(after stating the facts as above). The defendant contends that the evidence did not show that plaintiff was injured, substantially as alleged in his complaint, by having been knocked over by the force of a stream of water issuing from a vent in the pipe, but does show that the injury was due to the carelessness of plaintiff in permitting his arm to come in contact with the walls of the drift. The complaint alleged that:

The complaint further charged the defendant with negligence in permitting the pipe to become unsafe and out of repair. The plaintiff testified:

On cross-examination he testified :

John Gillis testified:

This testimony describes the accident substantially as alleged in the complaint. It is true there is testimony on the part of the defendant describing the accident in different terms. John I’ete was called as a witness on the part of the defendant. He testified:

The objections to the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint and the evidence introduced in support thereof is the fact that the evidence introduced on the part of the defendant tends to show that there was no leak in the pipe near lite place of accident, and, therefore, no force of water coming from the pipe at that point; hut the leak or break was some 50 feet further up the pipe, from which point the water flowed along the pipe to an elbow opposite the place of accident, where the water fell in a shower, giving the appearance of a leak or break in the pipe at that point. Conceding that the testimony of the defendant does appear to establish this fact, we do not see how it is material here. The *788 plaintiff did not, in bis complaint or in his testimony, attempt to locate the leak in the pipe. All he did -was to locate the place where he was injured as the place where he -was struck by the falling water. And conceding, further, that he may have overestimated the force of the water, under the impression that the leak in the pipe was at the place of the accident, we do not see how that fact, if it is a fact, presents a question for this court to determine.

The evidence tended to show that defendant was negligent in maintaining the pipe in a defective condition. The question, then, was whether there was a sufficient force of water coming down at the place of the injury to cause plaintiff to change his position, so that his arm was thrown out, and caught between the car and the beam, and broken; and that was a question of fact for the jury to determine. The fall of the water need not have been at the point of the leak or break in the pipe, and need not have been of sufficient power as to have physically forced the plaintiff around and to have thrown his arm up against the beam. It was sufficient if it caused the plaintiff to make an instinctive effort, reasonable under the circumstances, to avoid what he supposed was imminent danger; and this effort caused the plaintiff to throw his arm where it'was injured.

The ultimate facts to be alleged and proven were the neglect of the defendant in maintaining the pipe in a defective condition, the resulting injury to the plaintiff, and his freedom from contributory negligence. A leading case on this subject is the English case of Jones v. Boyce, 1 Starkie, 493. The action was on the case against the defendant, a coach proprietor, for so negligently conducting the coach that the plaintiff, an outside passenger, was apparently placed in a perilous position, which caused him to leap from the coach to the ground, whereby his leg was broken. The coach was not overturned, and evidence was introduced on the part of the defendant tending to show that there was no necessity for the plaintiff to jump from the coach. Lord Ellenborough, in submitting the case to the jury, said;

In Coulter v. American Merchants’ Express Co., 56 N. Y. 585 , the complaint was that the plaintiff had received injuries caused by the negligence of defendant’s servant. The plaintiff was walking on the sidewalk of a street in Syracuse, when an express wagon belonging to defendant was driven up rapidly upon the sidewalk behind her. She sprang sideways to escape the danger, and struck her head against the wall of a building, and was injured. The court said:

In Beven on Negligence in Law (3d Ed.) vol. 1, p. 156, the author says:

The uncontradicted evidence is that the force of the water was sufficient to put out the lights carried by those on the car, leaving them in total darkness, except for an electric light about 100 feet up the slope. The plaintiff testified that the water struck him with such force as to throw him around on the car and put out all the lights. John Gillis testified that the water put out the lights before he realized what had happened. The water struck him in the face, and knocked his cap and light off his head, and threw his head over against the car, and left him in total darkness until it got to the top of the slope. John Pete, a witness for the defendant, testified that the water put out the lights; there was an electric light about 100 feet up the slope; when the water struck him, he put his head down, but the plaintiff did not. This evidence was sufficient to support the allegations of the complaint; and whether, under such circumstances, the defendant was negligent in maintaining the pipe in its defective condition, and the plaintiff free from contributory negligence, were clearly questions of fact for the jury.

