conviction, eligible for treatment under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5024 , as a Young Adult Offender under 18 U.S.C. § 4209 , 4 and in need of confinement. Accordingly, the Court committed petitioner to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision for a period of 20 years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (c), 5 or until discharged by the Federal Youth Corrections Division of the Board of Parole, as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 5017 (d). 6 At the same time, the Court recommended that petitioner receive adequate psychiatric treatment while serving his sentence. Upon motion of the Government, the dismissal of Count 1 of the Indictment was ordered. (Judgment, Feb. 20, 1967.)

PETITIONER’S FIRST CONTENTION

That petitioner was not taken before a United States Commissioner without “unnecessary delay”, as required by Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Petitioner contends that his conviction should be set aside because he was not taken before a United States Commissioner without “unnecessary delay”, as required by Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 7 *162 This contention is completely without merit. The files and records clearly show that on November 22, 1966 petitioner was arrested, taken into Federal custody and immediately arraigned before a Commissioner, on the same afternoon as his arrest. In addition, the affidavit of Ronald G. Perkerson, Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shows that there was an immediate arraignment after petitioner came into Federal custody.

Assuming arguendo that there was a prohibited delay, the appropriate remedy would be to exclude from evidence statements obtained during the period between the arrest and the arraignment. In this instance, however, no evidence was introduced by the Government because of petitioner’s plea of guilty.

PETITIONER’S SECOND CONTENTION

That petitioner confessed without being advised of his rights.

The Ninth Circuit, by whose rulings we are bound, has repeatedly asserted its adherence to the general principle that convictions which follow pleas of guilty are based solely and entirely upon the pleas entered, not upon any evidence which may have been improperly acquired by the prosecuting authorities. Norris v. Wilson, 378 F.2d 324, 326 (9th Cir. 1967); Wallace v. Heinze, 351 F.2d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1965); Davis v. United States, 347 F.2d 374, 375 (9th Cir. 1965); Harris v. United States, 338 F.2d 75, 80 (9th Cir. 1964); Thomas v. United States, 290 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1961); Eberhart v. United States, 262 F.2d 421, 422 (9th Cir. 1958). In rendering its opinion in Hardee v. Wilson, 363 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1966), the court recently stated:

In Thomas v. United States, supra, the court was confronted, as here, with a motion to vacate and set aside a sentence pursuant to Section 2255 in which petitioner alleged that a search had been conducted on his property without a warrant or probable cause and that the fruits of the search led to his arrest and indictment. In affirming the trial judge’s decision denying the motion, the court concluded;

The record discloses that petitioner Nairn was represented in this Court by competent counsel, was advised of his rights, and was determined to and did enter a plea of guilty to Count 3 of the Indictment. In view of petitioner’s guilty plea, it is equally clear that the alleged confessions were not and could not have been introduced into evidence. The question of an illegal confession is, therefore, totally irrelevant to petitioner’s present motion to vacate a conviction under Section 2255.

PETITIONER’S THIRD CONTENTION

That the plea of guilty was the result of psychological coercion, intimidation and fear induced by law enforcement officials.

Petitioner’s contention that his plea of guilty was the result of psychological coercion, intimidation and fear is conclusively shown by the record to be without merit. Without again quoting or repeating in detail the Reporter’s Transcript of the proceedings in court when his plea of guilty was taken, we are convinced the record unequivocally demonstrates that, in response to the Court’s careful questioning, petitioner unmistakably affirmed that he had discussed the nature and circumstances of the offense with his attorney; that his attorney had explained the maximum penalty the Court could impose; that no promise of reward or special treatment had been made to him; that there had not been any threat of coercion or violence; that he understood the plea of guilty was an admission of the essential allegations of the charge; and that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty and for no other reason. It is evident that the Court, in accepting petitioner’s plea of guilty, fully complied with the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 8 by conducting a careful and searching inquiry to insure that the plea was made voluntarily and with full understanding of the charge and the consequences of a guilty plea. Harris v. United States, 338 F.2d 75, 80 (9th Cir. 1964).

CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s arguments have no substance or support in the record. On the contrary, the three allegations raised in petitioner’s motion are overwhelmingly refuted by both the record and a proper reading of the law. Moreover, since petitioner has failed to set forth any grounds entitling him to a hearing, this Court finds that none is necessary.

Petitioner’s motion and the files and record conclusively show that petitioner is entitled to no relief and, particularly, to no hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 . 9 Earley v. United States, 381 F.2d 715, 716 (9th Cir. 1967), citing and quoting United States v. Fleenor, 177 F.2d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 1949).

ORDER

Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered that petitioner’s motion to vacate and set aside sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 be and the same is denied.

. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 :

. Indictment No. 144 — CD, filed December 21, 1966, United States District Court, Central District of California.

. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a) and (d):

. 18 U.S.C. § 4209 :

. 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (c):

. 18 U.S.C. § 5017 (d):

. Fed.R.Crim.P. 5(a):

. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11:

. Footnote 1, supra.