This is a suit by appellant for sub-rogation to the rights of one S. J. Rich, a prior mortgagee of certain real property, for a revival of the mortgage, for decree against the Crystal Springs Investment Company, and for a foreclosure of the revived mortgage and sale of the mortgaged premises, the proceeds to be applied upon such decree.

The undisputed facts upon which the suit is based are these: On the 8th day of July, 1907, one Thomas G. Clegg and wife executed their mortgage to Rich upon certain lands of which Clegg was the owner, consisting of 331 acres, more or less, to secure the payment of their promissory note of $1,400 given at the same time. Before September 25, 1908, Clegg and wife sold and conveyed the property covered by the mortgage to the Crystal Springs Investment Company, Limited, and on that date the Investment Company executed a mortgage back to Clegg to secure the payment of $2,080, the same being subject to the Rich mortgage. On October 26, 1908, Clegg sold and assigned his mortgage against the Investment Company to the Brown-Hart Company, Limited, and on February 23, 1909, he sold and assigned all remaining and existing right in said mortgage to the defendant T. H. Christy. Christy was the cashier of the First National Bank of Blackfoot, and in reality the latter assignment was for the Use -and benefit of the bank. Later, to wit, on April 20, 1910, the Brown-Hart Company assigned all its right and interest in the mortgage to Christy. The Rich mortgage having been foreclosed, the real property covered by it was on June 30, 1908, sold at sheriff’s sale, and Rich himself became the purchaser. This entitled him to a deed at the end of one year from that date; that being the statutory time for redemption under foreclosure sale in Idaho. The Investment Company becoming insolvent, the defendant W. J. D’Arcy was appointed receiver, and on June-28, 1909, the receiver petitioned the District Court of the state of Idaho, in and for Bingham county, being the-court by which he was appointed receiver, for authority to borrow *481 $2,500 with which to redeem the property from sale under the Rich mortgage. In pursuance of such petition, the court granted the order prayed for, authorizing and directing the receiver to borrow such sum as might be deemed necessary to redeem the said property from sale, not to exceed $2,500, and to execute a mortgage upon the property as security for the payment of such loan as might be obtained. These facts having been alleged, it is further set forth in the complaint as follows:

Tt was further proven at the trial that the complainant on June 30, 1909, advanced to the receiver the sum of $2,012.76, which sum was used by the receiver in payment to the sheriff of the Rich decree of foreclosure; that the property decreed to be sold, and which was sold by the sheriff, was thereby redeemed from the sheriff’s sale to Rich, and the lien of the decree discharged; also, that the receiver has not executed the mortgage to complainant to secure the repayment of the money so advanced by the latter, although he stands.ready to do so at any time the complainant is ready to accept the same. The claim for said sum so advanced has been allowed by the receiver against the estate of the Investment Company, but the receiver was unable to pay the same for lack of funds. Christy has also instituted suit to foreclose the mortgage executed to Clegg; it being the second mortgage on the premises. The complainant further admits upon the witness stand that he was solicited neither by Christy, his predecessors, the stockholders of the Investment Company; nor subsequent lien claimants of the premises covered by the mortgage to advance the money in ques *482 tion, and that he went too far in his allegations in the complaint to the effect that" he was so solicited by such parties.

This -leaves but one question, and that a question of fact to be determined under the evidence, which is whether the receiver contracted andl agreed with the complainant that the repayment of the money loaned the receiver, namely, the $2,012.76, should be secured by a first mortgage upon the land, and whether Christy and his predecessors in interest agreed with complainant that his loan should take precedence over all other liens. Concerning this matter the complainant testifies as follows:

Complainant’s conversation with these parties was had the day before the time for redemption of the landl from sheriff’s sale expired. It further appears that the conversation was had with Hart, instead of Brown. On complainant’s arrival at Ogden, he arranged with a bank there for the money, and it was arranged, through telephone, that the Blackfoot State Bank should pay the money to D’Arcy with which to redeem the land from sale. D’Arcy accordingly made the redemption. On cross-examination complainant testifies, as interrogated :

As to his relations with D’Arcy, witness continues:

Upon the other hand, Christy testifies, in effect, that he never had such a conversation with complainant as the latter testifies to; that he could not have had it, as he was away from Blackfoot at the time, attending the fair at Seattle, and did not return until July 3d. He further says that the redemption of the mortgage or the land from sale took place while he was at Seattle, and that he talked the matter over with complainant after that, but refused to subordinate his mortgage, then held by the bank, to complainant’s claim for the money advanced for the purpose of the redemption. Mr. Hart testifies that complainant came and asked in regard to the release of the mortgage and taking a new mortgage in second place. He says:

It is not clear whether this conversation was before or after the redemption. Mr. D’Arcy is positive that he never had any understanding or agreement with the complainant to give him a first mortgage.

Now, upon this testimony, the complainant himself shows that no final agreement was ever entered into between himself and Christy or the Brown-Hart Company, whereby he should have a prior mortgage for the money advanced for the redemption. According to his story, there was some talk about the matter with both Christy and Hart, representing Brown-Hart Company, but the minds of the parties never fully met, and the agreement was not consummated. On the other hand, Christy denies that he ever had such a conversation with the complainant as complainant relates; and Hart says, while there was some talk upon the subject, he (Hart) told complainant that he could give him no answer until he saw his attorney, and that he did not talk with complainant about the matter afterwards. D’Arcy is positive there never was any such agreement with him. So that, upon the whole, there can be no question that complainant has wholly failed to sustain his contention, and must therefore fail in the controversy.

It would seem there was a strong inducement for complainant doing as he did in advancing the money with which to make the redemption. He held a large block of stock in the Investment Company, amounting *484 on its face value to $12,000. The redemption would, of course, inure to the benefit of the Investment Company, and through his holding such stock to himself. He displayed great anxiety to prevent the sale from passing beyond the power of redemption, in which event the land would be lost, entirely to the Investment Company; and, while perhaps he did have some conversation with Christy andl Hart about the redemption and the propriety of his taking a first lien, yet he took things for granted looking toward such an agreement that never reached the stage of a final meeting of minds upon the subject, or any consummation of the supposed agreement.

The decree of the Circuit Court will be affirmed; and it is so ordered.