J. Homer Fritch, Inc. v. United States

(after stating the facts as above). Each party to the action claims that its respective contention is sustained by tire language of the telegram of September 12, 1911:

The defendant claims that it distinctly called for extension of the option to purchase and for nothing else. The plaintiffs claim it meant extension of both the charter party and the option to purchase, because the charter party included the option to purchase, and there had been an understanding that all moneys paid on the charter, less cost of operation, should be credited on the purchase price of the vessel, and that this meaning is made certain by the words “otherwise charter to terminate as provided therein,” which words, it is said, indicate that if the option were extended, the charter was not to terminate, and that the whole dispatch means this:

But counsel for the defendant say that the meaning of the word “otherwise” as used in the telegram is “in other respects,” and that the dispatch means:

If that was the message intended to be conveyed, the word “otherwise” was unfortunately chosen. That meaning, it seems to us, is not suggested by the other words of the telegram, and is not the natural meaning.…