This is an appeal from an order of the District Court for the Northern District of California dismissing proceedings upon order to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not issue as prayed for in an application made on behalf of one Looe Slice.

It is alleged in the petition for a writ of habeas corpus that Looe Shee came to the United States of America from the republic of Mexico as the la.wful wife of Lew Chow, a citizen of the United States, in April, 1906, and since her arrival in the United States she has continued to be, and then was, the wife of said Lew Chow; that she was being imprisoned, restrained, confined, and detained of her liberty by Hart II. North, Commissioner of Immigration at the port of San Francisco, without authority of law; that she was in custody under a warrant of deportation issued September, 1907, by the Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor under the provisions of Immigration Act Feb. 20, 1907, c. 1134, 34 Stat. 898 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 389) ; that said warrant of deportation provided that she, the said Looe Shee, be deported from the United States to the Empire of China. It was alleged that said Looe Slice last resided in the republic of Mexico, and left her home therein to enter the United States as the lawful wife of Lew Chow, a citizen thereof. Upon the petition the court ordered the Commissioner of Immigration to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not issue as prayed for.

In the answer to the order to show cause the Commissioner of Immigration set forth his application to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor for a warrant for the arrest of Looe Shee, the issuance of the warrant, the arrest, and the taking of Looe Shee before a board of special inquiry; her appearance before the board by attorneys, who were fully advised as to their right to introduce evidence in her behalf; the tefttsal of her attorneys to offer any testimony in her behalf ; the findings of the board:

The answer alleges:

*568 The warrant is dated October 10, 1908, and is set forth in the answer. It is signed by the acting Secretary of Commerce and Tabor and recites :

The answer admitted that, prior to the time the said Looe Shee entered the United States, she went through the form of a contract of marriage and marriage ceremony with a native Chinese person named Lew Chow, which said native Chinese is mentioned in the petition in this case. In the eighth paragraph of the answer it was alleged that:

In the court below evidence was introduced upon the issues presented by the application for the writ of habeas corpus, the order to show cause, and the answer, and the court found all of the allegations contained in the answer to be true, except paragraph 8 of the answer, to the effect that the marriage ceremony therein referred to was a sham, and was entered into for the purpose of evading- the laws of the United States prohibiting the landing of Chinese persons. As a conclusion of law the court found that the petitioner was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus as prayed for, and the proceedings were thereupon dismissed.

The proceedings for the deportation of Looe Shee were in pursuance of the following provisions of the act of February 20, 1907, entitled “An act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States” ( 34 Stat. 898 ):

It appears from the answer that Uooc Shoe had full opportunity to be heard before the executive officers of the government upon all questions involving her right to be and remain in the United States under this statute.- This brings the case within the law as declared in the Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86 , 23 Sup. Ct. 611, 47 R. Jíd. 721. In that case a Japanese woman was landed at the port of Seattle, in the state of Washington, on the lltli day of July, 1901. On or about July 15, 1901, the immigrant inspector, having instituted an investigation into the circumstances of her entry into the United States, decided that she came into the United States in violation of the law, that she was a pauper, and a person likely to become a public charge; aliens of that class being excluded by Act March 3, 1891, c. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1291). It was contended that the. provisions of the latter act, giving to inspection officers plenary power over the classes of aliens therein referred to, should be construed to extend only to aliens who had not effected an entrance into the United States, and not to those who had lawfully entered the United Slates and had been incorporated into the population of the country. The proceedings in the case were in conformity with the provisions of that act and other acts of Congress then in force, and were substantially the proceedings followed in the present case under Act Feb. 20, 1907, 34 Stat. 898 . This act was a re-enactment and extension of the legislation upon the subject of immigration, and made in the light of the construction placed upon the previous acts by the courts. The decision of the Supreme Court in the Japanese Immigrant Case is therefore applicable to the present case. In that case the court said:

This case was followed under revised and amendatory statutes in United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161 , 24 Sup. Ct. 621, 48 L. Ed. *571 917 , United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253 , 25 Sup. Ct. 644, 49 L. Ed. 1040 , and Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8 , 28 Sup. Ct. 201, 52 L. Ed. 369 .

.It is contended, however, on behalf of Eooe Shee, that, having en-teied the United States lawfully as the wife of a citizen of the United States, the act of Congress did not apply to her, as the wife of a citizen takes the status of her husband. But this is not a question of status, having relation only to the date of her arrival and entry into the United States. The question is: What was her status at that time, and what has it been during the probation period of three years prescribed by Congress? As said by Mr. Justice Holmes in the late case of Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 138 , 29 Sup. Ct. 470, 53 L. Ed. —:

This was said in a dissenting opinion; but it was not a dissent irons anything that the majority of the court had said in the case. On the contrary, it was the statement of the law as it had been declared by the court in previous cases with respect to the conditions upon which aliens are permitted to be and remain in this country, and upon that subject unquestionably expressed the views of the whole court.

It is further contended that, as Eooe Shee arrived in this country on April 28, 1906, and was a resident in the United States at the time of the passage of the act of February 20, 1907, the act did not apply to her. This question was before Judge Wolverton in the District Court of Oregon in the case of Ex parte Durand (D. C.) 160 Fed. 558 . In a carefully considered opinion, referring to the provisions of Act March 3, 1903, c. 1012, 32 Slat. 1213, and Act Ecb. 20, 1907, 34 Stat. 898 , the court held that the act of 1907 continued in.force the act of 1903 as to the conduct of alien prostitutes during the period of probation pren ided by law, and saves the right of the United States to deport one who arrived in 1906, though no proceeding was brought for that purpose until 1908. We adopt the opinion in that case as our opinion on this question in this case.

ir is objected that the act of February 20, 1907, does not apply to Chinese persons, or a person of Chinese descent. The objection is based upon the provisions of section 43 of the act, which provides as follows:

It is contended that Congress has expressed its purpose in the Chinese exclusion acts that the immigration, residence, and exclusion of Chinese persons should be governed by the laws of Congress upon that subject, and not by the general laws regulating immigration. We cannot agree to such a limitation of the act of February 20, 1907, which is entitled “An act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States,” and by the terms of -its various provisions applies to all aliens alike. To hold otherwise would be to favor the Chinese with respect to the admission of certain objectionable individuals, .which could not have been the purpose of Congress. We think the construction placed by the Attorney General upon a similar provision in the act of March 3, 1903, is the construction to be placed upon this statute. 24 Op. Atty. Gen. 706. In that opinion the Attorney General said:

He further said:

With respect to the objection that the warrant of deportation was signed by the acting Secretary of Commerce and Labor and not by the Secretary or Assistant Secretary of that Department, the court will take judicial notice of the departments of the government and the executive officers of such departments. Wigmore on Evidence, § 2576.

. The judgment of the court below is affirmed.