On the 18th day .of December, 1909, the Acting Secretary of Commerce and Labor addressed to the Commissioner of Immigration at Ellis Island, New York Harbor, this warrant 'for the transportation of the petitioner to Italy:

Shortly thereafter a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was presented on behalf of the petitioner to the court below at 'Seattle, Wash., where the petitioner then was, setting forth:

The writ prayed for was granted; answer and return to which was made by the immigration officer, and upon reference to a. commissioner "for the taking of testimony therein as to the alleged citizenship of one Antonio Gallo, and the alleged marriage of Marie Gallo to said

*569 Antonio Gallo,” testimony was given and other evidence taken, which subsequently came on for consideration by the judge of the court below, who filed this decision:

An order of discharge wa's thereupon signed and filed, from which order the present appeal was taken.

To the order of reference for the purpose stated the government objected, on the ground that it was beyond the power of the court to make; the contention being that the only question then properly before the court was whether or not the appellee had been given a fair hearing by the officers of the Department of Commerce and Labor upon the order to show cause why she should not be deported to the country from which she came. The position of the government in this, respect must be sustained, on the principle controlling the disposition of the cases of Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8 , 28 Sup. Ct. 201, 52 L. Ed. 369 , Looe Shee v. North, 170 Red. 566, 95 C. C. A. 646 , In re Tang Tun, 168 Fed. 488 , 93 C. C. A. 644 , In re Can Pon, 168 Fed. 479 , 93 C. C. A. 635 , and Edsell, Chinese Inspector, v. D. Charlie Mark (C. C. A.) 179 Fed. 292 .

The record shows that the appellee was arrested at Tacoma, Wash., September 19, 1909, and was given a hearing by the immigration officers the next day, at which time she was informed of her right to be represented by counsel. Replying that she did not desire counsel, she was sworn and examined at length. She was further examined at length by the officers a few days later, at which time she was represented by counsel, who also introduced and examined at length before the officers three other witnesses, named, respectively, Nicola Alfredo Carino, Salvatore Savoye, and Tony Galli. The appellee was again examined before one of the immigration officers — Inspector Fisher— on the 23d of November of the same year. In the course of her various examinations the appellee made numerous substantially conflicting statements, not only in respect to her name, but at one time testifying that she was married to one Tony Gálli, and at another time testifying that she was never married to any one; at one time admitting that she was a prostitute, and at another time denying it. Furthermore, the record shows that she, as well as the witnesses examined on her behalf, made statements in respect to her claimed residence in New York City, which officers of the department charged with the execution of the immigation laws found untrue, and there was the direct testimony of a witness introduced by the government — a detective named Miller — that she was an inmate of a house of prostitution in Tacoma in September, 1909.

*570 .• The record contains'a review by Inspector Fisher, in his report made to• the Department of Commerce and Labor, of the evidence giveii in the cause, and his findings of fact made therefrom, and the ultimate' decision,of the department first herein set out. Under such circumstances ,w,e do not see how it can be properly held that the appellee was hot.given a fair hearing by the officers of that department. Mistakes of law by executive officers are, of course, re-examinable by the courts:. Such'were the cases of Botis v. Davies (D. C.) 173 Fed. 996 , and Ex parte Koerner (C. C.) 176 Fed. 478 . But mere questions of fact, such as the case before us, where they have been fairly examined by the executive officers designated by Congress for that purpose, and their conclusions of fact reached upon conflicting evidence, will not be judicially reviewed. Authorities supra.

The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the cause remanded to the court below, with directions to dismiss the proceedings.