Schmidt

The appellee shipped as steward, at the wages of $100 a month, on board the steamship City of Sydney, the *514 home port of which was New York, under shipping articles of date July 24, 1913, signed on behalf of the respective parties, then “bound from the port of San Francisco to Ancon, Canal Zone, and such other ports and places in any part of the world as the master may direct, and back to the final port of discharge in San Francisco, the United States, for a term of time not exceeding six calendar months.” Among the terms specified in the articles were the following:

The case shows that the ship left San Francisco on the 24th of July, 1913, for Balboa, returning to San Francisco on the 23d day of the following September, and that on the next day, September 24th, the appellee received from the shipping commissioner all of his wages for that round trip — the ship then being tied up at the wharf discharging her cargo. What the appellee did during that time, and what is referred to by the trial judge and by counsel as the custom then prevailing at the port of San Francisco, is thus stated by the appellee in his testimony, of which we find no contradiction in the other…

(dissenting). I am unable to concur in that part of the opinion in which it is held that the lower court should now enlarge the original decree by including therein the statutory penalty for the time which has elapsed since the decree was entered. I fail to see any substantial reason for concluding that the plaintiff’s cause of action was not merged in and swallowed up by the decree, as is the general rule. United States v. Price, 50 U. S. (9 How.) 83, 93 , 13 D. Ed. 56. _

_ As to the severity of the penalty, there is, of course, no thought of suggesting that a court can properly decline to enforce a statute because it may seem to be unnecessarily harsh. But the question being, what is^the meaning of the statute, what penalty Congress really intended to impose, it is deemed proper to consider the effect of the law in practical operation, for if, under one of two possible constructions it will operate with extreme and unnecessary severity, and under the other it will operate reasonably and yet accomplish the purpose for which it was- enacted, other considerations being equal, I conceive it to be the duty of the court to adopt the latter meaning. What will be the result of…