1. Commerce (§ 61*) — State Railroad Commissions — Order Fixing Rates— Validity Presumed.

An order of a stare railroad commission reducing class and commodity freight rates will be presumed to be reasonable, and not to interfere with interstate commerce, in the absence of a showing to the contrary.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. § 82; Dec. Dig. § 61.*]

2. Pleading (§ 214*) — Admission by Demurrer — Scope.

A demurrer admits the truth of all facts wtfll pleaded, but the admission does not extend to mere deductions or opinions unsupported, by the facts pleaded, nor to mere conclusions of law.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 525-534; Dec. Dig. § 214.*]

3. Carriers (§ 18*) — State-Made Freight Rates — Reasonableness—Pleading — Requi s m

To establish the unreasonableness of a state-made freight rate, a bill must disclose facts showing with reasonable definiteness, not only the present total value of the road affected, with the total gross revenue, but also the gross revenue from] each class of business, interstate and local, freight, passenger, or other, and the proportionate property values devoted thereto, respectively; and not only should the gross operating expenses of the road appear, but also a proportionate application of such expenses to the different classes of traffic, freight, and passenger, so that the net revenue from each source may be thereby ascertained and the ultimate question determined as to the effect of the rates complained of upon the particular traffic affected thereby.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 19, 20; Dec. Dig. § 18.*]

4. Carriers (§ 18*) — State-Made Freight Rates — Reasonableness—Pleading — Sufficiency.

A bill is insufficient to show unreasonableness of state-made freight rates where it consists largely of matters of mere opinion and general conclusions, such as an averment that the rates are unjust and unreasonable ; where, though the total present value of the road is stated, the portions assignable to intrastate traffic and to the particular traffic are not shown; where the values and operating expenses assignable to passenger and freight traffic are not segregated; where, though the gross operating expenses for one year are given, there is no apportionment thereof to intrastate business and interstate business nor between local freight traffic and local passenger traffic nor to the particular traffic; where, though it is alleged that the known ioss resulting from the order will be a specified amount, no facts are stated to show how the result will be reached; and where, though It is stated that the complaining road’s principal business between the points affected consists of interstate commerce and (he road will he compelled to lower iis interstate rales, it is not shown what part of the predicted ioss will be on the traffic affected as distinguished from the general body of traffic.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 19, 20; Dec. Dig. § 18.*]

5. Pleading (§ 8*1 — Conclusions.

A bill is insufficient to establish invalidity of state-made freight rates as constituting an interference with interstate commerce where it consists largely of general averments as to the prospective effect of the rates without stating concrete facts from which such effect can logically or naturally result.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 12-28%; Dec. Dig. § 8.*]

6. Commerce (§ 13*) — Intrastate Commerce. A state can regulate purely local or state commerce.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. § 7; Dec. Dig. ' | 13.*]

7. Commerce (§ 48*) — State Regulations — Interference with Interstate Commerce.

A state regulation of Intrastate commerce is not invalidated through an indirect or incidental interference with interstate commerce.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. §§ 36-44; Dec. Dig. § 48.*]

8. Carriers (§ 13*) — Freight—Discrimination—Conformity to State-Made Rates.

Reduction of interstate freight rates to conform to valid state-made rates does not constitute an unlawful discrimination against the interstate traffic.

[Ed. Note. — For. other cases, see Carriers, Dec. Dig. § 13.*

What constitutes an unlawful preference or discrimination by a carrier under interstate commerce regulations, see note to Gamble-Robinson Commission Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 94 C. Q. A. .230.]

9. Constitutional Law (§ 242*) — Equal Protection of the Law — Railroad Freight Rates.

That freight rates between two points were reduced by a -state commission as to complainant, but not as to a competing railroad, does not show a denial of equal protection of the laws as to complainant, though there is an identity of distance and similarity of service between the points, in the absence of a showing of the respective investments of the competing lines.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 691; Dee. Dig. § 242.*]

10. Constitutional Law (§ 242*) — Equal Protection of the Law — Railroad Freight Rates. . ■

Mere failure of a state railroad commission .to reduce freight rates as to competing lines at the same time does not constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws as to the road whose rates are first reduced.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 69.1; Dec. Dig. § 242.*]

11. Constitutional Law (§ 242*) — Equal Protection of the Law — Railroad Freight Rates.

Reduction of freight rates by a state railroad commission cannot be deemed a denial of equal protection of the laws because rates on a competing line are not reduced, unless the rates as reduced are unrea- ' sonable and confiscatory.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Gent. Dig. § 691; Dec. Dig. § 242.*]