This was an action upon a policy of fire insurance to recover for a loss sustained by the plaintiff in error, the Port Blakely Mill Company, a corporation, which was plaintiff below, by the burning of a portion of the sawmill plant owned and operated by it at Port Blakely, in the state of Washington. Upon the conclusion of the plaintiff mill company’s evidence, the trial court, on motion of the defendant company, directed a verdict in its favor, which was accordingly returned. Judgment followed against the plaintiff mill company, which brings the case here upon writ of error.

'['he printed portion of the policy contained a provision to the effect that it should be void if the plaintiff’s plant should be operated at night later than 10 o’clock, or if its operation should be suspended for more than 10 consecutive days, or if mechanics should be employed in altering or repairing the plant for more than 15 consecutive days, or if certain prohibited materials should be kept upon the premises; but those provisions of the printed portion of the policy were modified by the following provision, prepared by the plaintiff’s insurance broker, and inserted in the policy by mutual consent of the respective parties thereto, to wit:

It is not disputed-that by virtue of the clause just quoted the assured was entitled to make additions to the plant, alterations therein, and repairs thereto, without regard to the printed portions of the policy, and could operate the plant throughout the night and employ such mechanics and do such work and keep such materials upon the premises as it desired, and as were incidental to the prosecution of the business in which it was engaged; and, as its sprinkler equipment was by the policy expressly made a part of the machinery insured, it is conceded that the assured was entitled, under the policy, to make any additions to the sprinkler equipment, .and such extensions and alterations thereof and repairs thereto as it might desire, all of which concessions, however, are coupled with this other provision of the policy:

As a matter of course, if in making additions to or extensions of the plant or alterations therein permitted by the policy it became necessary to move or disconnect the sprinkler system or any part thereof, it could not in the nature of things be kept in good working order during the time of temporary suspensions for those purposes, and therefore in the nature.of things it could not be maintained in good-working order “at all times.” The clear meaning of the clause relied upon by the defendant in error therefore is in our opinion this: Warranted by the assured that it will use due diligence to maintain its automatic sprinkler system in good working order.

Did the assured use that required diligence was the real question in the case. The trial court refused to submit it to the jury; itself de *718 ciding the question as a matter of law against the plaintiff. To test the correctness of the court’s action, we have therefore to consider the evidence introduced by the plaintiff.

The evidence showed that the mill in question is 450 feet long by about 100 feet in width. The sprinkler system was installed by the company for the purpose of extinguishing fire, should it occur. Water therefor was supplied by reservoirs owned by the company. The system was divided into divisions, those numbered 3, 4, and 5 covering that portion of the mill plant comprising the mill building, in the eastern part of which was the lath mill. Each division was connected with the supply pipes leading from the reservoirs by a large vertical pipe, called a “riser.” Lateral pipes containing sprinkler heads were extended from each riser over the area intended to be covered by its division of the sprinkler system. Until a fire occurred, the water supply was usually kept out of the lateral pipes by means of the air pressure, which closed and held down the gate in an automatic air valve placed in the riser; the operation of the system being that, upon the happening of a fire, such fire would fuse and melt'the sprinkler heads, thus releasing the air pressure and opening the air valve, thereby permitting the water to flow from the riser into the lateral pipes and out upon the fire through the sprinkler heads. In each riser immediately below .the air valve there -was a gate, operated by hand, by means of which the water supply in any division could be shut off.

In its answer to the plaintiff’s complaint the defendant company set up affirmatively that on or about April 1, 1907, the plaintiff caused the gate valve in division No. 3 of the sprinkler system to be' closed and the connecting pipes to be removed, thereby wholly cutting off the water from that division, and that the plaintiff “carelessly and negligently and without the exercise of due diligence” caused and permitted division 3 of the sprinkler system to remain in the condition last above indicated without water, and useless as a means of fire protection, from April 1, 1907, continuously until after the fire on April 22, 1907. The record shows that the fire occurred in the night of the day last mentioned, which was Monday, in that portion of the plant covered by division 3 of the sprinkler system. In its reply filed to this affirmative defense the plaintiff mill company put in issue the averments of negligence and lack of due diligence on its part, and also denied that division 3 of its sprinkler system was without a supply of water at the time the fire occurred. It further set up that on or about April 1, 1907, its business required that additions, alterations, and repairs be made to that portion of its mill building known as the lath mill, and also to division 3 of its sprinkler system, in order to make it more effective and to extend it to the lath mill, and that'accordingly, and in conformity with the conditions and provisions of the policy in suit, the plaintiff proceeded with the execution of that work, and as expeditiously and rapidly as possible; that it could not be performed without turning off the water from division 3 of the sprinkler system; that on April 31, 1907,' the work had been so far completed that the water could be and was on that day turned into division 3,.which was the earliest time possible, and that at the time of and during the fire in question division 3, as well as all other divisions of the sprinkler sys *719 tem, was in good and thorough working order; and that the plaintiff mill company had at all times used due diligence to maintain the whole of its said sprinkler system in good working order at all times.

There was evidence on the part of the plaintiff mill company to the effect that one Ford, a man experienced in the construction and operation of sawmills and sprinkler systems connected therewith, was appointed superintendent of the plaintiff mill company’s sprinkler system in March, 1903, and was such superintendent continuously to the time of the fire in question. His testimony is to the effect that he was instructed by the general manager of the mill company, who appointed him, to make a thorough investigation of the system, and order all necessary supplies to keep it in good working order, all of which he did. -He explained in his testimony the details of the system, its different supplies of water, its various connections and laterals and its operation, and testified, in substance, that the company had a full crew of properly qualified men with which to keep the system in good order, who worked upon it continuously, and kept the system in good order; that the company kept in stock everything necessary to keep the system in good working order, and that he personally made an examination of some part of the system each day; and that he had a daily conference with the general manager in respect to the sprinkler system and its condition. The general manager, Mr. Eddy, testified to the same general effect, saying, among other things:

The evidence showed that in the early part of 1907 the lath mill had to be and was rebuilt, and that division 3 of the sprinkler system *720 had to be and was extended into the new lath mill. The superintendent, Ford, testified that he superintended the moving of it, and that at the time he had all the equipment he had referred to in his testimony.

*721 The witness Ford also gave this further testimony:

We think enough of the testimony has been set forth to show that the question as to whether the mill company used due diligence to keep its sprinkler system in good working order was for the determination of the jury, and that the trial court was in error in directing a verdict for the defendant insurance company. In such cases that course is justified only _when the plaintiff’s evidence is such that it can be fairly said that all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from it. The authorities to this effect are so numerous that it is unnecessary to cite them. The law also is that in passing upon a motion to take a case from the jury it is the duty of the court to take that view of the evidence most favorable to the party against whom a directed ver-diet is asked. Janoski v. Northwestern Impr. Co., 176 Fed. 215 , 99 C. C. A. 569 , and cases there cited.

That reasonable men may differ as to whether the facts testified to in the present case show that the mill company used due diligence to maintain its sprinkler system in good working order as required by the policy in suit is well illustrated by the case of the same mill com- *725 pány against the Springfield F. & M. Insurance Co., reported in 56 Wash. 681 , 106 Pac. 194 , 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 593, and in (Wash.) 110 Pac. 36 , in which case the policy in suit, in so far as the question here involved is concerned, was identical in terms, in which, the same fire was in question, and in which the plaintiff’s evidence in respect to the question of diligence seems to have been substantially the same as that presented in the present case, and where it was held by at least some of the judges of the state of Washington that it showed the exercise of due diligence in the matter in question on the part of the mill company.

The judgment is reversed and cause remanded to the court below for a new trial.