The contention that plaintiff assumed the risk, because there had been a shower of water at the point of the accident for several days prior to the injury, is answered by the testimony of the plaintiff and others that the volume of water was not so great when they passed this point before. The plaintiff testified that there never was any danger there from water before; that there never was any leak there before of that amount; that he had no reason or occasion to fear the water when he went up the gangway or slope. If the jury believed this testimony, it was sufficient to warrant it in finding that the plaintiff did not assume the risk incident to the position in which he was placed by reason of the falling water.

It is assigned as error that the court refused to give the jury certain instructions requested by the defendant defining proximate cause. These instructions defined proximate cause as meaning substantially such a cause as might have been foreseen or reasonably expected to result in the injury sustained by the plaintiff. One of these instructions was as follows:

A clear and comprehensive definition of the term “proximate cause” is undoubtedly required in an instruction to a jury in a case where there is a succession of causes, and the question is whether there is a new and independent cause intervening between ‘the primary cause and the injury to the plaintiff. As stated by Mr. Justice Cooley in his work on Torts (3d Ed., p. 99):

*790 In discussing this subject the author lays down the following propositions: .

The author refers to cases illustrating • these propositions, among others, the celebrated case of Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403, 2 W. Bl. 892. In that case defendant threw a lighted squib made of gunpowder from the street into a market house where a large concourse of people were assembled. The squib was thrown from one market stand to another by the keepers of the stands, in self-protection, until it struck the plaintiff in the face, and, exploding, put out one of his eyes. Judge Cooley says of this case:

' The evidence in the present case tends to show that there was negligence on the part of the defendant in maintaining a defective water pipe, and that- there was a natural and continuing sequence uninterruptedly connecting this breach of duty with the injury to the plaintiff. There was but a single wrong, and this wrong constituted an invasion óf plaintiff’s right to a reasonably safe place in which to work. There was evidence that the injury to plaintiff was a natural one under the circumstances, and should have been anticipated by a reasonably careful and prudent employer. The case comes, therefore, under Judge Cooley’s first proposition.

Upon the evidence the court gave the following instructions:

To these instructions no exception was taken by the defendant. We think, upon the evidence before ihe court, they were correct and sufficiently explicit; and those requested by the defendant erroneous for the reason that they defined proximate cause in such terms as to take from the jury the question whether there was such a degree of negli.gence on the part of the defendant as amounted to a breach of duty to the plaintiff to furnish him with a reasonably safe passageway through the shaft in going to and from his work to the mine.

The objection to the instructions of the court appears to be that the court did not define proximate cause as a cause from which the specific injury to the plaintiff was the natural and probable consequence, which should have been foreseen and guarded against by an ordinarily careful and prudent person. In other words, the defendant, to be liable for his negligence, must, under the requested instructions, have foreseen that the water escaping from the- defective water pipe would have for its natural and probable consequence the particular injury received by the plaintiff. We do not understand this tche the law in a case involving the question whether there was a primary act of negligence on the part of the employer amounting to a breach of duty to the employe, and a natural and continuous sequence connecting this breach of duty with the injury to the employé. If the jury determine this question of primary negligence adversely to the employer, then he is liable for the consequence of his negligent act, and it need not appear that he anticipated or had reason to anticipate an injury to the particular person who was in fact injured, or the particular kind of injury produced.

It is assigned as error that the court refused to. instruct the jury that the plaintiff had testified that he knew the pipe was defective and im *792 properly installed, and, therefore, likely to leak; that lie knew that it did leak; that he had no right to assume that the leak would be repaired; that he was therefore charged with the assumption of all risks and dangers incident to a sudden increase in the amount of water and its force flowing from the leak; and that if he did not properly protect himself, either by assuming a safe place upon the bumpers or by-'riding inside the car, his own negligence in failing to do so contributed to the injury and was the proximate cause thereof,' and the verdict should be for the defendant if they so found.' The instruction was properly refused. The knowledge of the plaintiff that the pipe was defective and leaked did not, as a matter of law, deprive him of the right to assume that the pipe would be repaired. Whether the leak from the pipe might suddenly and unexpectedly increase, as the evidence tended to show that it did, was a question of fact for the jury; and whether, under all the circumstances, the plaintiff assumed the risk of the employment, was a question of fact for the jury, to be determined under proper instructions. Such instructions were given by the court, and no exception taken.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.